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ABSTRACT 
 
Although the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program has grown into 
the largest subsidized housing program in the U.S., we have limited understanding about 
the performance of the program. This study explores the associations between LIHTC 
subsidized households and uneven geography of opportunities in the cities of Charlotte, 
North Carolina, and Cleveland, Ohio, to identify socioeconomic inequalities for 
subsidized households using a variety of methods. First, the dissertation employs the 
simple bivariate analysis, in terms of a location quotient (LQ), to examine the empirical 
evidence on inequitable opportunities. Based on the results of location quotients, this 
study suggests that current patterns of LIHTC developments may perpetuate inequitable 
opportunities for subsidized households through pushing them into the vicious circle of 
residential segregation and inequality.  
This paper also explores impacts of the LIHTC program on nearby property 
values and neighborhood stability to contextualize the economic and neighborhood 
impacts of the program. To be more specific, this dissertation examined housing prices 
and housing turnover before and after the introduction of LIHTC developments into the 
neighborhood, based on housing sales data from 1996 to 2007. This data is merged with 
parcel-level data from Mecklenburg and Cuyahoga County. The study estimates an 
AITS-DID (Adjusted Interrupted Time Series-Difference in Differences) and an 
extended Cox hazard model with the difference-in-differences specification to clarify the 
direction of causality in the impacts of LIHTC developments. This research also 
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explores impacts on neighboring housing prices and neighborhood stability from LIHTC 
developments citywide and in neighborhoods stratified by income.  
When it comes to estimating the relationships between the developments of 
LIHTC subsidized housing and surrounding housing prices, this study found that 
impacts of LIHTC developments varied across different housing market conditions (i.e., 
a “hot” and a “cold” market). The LIHTC developments had a negative impact on 
nearby property values in Charlotte while they had a positive impact in Cleveland. These 
results suggest that the LIHTC program may be implemented to revitalize or stimulate 
deteriorated areas, especially in depressed housing market conditions. In terms of 
examining the associations between the LIHTC developments and neighborhood 
stability, this study found significant negative impacts on stability of LIHTC 
developments in both cities, and the probability of housing turnover was significantly 
higher when LIHTC units were developed within the immediate neighborhood of each 
property. However, for the high-income submarket, there were strong spillover effects in 
Charlotte while there were no significant impacts in Cleveland. These results suggest 
that the vulnerability of neighborhood stability due to LIHTC development needs to be 
considered when implementing a successful subsidized housing program. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Community opposition to subsidized housing developments has hindered the 
implementation of subsidized housing programs for nearly a century. These conflicts 
have been rooted in a negative perception of households receiving subsidies, which is 
often tied to attitudes toward tenant characteristics such as ethnicity and poverty status 
(Freeman & Botein, 2002). These negative attitudes toward subsidized residents have 
had the effect of excluding low-income families from “decent” neighborhoods. The core 
issue of “not in my backyard” (NIMBY) attitudes is based on fears of neighborhood 
deterioration, especially in terms of higher crime rates and the depreciation of nearby 
property values, due to the influx of “undesirable” households. Therefore, NIMBY 
attitudes have posed a significant barrier for the placement of subsidized housing, which 
has been a longstanding concern for policy makers (Freeman & Botein, 2002; Galster, 
Tatian, & Smith, 1999; Santiago, Galster, & Tatian, 2001). 
Many studies suggested a significant lack of affordable housing across the 
country. According to Harvard University’s Joint Center for Housing Studies, around 
one-third of total households spend nearly 30 percent of their income for housing and 
around half of the lowest-income households expend at least 50 percent of income for 
housing (University, 2004). Further, this situation, especially in terms of the burden for 
housing costs, has become worse nationwide for both homeowners and renters (Lee, 
2008). As for homeowners, between 1990 and 2000, the percent of homeowners paying 
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at least 50 percent or more of their income for housing increased by 50 percent across 
the country, and this growth rate is over two times faster than that of overall 
homeowners (Simmons, 2005). Also, the distribution of low-income rental units shifted 
noticeably to higher priced units during the 1980s and 1990s, and the incomes of low-
income renters have declined as rents have continued to rise since 2000 (Hockett, 
McElwee, Pelletiere, & Schwartz, 2005). 
Why do neighborhoods vehemently oppose subsidized housing developments in 
spite of a most urgent situation, which is to resolve the significant lack of affordable 
housing? There are plenty of studies that have tried to explore the effect of subsidized 
housing policy by asking “Why Not In My Backyard?” NIMBY attitudes explicitly stem 
from specific concerns that subsidized housing developments will threaten the personal 
security of residents, cause deterioration in the quality of neighborhoods, and depreciate 
property values (Dear, 1992). Concerns about increasing crime in neighborhoods come 
from the characteristics of subsidized households, which are minorities and low-income 
families. The crime rates might be associated with poverty, income, and race. According 
to the theory of differential opportunity, uneven distributions of legitimate and 
illegitimate opportunities among classes cause unequal exposure to delinquency and 
criminality (Blau & Blau, 1982). The degree of delinquency and criminality varies 
according to the different social structures of communities (Blau & Blau, 1982). 
Specifically, three structural factors, low economic status, ethnic heterogeneity, and 
residential mobility, as described by Shaw and McKay (1969), result in the deterioration 
of communities, which lead to delinquency and criminality (Sampson & Wilson, 1995). 
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In this context, NIMBY attitudes toward subsidized households might be evident. 
Neighbors are also concerned about the decline of neighborhood quality due to the 
placement of subsidized housing developments (Dear, 1992; Kean & Ashley, 1991). The 
fears of the deterioration of the physical appearance of neighborhoods due to graffiti and 
garbage lead to an NIMBY sentiment (Dear, 1992; Kean & Ashley, 1991). Further, 
neighbors are reluctant to be subject to increased traffic, less parking availability, and 
damaged public spaces (Dear, 1992; Kean & Ashley, 1991). However, most of all, the 
core issues of NIMBY attitudes are fears of depreciation of property values due to the 
influx of undesirables into neighborhoods (Dear, 1992; Kean & Ashley, 1991; Nguyen, 
2005; Pendall, 1999). Because housing prices are determined by the socioeconomic and 
environmental characteristics of neighborhoods, the concerns about personal security 
and neighborhood amenities have a tendency to arouse fears about depreciation of 
property values. In other words, NIMBY attitudes stem from a fear of a decline in 
housing prices that reflects other concerns such as personal security and neighborhood 
amenities, and ultimately represent the explicit reason of opposition to subsidized 
housing programs. Thus, the fears of neighbors have been a significant barrier to the 
implementation of subsidized housing in order to protect property values in desirable 
neighborhoods.  
The NIMBY attitude has fueled debate and research on the external effects of 
subsidized housing developments on neighborhoods for several decades. Many previous 
studies have examined the impacts of subsidized housing programs on neighborhood 
property values to assess the effects of NIMBY attitudes. However, these findings have 
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been inconsistent. Some have found a negative impact of subsidized housing programs 
on nearby property values, while others have found a positive impact, or even no impact. 
In addition, there are few studies that focus on the relationship between subsidized 
housing programs and neighborhood stability, especially in terms of neighborhood 
housing turnover, as a proxy for attitudes toward subsidized households. The 
discrepancies of tenant characteristics among subsidized and non-subsidized housing 
may have a destabilizing effect on neighborhoods, causing existing residents to feel 
uncomfortable and desire to move. Thus, exploring the association between subsidized 
housing and neighborhood housing turnover would provide a better understanding of the 
impacts of subsidized housing developments on neighborhoods. Further, there are no 
studies to date examining housing turnover at the individual parcel level while taking 
into account the spatial characteristics of properties before and after the implementation 
of subsidized housing developments. This study addresses these gaps by examining how 
the spatial distribution of subsidized housing developments influences nearby property 
values and housing turnover. This research addresses a simple question: Does the Low 
Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) subsidized housing development significantly 
impact 1) surrounding housing prices and 2) neighborhood stability in terms of housing 
duration? 
The explicit reasons for opposition to subsidized housing programs, involving 
concerns about depreciation of property values, have been described above. However, 
the implicit cause of NIMBY attitudes must not be overlooked. Sharp conflicts between 
subsidized households and their neighbors have been rooted in a negative perception of 
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subsidized households, which fundamentally stems from the attitudes toward tenant 
characteristics such as ethnicity, poverty, and income level (Freeman & Botein, 2002). 
In other words, because subsidized housing is generally occupied by subsidized tenants 
who have different characteristics from non-subsidized communities in terms of 
sociodemographic characteristics, non-subsidized tenants have a tendency to resist the 
inflow of subsidized tenants. According to the study by Freeman and Botein (2002), 
people have a negative perception of the nondeserving poor, which refers to able-bodied 
nonelderly tenants in subsidized housing. The nondeserving poor is deemed as the 
symbol of idleness and the main culprit of high crime (Katz, 1993). This perception 
causes people to regard subsidized households as undesirable neighbors. Racial 
prejudice of nonwhites such as African-Americans and Latinos is another reason for 
resisting subsidized households because nonwhites are generally overrepresented in 
subsidized housing (Casey, 1992). The differences in education level would also be a 
factor that causes opposition. Well-educated people who live in desirable neighborhoods 
have a tendency to have reached a higher socioeconomic status (Freeman & Botein, 
2002). The higher educational level of parents who have a higher socioeconomic status 
also tends to affect the educational attainments and the future socioeconomic status of 
their children (Galster & Killen, 1995). Thus, living in these sorts of desirable 
neighborhoods implies that members of the communities could maintain and bequeath 
their socioeconomic status. Therefore, the inflow of low-income neighbors may be an 
interruption in the enhancing of their socioeconomic status for the residents of desirable 
neighborhoods (Freeman & Botein, 2002). 
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One of the critical problems of the NIMBY attitudes is that this syndrome is 
easily translated into political action (Kean & Ashley, 1991). In other words, the 
NIMBY opposition translates local and national planning policies into barriers to 
housing programs for low-income families. For instance, massive public protests against 
the Moving to Opportunity program in Baltimore, Maryland showed that the first wave 
of participation in the national demonstration program was discontinued (Galster, 2003). 
The most destructive consequence of NIMBY opposition is to cause spatial disparities of 
subsidized housing developments. According to the political economy of race 
perspective, the urban spatial patterns and forms are shaped by both racism and the 
choices determined by local elites (Rohe & Freeman, 2001). In this context, the location 
of subsidized housing developments might be determined by NIMBY attitudes related to 
racism and the preference of local elites. Because subsidized households are regarded as 
undesirable neighbors due to their ethnicity and poverty, the NIMBY opposition of local 
elites may push subsidized housing into the undesirable and the least resistant 
neighborhoods (Rohe & Freeman, 2001).  
In conjunction with exploring the impacts of subsidized housing developments, 
as a proxy for attitudes toward subsidized households, this study also addresses why the 
NIMBY attitude matters. The spatial disparities of subsidized housing due to NIMBY 
opposition ultimately cause barriers to the entry of subsidized households in desirable 
neighborhoods. This implies that subsidized households are isolated from the 
mainstream of social and economic opportunities for upward mobility. The objective of 
the national housing policy is to provide affordable housing, decent homes, and a 
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suitable environment for low-income families. The significance of this for low-income 
families cannot be overemphasized. The report of the Bipartisan Millennial Housing 
Commission (2002) underscores this significance: “Securing access to decent, affordable 
housing is fundamental to the American Dream. All Americans want to live in good-
quality homes they can afford without sacrificing other basic needs. All Americans want 
to live in safe communities with ready access to job opportunities, good schools, and 
amenities. All parents want their children to grow up with positive role models and peer 
influences nearby. And the overwhelming majority of Americans want to purchase a 
home as a way to build wealth. The importance of helping more Americans satisfy these 
objectives cannot be overstated” (Bipartisan Millennial Housing Commission, 2002). 
However, because subsidized households are separated from opportunities for social 
needs to be met and access to resources due to the NIMBY attitudes, doubt can be cast 
on the effectiveness of housing policies for low-income families. Hence, by looking at 
the residential segregation and multidimensional social inequality based on previous 
literature, this study explores the associations between NIMBY opposition to subsidized 
housing programs and social inequalities.  
 
1.1 Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses 
The underlying research questions for this study consist of three parts. Does the 
LIHTC subsidized housing development significantly impact 1) surrounding housing 
prices and 2) neighborhood stability in terms of housing duration? In addition, 3) do 
NIMBY attitudes about subsidized households cause social inequalities for those 
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households? While exploring the relationships between NIMBY opposition to subsidized 
housing developments and social inequalities highly relies on theoretical contexts, 
investigating the impacts of subsidized housing developments is comprised of empirical 
analysis in this study (See Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1. Research Questions 
 
Estimating the impacts of subsidized housing is a complex process because there 
are several overarching factors in a subsidized housing development that could affect 
surrounding property values and housing turnover. The majority of prior studies failed to 
consider the important fact that the impacts of subsidized housing may vary according to 
the type of housing programs, the sociodemographic characteristics of neighborhoods, 
and the size of the subsidized housing developments. Also, the methodologies of 
previous studies do not take into account the direction of causality on the impacts of 
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subsidized housing developments. Thus, this research suggests a conceptual model that 
offers a comprehensive view in order to overcome the limitations of prior studies (See 
Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 2. Conceptual Model for Empirical Analyses 
 
The main features of this conceptual model—which also lead to testable research 
hypotheses—can be described as follows: 
 Sales prices (or housing turnover ratios) for a single-family house will 
depreciate (or increase) when the subsidized housing is newly developed 
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within the neighborhood of a single-family house; 
 Sales prices (or housing turnover ratios) for a single-family house will 
depreciate (or increase) when the size of subsidized housing is larger; 
 Subsidized housing developments will exert a negative impact in high- and 
middle-income neighborhoods, while subsidized housing will exert a positive 
impact in low-income neighborhoods; 
 Subsidized housing developments will exert a negative impact in a hot 
housing market, while subsidized housing will exert a positive impact in a 
cold housing market. 
 
Specifically, this research examines the impacts of subsidized housing 
developments on nearby property values and housing turnovers in two cities during a 
period prior to the housing market crisis: Charlotte, North Carolina, and Cleveland, Ohio. 
Charlotte, a growing Sunbelt city, is representative of a “hot” housing market while 
Cleveland, a declining Rust Belt city, can be characterized as a “cold” market. By 
comparing neighboring property values and housing turnover in these two cities, this 
paper can assess whether the impact of subsidized housing developments varies between 
“hot” and “cold” markets. This research also compares the impacts of subsidized 
housing across different housing submarkets based on family income to determine 
whether impacts vary across low, middle, and high income neighborhoods. By 
identifying the associations among subsidized housing developments, property values, 
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and housing duration in neighborhoods varying by socioeconomic strata, this study will 
provide insights into the impact of subsidized housing on neighborhoods.  
This research employs the AITS-DID (Adjusted Interrupted Time Series-
Difference in Differences) model to examine the impact of subsidized housing programs 
on nearby property values. The fundamental concept of the AITS-DID model continues 
to be parallel to those of the hedonic price model (Koschinsky, 2009). However, to 
identify the direction of causality on the impacts of subsidized housing developments, 
the AITS-DID model estimates the levels and trends in coefficients in two kinds of 
neighborhoods during two periods (Galster, 2004).  
In addition, this study uses the extended Cox hazard model, which is a partial 
likelihood estimation method, to explore the impact of subsidized housing programs on 
neighborhood housing turnover. Housing sales are regarded as the hazard occurrence, 
and the housing duration is specified with the duration of each property’s transaction 
measured in days between the first sale and the next sale during the research period (Kim 
& Horner, 2003). The hazard model controls for both of these factors simultaneously. 
This research will also clarify the direction of causality to capture the differentials in 
levels of pre- and post-neighborhood stability associated with subsidized housing 
developments by comparing control and impact sales (Galster, Tatian, & Smith, 1999; 
Koschinsky, 2009; Schwartz, Ellen, Voicu, & Schill, 2006).  
Finally, for each city, both the AITS-DID and extended Cox hazard models are 
estimated separately for three types of neighborhoods stratified by family income to test 
whether impacts of subsidized housing vary based on income heterogeneity. In the 
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sections that follow, the features of this conceptual model are specifically described 
along with the literature (Chapter III) that supports the conceptualization. 
 
1.2 Dissertation Outline 
This paper is organized as follows: Chapter I provides background information 
on the research topics and elaborates on the research questions and hypotheses under 
examination for the dissertation.  
Chapter II focuses on the role of NIMBY attitudes for subsidized households. To 
be more specific, this chapter examines the multidimensional relationships between 
social forces and social inequality. In addition, compared to previous studies, this 
chapter investigates the links among social forces such as urban sprawl, residential 
segregation, poverty concentration, and multidimensional social inequality, especially by 
looking at the big picture of these inner mechanisms.  
Chapter III examines the literature on the impacts of subsidized housing 
developments on neighborhoods.  This literature review traces the development of 
spillover effects models, looks at the gap in previous methodologies, and assesses 
methodological reasons that support the value of employed models in this study. In 
addition, by looking at the theoretical perspective of the impacts of subsidized housing 
programs, this chapter determines several overarching factors in a subsidized housing 
development that could affect neighborhoods.  
Chapter IV describes study areas and data sources. This chapter characterizes 
two contrasting research areas (Charlotte and Cleveland) and describes the sales, 
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property, LIHTC developments, location, and neighborhood data that are estimated with 
the models used in the study.  
Chapter V outlines the research methodologies employed in this study. First, a 
simple bivariate analysis (location quotient) is described to examine the associations 
between the spatial location of subsidized housing and social inequalities. Second, the 
AITS-DID model exploring the relationships between subsidized housing developments 
and nearby property values is discussed in this chapter. Last, the extended Cox hazard 
model with the difference-in-differences specification is described to examine the 
relationship between subsidized housing developments and neighborhood stability.  
Chapter VI interprets the results of three analyses. First, this chapter interprets 
the results of bivariate analysis exploring the associations between subsidized 
households and uneven geography of opportunities by identifying the sociodemographic 
characteristics of neighborhoods. Second, the results of the AITS-DID analyses are 
interpreted to estimate the impact of subsidized housing developments on neighboring 
housing prices in the two cities. Last, the results of the extended Cox hazard analyses are 
also reported to identify the impact of subsidized housing projects on neighborhood 
stability.  
The final chapter discusses the important findings of the study and provides 
broad implications of the conclusions for subsidized housing developments.  
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CHAPTER II  
LITERATURE REVIEW: A VICIOUS CIRCLE OF RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION 
AND INEQUALITY 
 
Why does NIMBY opposition matter for subsidized households? Housing 
developments may perpetuate social inequalities caused by uneven development, or may 
reverse this situation by expanding and distributing housing options for low-income 
families that make it possible to access better social and economic opportunities (Van 
Zandt & Mhatre, 2009). However, current uneven development patterns of subsidized 
housing due to NIMBY opposition may accelerate inequitable opportunities for the least 
advantaged populations by pushing them into socially segregated and poverty 
concentrated neighborhoods. 
Social segregation in the U.S. has ignited a pattern of uneven urban development 
for over half a century. This suburbanization pattern has brought some neighborhoods to 
life and has contributed to the deterioration of others (Van Zandt & Mhatre, 2009). The 
urban sprawl has induced the rich to move into suburbs, called “leaving the cities 
behind,” while the poor remain isolated in blighted central cities (Friedrichs, Galster, & 
Musterd, 2003; Jargowsky, 2002; Van Zandt & Mhatre, 2009; Wilson, 2012). This 
polarization is further accelerated by the forces involved in the “pull” of desirable 
suburban characteristics and the “push” of undesirable inner urban area characteristics 
(Jargowsky, 2002; Orfield, 1997). Specifically, the interrelated social forces among 
sprawl, poverty concentration, and residential segregation have created pockets of both 
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problems and privilege in terms of inequitable opportunities in education, employment, 
and safety in metropolitan areas (Denton, 2006; Squires & Kubrin, 2005; Van Zandt & 
Mhatre, 2009). Van Zandt and Mhatre (2009) argued that this uneven geography of 
opportunities can be counteracted by expanding housing options and locational 
outcomes for the least advantaged. This argument is based on one significant premise 
that the geography of opportunities is largely influenced by the communities and 
neighborhoods in which people live (Briggs, 2005; Denton, 2006; Squires & Kubrin, 
2005). The place matter is a significant key in order to explain the ecology of the uneven 
geography of opportunities because that where people live is significant for taking 
advantage of various opportunities (Abrams, 1955; Briggs, 2005; Van Zandt & Mhatre, 
2009). For these reasons, the present situation on siting of subsidized households in 
undesirable neighborhoods due to NIMBY attitudes might play a key role in limiting 
them access to better social and economic opportunities. 
When the place is combined with racial and class issues, the situation aggravates 
the inequitable opportunities, especially for the least advantaged. In other words, a 
residential segregation pattern that includes racial and income segregation results in the 
poor being isolated and deprived of opportunities to have their social needs met and 
access to resources. Residential segregation by race and income have been widely 
studied and the research has arrived at somewhat common results. Residential 
segregation of minorities, especially in the perspective of racial and income segregation, 
is the main culprit in creating a barrier in social opportunities and accelerating social 
isolation. Most of all, racial segregation, especially for African Americans, is the most 
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integral part of residential segregation, and has exacerbated the concentration of poverty 
(Briggs, 2005; Denton, 2006; Massey & Denton, 1988; Massey & Denton, 1989; Massey 
& Eggers, 1990). In this context, racial discrimination in the housing market has also 
determined the levels and trends of residential segregation, and ultimately racial 
discrimination has deprived minorities of housing opportunities (Galster, 1987). Income 
segregation is another significant factor in residential segregation. Residential 
segregation by income has expanded class divisions, and limits access to social resources 
(Briggs, 2005; Squires & Kubrin, 2005). 
Taken together, several prior studies found that residential segregation by race 
and income causes spatial distribution of the disadvantaged, which means inequitable 
access to opportunities in terms of social needs and resources (Briggs, 2005; Squires & 
Kubrin, 2005). However, many previous studies separately focused on the link between 
residential segregation and inequitable opportunities in terms of employment, education, 
or safety. These studies tended to focus on particular perspectives of the relationship 
between segregation and opportunity. There are no studies that shed light on the links 
among social forces such as urban sprawl, residential segregation, poverty concentration, 
and multidimensional social inequality, especially by looking at the big picture of these 
inner mechanisms. Thus, in this chapter, this study takes into account the issue of urban 
inequality for subsidized households while investigating the multidimensional 
relationships of sprawl, residential segregation, concentrated poverty and various aspects 
of social and economic opportunities. This review explores how subsidized households 
may suffer from limited access to social opportunities. 
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2.1 Social Equity and Opportunities 
Urban planners face an ethical conundrum when it comes to the expansion of 
affordable housing choices. Affluent citizens often oppose the spread of affordable 
housing within their communities – expressed through NIMBY behavior, while lower-
income residents (who may or may not reside within the jurisdiction) clamor for better 
housing options and locational outcomes. The decision making of urban planners and 
policy makers to provide affordable housing options is related to this ethical concern. A 
political decision according to the socioeconomic context of planning determines 
whether or not some neighborhoods have benefits (Beatley, 1984). In this context, the 
distribution of benefits (how and to whom) is a key to answer the ethical questions of 
planners. Thus, before beginning the study on the multidimensional mechanisms of 
social segregation and fair opportunities, it is significant first to define social equity.   
The literal meaning of equity is fairness, and the term of fairness is associated 
with the distributive perspective in society (Burton, 2000). Even though there are several 
interpretations of social equity or social justice, Rawls’ theory of justice pinpoints the 
definition of social equity, especially in terms of distribution of benefits. Rawls (1971) 
offered the following interpretation on distributive justice: “All social primary goods – 
liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect – are to be 
distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the 
advantage of the least favored (Rawls, 1999, p. 303).” 
According to Rawls’ difference principle, inequalities can only be permitted 
when distribution of primary goods is to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged. The 
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greatest for the least advantaged also has to be subject to conditions of two other 
principles, which are equal liberty and fair equality of opportunity. In this context, social 
equity is the process of reducing the gap of primary goods between the advantaged and 
the disadvantaged, especially when permitting positive discrimination in favor of 
disadvantaged groups (Burton, 2003). Hence, the role of planners and policy makers to 
achieve the objective of the national housing policy may be defined as trying to reduce 
the gap between the advantaged and the disadvantaged.  
We need to clarify the terms disadvantaged groups and primary goods in order to 
provide an interpretation of social equity. First, according to Rawls’ interpretation, social 
primary goods include liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the basis of self-
respect. This implies that discrepancies in opportunity, income, and wealth could be 
reasonable proxies to grasp the spatial distribution of the disadvantaged (Beatley, 1984). 
Among those social primary goods, opportunity is the most significant factor to account 
for social equity because barriers to social and economic opportunities impede upward 
mobility of the least advantaged groups, especially in income and wealth (Massey, 2004). 
Uneven opportunities for the least advantaged groups reinforce disparity in wealth 
accumulation. For instance, lack of access to opportunities for a quality education, high-
paying jobs, and safety from crime limits the opportunities for wealth accumulation. In 
reverse, the disparity in wealth may cause exposure to poor education quality, 
inadequate access to jobs, and high crime rates, especially in terms of the spatial location 
of the least advantaged groups. Restriction of social and economic opportunities 
perpetuates social stratification while impeding upward mobility (Massey, 2004). Hence, 
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looking at opportunities for upward mobility would be the most significant aspect for 
explaining social equity. Second, the distinction between the advantaged and the 
disadvantaged would be based on the possession of primary goods (Burton, 2003). From 
the perspective of the possession of primary goods, especially in terms of social and 
economic opportunities, this research defines the least advantaged groups as low-income 
families and/or minorities. In addition, it is axiomatic that subsidized households are also 
included to the least advantaged populations regarding their possession of primary goods.  
 
2.2 Urban Sprawl and Segregation 
A pattern of uneven urban development, that is urban sprawl, is not the only 
cause leading to social segregation, but it is a significant factor in explaining aspects of 
segregation. Denton (2006) suggested that the pattern of urban sprawl is one of the major 
causes of segregation along with other factors including housing discrimination, income 
differences, and residential preferences. This suburbanization pattern has brought some 
neighborhoods to life but has caused deterioration in others (Van Zandt & Mhatre, 2009). 
According to the definition of urban sprawl expounded by Squires (2002), urban sprawl 
reflects an “exclusionary pattern” in deteriorated cities (Jargowsky, 2002). The notoriety 
of this suburbanization pattern was accelerated by segregation by race and income. 
Regional development patterns, which are urban sprawl, restrict the poor and minorities, 
especially African Americans, from moving into desirable areas. In terms of 
metropolitan areas, most African Americans are isolated in the center cities (Denton, 
2006). Although some African Americans were suburbanized in 2000, they were also 
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distributed in undesirable neighborhoods and are segregated from majorities such as 
whites (Denton, 2006). This spatial pattern, segregation by race, remained high in both 
the 1990s and 2000s, and is a pronounced pattern in the Rust Belt cities of the Northeast 
and Midwest (Briggs, 2005; Massey, 2004). Even though some researchers suggested 
racial segregation has declined over the past century, these results are limited to certain 
small sunbelt areas with a small population of African Americans (Massey, 2004; 
Squires & Kubrin, 2005). Income segregation has also increased since 1970 (Abramson, 
Tobin, & VanderGoot, 1995; Fischer, 2003; Massey, Gross, & Eggers, 1991). Because 
the income differences are continuing parallel to the role of race, the perpetuation of 
income segregation along with racial segregation is not surprising. However, there is 
considerable agreement among the priori studies that the role of race overwhelms those 
of class in order to interpret social segregation (Briggs, 2005; Denton, 2006; Fainstein, 
1993; Goldsmith, 2000; Massey & Eggers, 1990). Although the role of income class is a 
significant factor for explaining spatial disparities, due to the fact that differences in 
housing prices between center cities and suburbs, spatial patterns among races in the 
same class show that African Americans are highly segregated compared to other races 
(Denton, 2006). For example, the average African Americans earning more than $60,000 
per a year are more segregated than the average whites earning less than $30,000 (Briggs, 
2005; Logan, Oakley, & Stowell, 2003). Also, when we look at the long-term patterns of 
poor neighborhoods where whites and African Americans live, the role of race is still a 
more crucial factor than those of income. Specifically, between 1979 and 1990, 57 
percent of (female-headed) African American families with an income below the poverty 
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line spent at least half of a ten-year span in poor neighborhoods compared to less than 30 
percent of (female-headed) white families (Briggs, 2005). Furthermore, though some 
African Americans lived in non-poor neighborhoods at some time, they fell back into 
poor neighborhoods in repeated cycles over time; African Americans, regardless of the 
role of income, suffer from the long-term pattern of “recurrence” (Briggs, 2005). This 
implies that the role of race is the strongest factor accounting for social segregation. 
Urban sprawl, specifically spatial disparities, exacerbates disparity in 
opportunities for the least advantaged groups by reinforcing racial and income 
segregation. However, the last key feature in urban sprawl to explain the uneven 
geography of opportunities is the poverty concentration. Squires and Kubrin (2005) 
suggest that urban sprawl, racial segregation, and concentrated poverty are interrelated 
social forces that account for uneven opportunities. Racial segregation, especially for 
African Americans, interacts with income segregation causing and intensifying spatial 
concentrations of poverty. These poverty concentrations are because the minority poor 
are clustered in racially homogenous and dense areas (Massey, 2001; Massey, 2004). 
Interestingly, Massey (2001) suggests a causal relationship between racial segregation 
and concentrated poverty. Specifically, the increase in racial segregation causes a decline 
in income level. Also, inequality is perpetuated and income segregation increases. This 
process results in the immigration of moderate households moving out to more affluent 
areas (Friedrichs, Galster, & Musterd, 2003), so poverty concentration is intensified. In 
this context, the interacting forces among urban sprawl, segregation by race and income, 
and poverty concentration reinforce the uneven geography of opportunities. 
 22 
 
Current patterns of subsidized housing developments have contributed to this 
uneven geography of opportunities. Due to NIMBY opposition to subsidized households, 
large numbers of subsidized housing developments are located in central cities rather 
than in the suburbs. During the 1980s and 1990s, around 80 percent of subsidized 
housing units are sited in central cities (Freeman, 2004). Among those subsidized 
housing developments, a relatively large percent of LIHTC units are penetrating 
suburban areas compared to other subsidized housing units, but still around 60 percent of 
LIHTC units are located in central cities (Freeman, 2004). Freeman (2004) also found 
that severely disproportionate shares of African-American households exist in LIHTC 
neighborhoods compared to all metropolitan neighborhoods. Further, neighborhoods 
where LIHTC units were developed have higher poverty rates, lower median incomes, 
and lower median home values than metropolitan neighborhoods (Freeman, 2004; Rohe 
& Freeman, 2001). This shows that NIMBY attitudes on subsidized households, in 
conjunction with the interacting forces among urban sprawl, segregation by race and 
income, and poverty concentration, may perpetuate the uneven geography of 
opportunities. 
 
2.3 Residential and Housing Segregation 
The place matter is a significant key in order to explain the ecology of an uneven 
geography of opportunities because “location of housing is the centerpiece of 
opportunities” (Carr & Kutty, 2008). Although providing a decent home and suitable 
living environment for every American family is the ultimate objective for a national 
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housing policy, “decent home” may not guarantee a “suitable living environment” when 
fair opportunities are linked to the place matter (Denton, 2006; Massey & Denton, 1993). 
When we speculate about the association between neighborhoods and various 
opportunities, it is axiomatic that neighborhoods determine social and economic 
opportunities for upward mobility (Massey & Denton, 1993). Access to social and 
economic opportunities such as wealth accumulation, good quality schools, jobs, and 
safety from crime depends on the location of housing. The residential mobility, thus, 
continues to depend on the quality of a neighborhood in order to gain better 
opportunities (Massey, 2004). In this context, residential segregation builds barriers to 
various opportunities for upward mobility, especially for the least advantaged 
populations.  
When the place matter in terms of housing location and neighborhoods is 
combined with the racial and class matters, the situation perpetuates the inequitable 
opportunities, especially for minorities. To be more specific, a residential segregation 
pattern that includes racial and income segregation forces the least advantaged groups to 
be isolated and deprived of opportunities to have social needs met and access to 
resources. Historically, it is the role of race and class that restricts equal opportunities 
with respect to wealth accumulation, employment, education, or safety. Most of all, the 
role of race, especially for African Americans, is a more influential factor than that of 
income to account for residential segregation patterns, albeit both race and income are 
mutual and bidirectional in general (Denton, 2006; Fainstein, 1993; Goldsmith, 2000; 
Massey & Eggers, 1990). Even though residential segregation cannot be explained by a 
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single process (Massey & Denton, 1988), we can extract main causes of residential 
segregation from multidimensional social and economic processes. Prior studies share 
common factors that account for residential segregation: urban sprawl, attitudes, and 
discrimination (Denton, 2006; Galster, 1987). First, as mentioned earlier in the section 
on Urban Sprawl and Segregation, urban sprawl causes the rich to move into suburbs 
while leaving the poor isolated in impoverished central cities (Friedrichs, Galster, & 
Musterd, 2003; Jargowsky, 2002; Van Zandt & Mhatre, 2009). A “push-pull” of regional 
polarization shapes both pockets of problems and pockets of privilege, especially in 
terms of inequitable opportunities in education, employment, safety, and exposure to 
crime in metropolitan areas (Denton, 2006; Squires & Kubrin, 2005; Van Zandt & 
Mhatre, 2009). Residential segregation accelerated by urban sprawl pushes poor and 
minorities, especially African Americans, to be unwelcome in desirable areas. Although 
some African Americans were suburbanized in 2000, they were still located in 
undesirable neighborhoods and were segregated from the majority of whites (Denton, 
2006). This means that it is inevitable that poor and minorities are isolated from the 
mainstream of social and economic opportunities.  
Second, anti-Black attitudes exacerbate residential segregation. In general, social 
stigma rooted in a negative perception of minorities causes barriers to the entry of 
African Americans into desirable neighborhoods. This phenomenon shares core 
characteristics of a social disapproval of personal characteristics or beliefs which stem 
from labels; African Americans may cause deterioration of neighborhoods in terms of 
higher crime rates and the depreciation of nearby property values. In addition, social 
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stigma on subsidized households is also associated with these anti-Black (minorities) 
attitudes. As a result, although white attitudes toward African Americans have become 
more favorable over time (Denton, 2006), a deep-rooted stigma results in African 
Americans being excluded from social and economic opportunities by forming 
residential segregation. Further, NIMBY oppositions based on the stigma about 
subsidized households, which is tied to attitudes toward subsidized households’ ethnicity 
and poverty, have also deprived subsidized households of fair opportunities. Last, 
discrimination in the housing market might be a key cause of residential segregation. 
Discrimination in the housing market fundamentally stems from the attitudes toward 
characteristics of prospective residents, especially their race and ethnicity. In this context, 
discrimination in housing is strongly associated with anti-Black attitudes. African 
Americans have experienced difficulties in moving into desirable neighborhoods 
because discriminatory barriers stem from preferences of class and race in the housing 
market (Galster, 1987). Historically, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) closed 
their eyes to the discrimination in housing, especially for African Americans (Denton, 
2006). Solely African-American areas were rampant for over half a century and the 
construction of ghettos was completed by this peculiar atmosphere of society (Denton, 
2006). Although discrimination in the housing market has declined since the 1948 
Supreme Court decision, there is still subtle discrimination in the housing market 
(Denton, 2006). There is also housing discrimination for subsidized households. 
Landlords in desirable neighborhoods would regard Section 8 subsidized tenants as 
undesirable neighbors. Thus, landlords refused to rent to any subsidized tenants or would 
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turn those tenants away for racially discriminatory reasons (Malaspina, 1996). As a 
result, discrimination in housing creates a clearly visible map of residential disparity, 
and this peculiar spatial pattern, that is residential segregation, limits the least 
advantaged access to desirable neighborhoods and various opportunities for upward 
mobility. Deprivations of housing opportunities result in obstacles for social and 
economic opportunities for upward mobility such as education, employment, safety, and 
exposure to crime.  
Some researchers argued that residential segregation, especially by race, has 
decreased over the past century. However, their arguments are based on limited areas 
such as newer and smaller metropolitan cities where a small proportion of African 
Americans reside (Massey, 2004; Squires & Kubrin, 2005). In contrast, residential 
segregation has continued in the Rust Belt cities that include a disproportionate share of 
the African American population (Massey, 2004; Squires & Kubrin, 2005). Prior studies 
could not grasp accurate trends of residential segregation because of the limitations of 
employing the segregation indices. Different researchers used a different segregation 
index, so there are no consistent criteria in order to track trends of residential segregation 
in the U.S (Massey & Denton, 1988). However, Massey and Denton (1988) extracted 
five segregation indices through empirical analysis, and accounted for trends of 
residential segregation including multidimensional aspects, especially with respect to 
evenness, exposure, concentration, centralization, and clustering. They coined the term 
“hypersegregation,” which is when each minority is segregated from other groups in 
terms of the five dimensions. Their results show that African Americans have been 
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hypersegregated from other neighborhoods which have been established in older 
industrial areas of the Northeast and Midwest. This implies that it is still inevitable for 
minorities, especially African Americans, to be isolated from access to social and 
economic opportunities under American Apartheid (Goldsmith, 2000; Massey, 2004; 
Massey & Denton, 1993). 
Further, many studies suggest that the development pattern of subsidized housing 
has contributed to residential segregation (Galster, 1999; Massey & Kanaiaupuni, 1993; 
Rohe & Freeman, 2001). The discriminatory tenanting practices for subsidized housing 
programs have caused segregative site selection where subsidized housing developments 
were sited within undesirable neighborhoods (Bauman, 1987; Galster, 1999). Galster 
(1999) criticized these development patterns of public housing complexes as “a 
disgraceful legacy of blatant discrimination in the operation of our public housing 
program” (p. 125). According to the study of Goering, Kamely, and Richardson (1997) 
using a nationally representative sample of public housing developments for 1993, they 
found that African American tenants for public housing units continued to be located in 
segregated neighborhoods. In addition, Rohe and Freeman (2001) showed that public 
housing and LIHTC subsidized housing programs were developed in neighborhoods 
with a relatively high percent of minorities and poor households. They concluded that 
race and ethnicity plays a key role in the siting of subsidized households. It is axiomatic 
that subsidized households are isolated from desirable neighborhoods where access to 
social and economic opportunities is facilitated.  
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2.4 Housing Market Discrimination 
As mentioned earlier in the section on Residential and Housing Segregation, 
discrimination in the housing market is a significant key that accounts for the association 
between residential segregation and uneven geography of opportunity. However, before 
we scrutinize discrimination in the housing market to explain residential segregation, we 
need to address two other hypotheses suggested as causes of residential segregation for 
over half a century. First, there is the class hypothesis, which suggests that residential 
segregation could be interpreted as the natural ecological segregation by income 
differences (Galster, 1987). Minorities, especially African Americans, could not move 
into desirable neighborhoods due to their lower income requiring lower housing prices, 
so residential segregation reflects not the role of race but the role of income (Denton, 
2006; Galster, 1987; Massey, 2004). However, prior studies showed by empirical results 
that African Americans in the same class were more segregated compared to other 
groups in both the 1990s and the 2000s (Briggs, 2005; Denton, 2006; Massey, 2004; 
Massey & Eggers, 1990), so it may be hard to support the class hypothesis as an 
explanation for residential segregation. The class hypothesis could account for only a 
small fraction of residential segregation (Galster, 1987). The role of race overwhelms 
that of class in order to interpret residential segregation (Briggs, 2005; Denton, 2006; 
Fainstein, 1993; Goldsmith, 2000; Massey & Eggers, 1990). Second, according to the 
self-segregation hypothesis, residential segregation stems from the preference of African 
Americans. African Americans choose to live in segregated neighborhoods, by their own 
will, which consists of homogenous race components (Galster, 1987; Massey, 2004). 
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However, earlier studies produced contrary evidence to the self-segregation hypothesis. 
Charles (2003) showed that African Americans have weaker preferences for living in 
segregated neighborhoods compared to those of whites. According to Massey (2004), 
whites have a strong preference for living in homogenous neighborhoods. Whites even 
show a tendency to prefer all white neighborhoods. Strong preferences of whites for 
same-race neighborhoods are due to negative perceptions of African Americans (Massey, 
2004). These prior results on racial preferences prove that the self-segregation 
hypothesis would not be supported as a cause of residential segregation.  
Even though discrimination in the housing market has declined after being 
outlawed by the decision of the 1948 Supreme Court, discriminatory barriers in the 
housing market still remain a significant cause for reinforcing residential segregation in 
the U.S. (Denton, 2006; Massey, 2004). According to the discrimination theory, 
disadvantaged populations experience difficulties in moving into desirable 
neighborhoods because of discriminatory barriers that stem from preferences of class 
and race in the housing market (Galster, 1987). Housing discrimination could be 
explained by three distinct theories: agent prejudice, customer prejudice, and rip-off 
(Galster, 1987; Yinger, 1977). First, personal stereotypes of housing market agents and 
landlords of minorities cause discrimination in the housing market. Second, housing 
market agents and landlords discriminate against African Americans in order to 
maximize their profit by bowing to the preferences of white customers because white 
customers are reluctant to be integrated with African American residents. Last, housing 
market agents and landlords regard minorities as a potential source of extra profit, so 
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they swindle minorities (Galster, 1987). Even though the suggestions of agents may be 
less favorable, especially in terms of financial aspects, African Americans reluctantly 
accept their unfavorable information because of the fear of confronting discrimination 
(Galster, 1987). These three forces, based on distinctive theories, induce discriminatory 
barriers in the housing market. Galster (1987) proved empirically that residential 
segregation by race is significantly associated with discrimination in the housing market. 
Discrimination is especially pronounced in predominantly white neighborhoods. 
Unfair treatment of the least advantaged populations in the housing market, 
especially in terms of providing less information, steering to more heavily minority areas, 
and block-busting by agents, restricts minority home-seekers from locating in desirable 
neighborhoods (Carr & Kutty, 2008; Krivo & Kaufman, 2004). Also, housing 
discrimination impedes the siting of subsidized households in desirable neighborhoods 
through negative attitudes toward subsidized tenants. Residential segregation, 
exacerbated by discrimination in the housing market, limits the least advantaged 
population access to good education, jobs, safety from crime, and wealth accumulation. 
In other words, it is discriminatory barriers in the housing market that restrict housing 
opportunity for the least advantaged populations, and ultimately restrains various 
opportunities for upward mobility that alleviates interracial economic disparities (Galster, 
1987). It is inevitable that disadvantaged, underserved, or marginalized populations are 
isolated from the mainstream of social and economic opportunities. 
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2.5 Vicious Circle of Residential Segregation and Inequalities 
Residential segregation, accelerated by urban sprawl and housing discrimination, 
gives body to both pockets of problems and pockets of privilege, especially in terms of 
inequitable opportunities for wealth accumulation, education, employment, safety, and 
exposure to crime in both metropolitan areas and suburbs (Denton, 2006; Squires & 
Kubrin, 2005). In addition, NIMBY attitudes due to the social stigma of marginalized 
populations, especially in terms of subsidized tenants, diminish social opportunities and 
locational outcomes. The mechanism of costs of residential segregation is 
multidimensional. First, residential segregation reinforces the wealth disparities of 
minorities (Carr & Kutty, 2008). Residential segregation prevents minorities from 
moving into desirable neighborhoods where the appreciation of home value is more 
likely. Because housing is the largest economic resource for creating wealth in most 
households, the deprivation of housing opportunities limits the wealth accumulation of 
the least advantaged (Carr & Kutty, 2008; Denton, 2006; Krivo & Kaufman, 2004; 
Massey, 2004; Van Zandt, 2003). Second, restriction of spatial mobility due to 
residential segregation and NIMBY opposition means that the least advantaged groups 
are isolated from the mainstream of society and opportunities. Specifically, the least 
advantaged groups face obstacles for accessing good quality schools, jobs, and low 
crime rate. Lastly, deprivation of social and economic opportunities for upward mobility 
is accelerated by poverty concentration due to interaction (concentration) effects. This 
poverty concentration results from the poverty of disadvantaged populations being 
clustered in racially homogenous and densely populated areas (Massey, 2001, 2004). 
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Thus, concentrated poverty intensifies obstacles to various opportunities because lack of 
wealth and income, poor education, inadequate access to jobs, and high crime rates 
interact with each other (Carr & Kutty, 2008). 
 
 
Figure 3. Vicious Circle of Residential Segregation and Inequality 
 
Furthermore, the fact that the interrelated associations among residential 
segregation, poverty concentration, and deprivation of social and economic opportunities 
are mutual and bidirectional makes social inequality worse. To be more specific, 
residential segregation intensifies concentrated poverty, and these interacting forces 
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prevent the least advantaged groups from accessing social and economic opportunities 
for upward mobility. Conversely, lack of social and economic opportunities translates 
into residential segregation. This mechanism, the “vicious circle of residential 
segregation and inequality,” is illustrated in Figure 3. The suggested mechanism is 
modified and developed from both the “vicious circle of prejudice and inequality” and 
the “segregative system” expounded by Galster (1992) and Denton (2006) respectively. 
According to the vicious circle of prejudice and inequality, racial inequalities induce 
prejudice, which causes segregation as well as discrimination in the housing market, 
which also leads to segregation (Denton, 2006; Galster, 1992). While previous systems 
only looked at the associations among social prejudice, segregation, and housing market 
discrimination, the mechanism of this study suggests comprehensive views among urban 
sprawl, residential segregation, poverty concentration, and multidimensional social 
inequality. Further, interacting relationships, like a vicious circle, could also be detected 
among social and economic opportunities, especially among wealth accumulation, 
educational opportunities, and job opportunities in the suggested mechanism. 
Deprivation of wealth creation due to a lack of housing opportunities limits the access of 
the least advantaged groups to other opportunities such as good education and high-
paying jobs. Lack of educational opportunity also creates barriers to high-paying jobs. 
Conversely, deprivation of educational and job opportunities leads to restrictions on 
housing opportunities and wealth accumulation. This mechanism can also apply to the 
uneven geography of opportunities for subsidized households. Even though the “location” 
of housing is the centerpiece of socioeconomic opportunities, community opposition 
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expressed through NIMBY behavior has contributed to subsidized households being 
secluded from desirable neighborhoods. Current development patterns of subsidized 
housing may perpetuate inequitable opportunities for the least advantaged populations, 
especially in terms of subsidized households, by pushing them into a vicious circle of 
residential segregation and inequality. There is no room for doubt that breaking out of a 
vicious circle is the key to achieving social equity. 
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CHAPTER III  
LITERATURE REVIEW: IMPACTS OF SUBSIDIZED HOUSING ON 
NEIGHBORHOODS 
 
NIMBYism is based on the common idea that neighborhoods will be negatively 
affected by proximity to subsidized housing households. Is the common wisdom true? Is 
this just a stereotype? There have been many prior studies that focused on the impact of 
subsidized housing on nearby property values in the last decade. These researches, 
however, have produced conflicting results. Some have found a negative impact of 
subsidized housing programs on neighborhoods, while others have found a positive 
impact, or even no impact. The reason for contradictory results could be due to two 
aspects. First, lack of methodological rigor induces confusing findings, and it casts doubt 
on the validity of prior results (Nguyen, 2005). Second, the impact of subsidized housing 
might be different under certain circumstances such as neighborhoods’ characteristics 
and the housing submarket (Freeman & Botein, 2002). Exploring the specific 
circumstances would be possible when the validity of an analytic method is guaranteed. 
Further, even though many previous studies have explored the impacts of subsidized 
housing programs on neighborhood property values, there are few studies that focus on 
the relationship between subsidized housing programs and neighborhood stability, 
especially in terms of neighborhood housing turnover. Also, there are no studies to date 
examining housing turnover at the individual parcel level while taking into account the 
spatial characteristics of properties before and after the implementation of subsidized 
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housing developments. This chapter, thus, will focus on the review of prior researches in 
terms of the aspects of methodological rigor. In addition, another purpose of this review 
is to speculate on what previous studies have overlooked – overarching factors in 
subsidized housing developments that could affect neighborhood property values and 
housing turnover.  
 
3.1 Different Impacts of Subsidized Housing on Neighborhoods 
Many previous studies have examined the impacts of subsidized housing 
programs on neighborhood property values to assess the effects of NIMBY attitudes. 
However, their findings have been inconsistent. Table 1 provides the results of prior 
studies exploring the impact of subsidized housing on nearby property values, especially 
in terms of their study areas, the type of subsidized housing programs, and their findings. 
Several earlier studies prior to the middle 1990s used the test versus control area 
methodology. The findings from previous studies were mixed. For instance, Nourse 
(1963) investigated the relationships between public housing developments and 
neighborhood housing prices in St. Louis, Missouri. The author found that there were no 
significant impacts from two public housing projects while there was one positive 
impact from one project. Also, Schafer (1972) explored the impacts of the Below Market 
Interest Rate (BMIR) program in Los Angeles, California, and found that there was no 
statistically significant impact on neighborhood property values. After the middle 1990s, 
many studies employed the hedonic price model to scrutinize the impacts of subsidized 
housing developments. Cummings and Landis (1993) explored the impact of affordable 
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housing developments in San Mateo County, San Francisco County and Alameda 
County. They showed that affordable housing developments positively affected 
neighborhood property values in two projects and negatively in one project while there 
were insignificant relationships between affordable housing developments and property 
values within three other projects. Also, Lee, Culhane, and Wachter (1999) and Lyons 
and Loveridge (1993) looked at the impact of various subsidized housing developments 
in Philadelphia and Ramsey County, Minnesota, respectively. Their results showed that 
the impacts of subsidized housing developments might vary with different housing 
programs due to the unique nature of each program. However, these conflicting findings 
of previous studies did not provide convincing evidence on the impacts of subsidized 
housing developments due to the lack of methodological rigor, described in more detail 
in the end of the chapter. In conclusion, consistent results have not yet been reached with 
respect to the impact of subsidized housing programs on surrounding property values. 
 
Table 1. Results of Prior Studies on Impacts of Subsidized Housing on nearby Property 
Values 
Author(s) Year Study Area(s) Program(s) RM Result(s) 
Nourse 1963 - St. Louis - Public Housing T - (+) in one site 
- None in two sites 
Schafer 1972 - Los Angeles - Below Market Interest 
Rate (BMIR) project 
T - None 
Sedway  
& Associates 
1983 - Marin County - Low-income development T - None 
Rabiega, Lin,  
& Robinson 
1984 - Multnomah County - Public Housing P - (+) impact 
Cummings 
& & Landis 
1993 - San Mateo County 
- San Francisco 
County 
- Alameda County 
- Six BRIDGE Housing 
  Affordable developments 
C - (+) within 1/8 miles: One site 
- (+) within 1/2 miles: One site 
- (-) within 1/2 miles: One site 
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Table 1. Continued 
Author(s) Year Study Area(s) Program(s) RM Result(s) 
Lyons 
& Loveridge 
1993 - Ramsey County - Section 8 New 
Construction 
 & Rehabilitation  
- Section 8 Existing 
Vouchers 
- Section 221  
- Section 236  
- BMIR project 
- Public Housing 
C - Section 8 Existing Vouchers,  
Section 236 & BMIR: None 
- Section 221 & Public Housing: 
(+) 
- Public Housing: (-) 
- Section 8 New Construction 
  & Rehabilitation: Mixed  
Goetz, Lam,  
& Heit 
1996 - Minneapolis - Community Development 
  Corporation (CDC) 
developed subsidized 
project 
- Public Housing 
C - CDC project: (+) impact 
- Public Housing: (-) impacts 
Galster, Tatian,  
& Smith 
1999 - Baltimore County - Section 8 tenant-based  
housing units 
A - (+) in higher-valued 
neighborhoods 
- (-) in lower-valued 
neighborhoods 
Lee, Culhane,  
& Wachter 
1999 - Philadelphia - Public Housing 
- LIHTC 
- Section 8 Certificate & 
  Voucher 
- Section 8 New 
Construction 
  & Rehabilitation  
- Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) 
Housing 
C - Public Housing: a modest (-) 
- LIHTC: a slight (-) 
- Section 8 Certificate & Voucher:  
a slight (-) 
- Section 8 New Construction & 
 Rehabilitation: a modest (+) 
- FHA Housing: a modest (+) 
Santiago, Galster,  
& Tatian 
2001 - Denver - Dispersed Rehabiliated 
Public Housing units 
A - (+) impact 
- (-) impact in black 
neighborhoods 
Ezzet-Lofstrom  
& Murdoch 
2006 - Dallas County - LIHTC units C - (+) impact 
Schwartz, Ellen,  
Voicu, & Schill 
2006 - New York City - Project-based Housing 
units 
A - (+) impact 
Ellen & Voicu 2007 - New York City - LIHTC units A - (+) impact 
Koschinsky 2009 - Seattle, Washington - Project- and tenant-based 
  subsidized housing units 
A - (+) impact 
- Section 8 Voucher: (-) impact in 
  higher-valued communities 
Castells 2010 - Baltimore, Maryland - Three HOPE VI complexes D - One complex: (+)  
- Other two complexes: None 
RM: Research Methodology 
T: Test versus Control Area 
C: Cross Sectional  
D: Difference-in-Differences 
A: Adjusted Interrupted Time Series/Difference-in-Differences (AITS-DID) 
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Recent studies provided the clue that the impact of subsidized housing would be 
different according to the different characteristics of the program and unit and different 
neighborhood environments, even though these studies still have methodological flaws. 
Specifically, the impact of subsidized housing on nearby property values could be 
different due to (1) the different type of subsidized housing programs such as public 
housing, the LIHTC (Low-Income Housing Tax Credit), and the HCV (Housing Choice 
Voucher) programs, (2) the different characteristics of neighborhoods, (3) the size of 
subsidized housing complex, and (4) the design of subsidized housing units. This chapter 
scrutinizes what overarching factors in subsidized housing programs affect 
neighborhood property values and housing turnover. 
 
3.1.1 Type of Subsidized Housing Programs 
The old public housing program, a project-based subsidized housing program, 
had been excoriated as a major culprit of causing higher crime rates, depreciating nearby 
property values, and promoting white flight (Goldstein & Yancey, 1983; Lee, Culhane, 
& Wachter, 1999; McNulty & Holloway, 2000; Roncek, Bell, & Francik, 1981; Saltman, 
1990). In 1986, the LIHTC program was established to address the need for more units 
of affordable housing. This program differs from previous housing programs due to the 
utilization of private equity in developing housing for low income families (Deng, 2009). 
Congress allocates federal tax credits to states based on state population, and then tax 
credits are assigned to developers by state housing finance agencies (HFAs) (Baum-
Snow & Marion, 2009; Schwartz, 2010). Developers apply to HFAs for tax credits by 
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proposing specific projects, and then the size of tax credits for projects is determined 
based on the development’s cost and the proportion of units occupied by low-income 
households (set-asides) (Baum-Snow & Marion, 2009; Schwartz, 2010). The minimum 
requirements of set-asides are 20/50 and 40/60. To be more specific, either at least 20 
percent of the units should be affordable to tenants earning below 50 percent of the 
metropolitan area’s median family income or at least 40 percent of units should be 
occupied by tenants below 60 percent of the metropolitan area’s median family income 
(Baum-Snow & Marion, 2009; Schwartz, 2010). Since its implementation, the LIHTC 
program has grown into the largest supply-based subsidized housing program in the U.S. 
According to the HUD (Department of Housing and Urban Development) Report in the 
LIHTC database, around 24,000 projects including about 1.8 million housing units have 
been placed in service through this program between 1995 and 2011. In addition, Danter 
Company (2009) suggested that the LIHTC program accounts for around one-sixth of all 
multifamily housing built by 2006. LIHTC program accommodates more households 
compared to the public housing program implemented 50 years earlier (Schwartz, 2010).  
While several studies have examined the performance of the program in locating 
low-income households in higher-income neighborhoods (Abt Associates, 2006; 
McClure, 2006; Oakley, 2008; Van Zandt & Mhatre, 2009), few have assessed the 
impacts of the LIHTC program on the surrounding neighborhoods. Some researchers 
have argued that well-designed subsidized housing projects such as the LIHTC program 
may contribute to the enhancement of neighborhood vitality (Schill, Ellen, Schwartz, & 
Voicu, 2002). This expectation for a positive result from the LIHTC projects may 
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account for the reason why Congress has continued to support the production of the 
LIHTC program rather than distributing a tenant-based subsidy such as the HCV 
Program (Deng, 2009). However, further research is needed to assess LIHTC’s impact 
on neighborhood stability, which is the aim of this paper. On the other hand, some 
scholars suggest that the HCV program, as a tenant-based subsidized housing program, 
provides low-income families more flexibility in choices of locations as well as unit 
types (Van Zandt & Mhatre, 2013). It has been believed that the HCV program is helpful 
to deconcentrate income and racial segregation. Thus, the anticipated impact of each 
subsidized housing program might be different due to the characteristics of each 
program. In these contexts, subsidized housing needs to be classified according to the 
characteristics and types in order to delicately analyze the impacts on neighborhoods.  
Some have strived to analyze the different impacts of subsidized housing 
programs by direct comparison of each program. Deng (2007) compared the effects of 
HCV and LIHTC housing on neighborhood integration and school quality. She found 
that more voucher units were located in neighborhoods with a below-average percentage 
of African-Americans. She also noted that the school quality of LIHTC is better than that 
of the voucher, even though the differences are small. These findings imply that there 
are significant differences between the project-based and the tenant-based subsidized 
housing program, and it could make different impacts on neighborhoods. 
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3.1.2 Different Sociodemographic Characteristics of Neighborhoods 
NIMBY attitudes on subsidized housing can be explained as opposition to the 
influx of undesirables into neighborhoods (Nguyen, 2005). Subsidized housing is 
deemed to have clear differences with the non-subsidized housing in terms of the tenant 
characteristics. In other words, because subsidized housing communities are generally 
occupied by subsidized tenants who have different characteristics from non-subsidized 
communities in terms of ethnicity, income, and education, non-subsidized tenants have a 
tendency to resist the inflow of subsidized tenants. The discrepancies of tenant 
characteristics between subsidized housing and non-subsidized housing would be a 
reason that affects the property values of neighborhoods. Thus, the impact of subsidized 
housing may vary according to the different characteristics and conditions of the 
neighborhood. This underscores the appropriateness of analyzing the impact of 
subsidized housing by stratifying neighborhoods according to sociodemographic 
characteristics such as ethnicity and income (Freeman & Botein, 2002). As the housing 
market is known for its distinctive characteristics, one of which is heterogeneity that 
stems from the immobility of housing and imperfect information between a buyer and 
seller, it is difficult to define the market as a single homogeneous one (Mhatre, 2010). 
However, the majority of previous studies failed to identify or stratify neighborhoods by 
these characteristics; hence, they have overlooked housing submarket heterogeneity, a 
critical characteristic of the housing market. Thus, the fact that the housing market is 
divided by several different submarkets leads to questions about the results of prior 
studies. 
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However, only a few studies focused on the classifications according to the 
neighborhood types to determine the impact of subsidized housing on neighborhoods. 
Galster and his colleagues (1999) found that Section 8 development had an upgrading 
impact on nearby property values in wealthier white-dominant census tracts, but it also 
had a destructive impact in lower-valued census tracts by stratifying the neighborhoods’ 
racial composition and median home values. The same team of researchers, Santiago, 
Galster, and Tatian (2001), also found that the Housing Authority of the City and County 
of Denver (DHA) dispersed public housing units had a positive impact on nearby single-
family housing prices in wealthier white census tracts. On the other hand, some 
researchers found the positive impact of subsidized housing on neighboring property 
values in both higher- and lower-income neighborhoods. Ellen and Voicu (2007) 
assessed the impact of LIHTC units on surrounding property values in New York City. 
They found that the LIHTC units had a positive impact on nearby property values in 
both lower- and higher-income neighborhoods. This impact was also significant in lower 
density neighborhoods than in higher density neighborhoods.  
The majority of studies, however, failed to stratify by the characteristics of 
neighborhoods in order to assess the impact of subsidized housing on surrounding 
property values. Thus, it casts doubt on the validity of their results. In contrast, four 
teams’ studies (Ellen & Voicu, 2007; Galster, Tatian, & Smith, 1999; Koschinsky, 2009; 
Santiago, Galster, & Tatian, 2001) attempted to assess the impact of subsidized housing 
on surrounding housing prices by stratifying the characteristics of neighborhoods such as 
racial composition, income level, and density, so their results are relatively reliable. 
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Thus, a few studies pinpoint the significance of controlling the neighborhood 
heterogeneity of housing in order to evaluate the impact of subsidized housing on 
neighborhoods. 
 
3.1.3 Size of Subsidized Housing Developments 
Most studies assessed the impact of subsidized housing on nearby property 
values by looking at the proximity between subsidized housing and market-rate housing. 
In other words, the analysis of proximity to subsidized housing complexes stems from 
the anticipation that the impact of the housing would be larger when the market-rate 
housing is closer to subsidized housing complexes. Ezzet-Lofstrom and Murdoch (2006) 
assessed the impact of LIHTC units on neighboring housing prices of single families in 
Dallas County, Texas. They focused on single-family houses sold within 1.5 miles of the 
sites chosen for LIHTC units, using three rings of 0.5, 1.0, and 1.5 miles to define the 
proximity to LIHTC projects. They found that LIHTC projects had a positive impact on 
housing prices of single families that were located within 0.5 mile of LIHTC units rather 
than a negative impact. Cummings and Landis (1993) looked at the impact of affordable 
housing developments in San Mateo County, San Francisco County and Alameda 
County by using the rings of 1/8 to 1/2 miles. They found that affordable housing had no 
significant impact on nearby housing values within 1/4 mile, but showed a negative 
impact at 1/2 mile. These studies analyzed the impact of subsidized housing according to 
the proximity. Other researchers categorized the same measure of proximity in feet: 500, 
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1,000, and 1,500 feet (Castells, 2010; Ellen & Voicu, 2007; Galster, Tatian, & Smith, 
1999; Santiago, Galster, & Tatian, 2001; Schwartz, Ellen, Voicu, & Schill, 2006). 
However, when it comes to estimating the impact of subsidized housing, one 
critical question arises about prior method that focuses on the proximity to subsidized 
housing: Is the impact of the closest subsidized housing complex necessarily the largest? 
Could the size of the complex also be a determining factor? It is axiomatic that the 
proximity to subsidized housing is not the only factor to determine the impact. The size 
of subsidized housing units should be considered with the proximity in order to assess 
the impact of subsidized housing. For example, suppose there are two market-rate 
houses with the same conditions such as housing characteristics, location characteristics, 
and neighborhood characteristics. However, if the size of subsidized housing complexes 
that are equidistance from each market-rate house is different, the impact will be 
different. In other words, larger subsidized housing complexes will have a larger impact 
on market-rate housing than smaller subsidized housing complexes. This fact implies 
that when it comes to determining the impact of subsidized housing, both the proximity 
and size of the complexes should be considered in tandem. A few studies attempted to 
estimate the impact of subsidized housing by considering the size of housing. Schwartz, 
Ellen, Voicu, and Schill (2006) looked at the external effects of place-based subsidized 
housing on neighboring property values by using rings of 500, 1,000, and 1,500 feet in 
New York City. They also included the size of subsidized projects in their model. They 
found that the placed-based subsidized housing had a positive external effect on nearby 
housing prices. This external effect increased with the size of subsidized projects and 
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decreased with the proportion of multifamily and rental units. Other researchers also 
tried to take the size of subsidized housing into account (Ellen & Voicu, 2007; Galster, 
Tatian, & Smith, 1999; Lee, Culhane, & Wachter, 1999; Santiago, Galster, & Tatian, 
2001).  
 
3.2 Limitations of Prior Methodologies 
Several earlier studies prior to the middle 1990s attempted to determine whether 
or not subsidized housing impinges on surrounding property values. To do their research, 
they employed the test versus control area methodology. They selected control 
neighborhoods to compare with experiment neighborhoods that included subsidized 
housing. To be more specific, their methodologies explored two kinds of neighborhoods: 
one neighborhood including subsidized housing developments and another not including 
subsidized housing sites but having comparable sociodemographic characteristics 
(Nguyen, 2005). Then, housing prices in neighborhoods that contain subsidized housing 
developments were compared to those in other neighborhoods that do not have 
subsidized housing developments. Through this methodology, the results determined that 
there was no significant impact on neighboring property values, or that subsidized 
housing had a positive impact on the neighborhood. Sedway and Associates (1983) used 
this approach in order to analyze the impact of subsidized housing units in Marin County, 
California, and concluded that there was no significant impact on neighborhoods. 
MaRous (1996) conducted survey interviews with market analysis on four projects that 
included low-income housing units and market-rate housing units in Illinois, and 
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suggested that there was no evidence that low-income housing units have a destructive 
impact on market-rate housing units. However, earlier studies had significant flaws in 
terms of their methodology. There are no clear criteria to determine if the control 
neighborhoods are identical to the experimental neighborhoods (Freeman & Botein, 
2002). Specifically, even though researcher tried to select comparable neighborhoods, 
there might be subtle differences that are not easily captured by the test versus control 
area approach. Further, this methodology cannot control other factors such as locational, 
environmental, and neighborhood characteristics that can affect property values (Nguyen, 
2005). Thus, the findings of earlier research have been fundamentally criticized in terms 
of methodological rigor and validity.  
However, after the middle 1990s, recent studies have offered conflicting results 
on earlier studies, as the methodological approach has been enhanced by employing a 
multiple regression analysis (Freeman & Botein, 2002; Nguyen, 2005). The findings are 
that subsidized housing detrimentally affects neighborhoods in certain circumstances, 
and these impacts are different in certain types of subsidized housing programs 
(Cummings & Landis, 1993; Ezzet-Lofstrom & Murdoch, 2006; Goetz, Lam, & 
Heitlinger, 1996; Lee, Culhane, & Wachter, 1999; Lyons & Loveridge, 1993). These 
studies, however, still have shown conflicting results in term of relationships between 
subsidized housing developments and nearby property values. In conclusion, consistent 
results have not yet been reached with respect to the impact of subsidized housing 
programs on surrounding property values. 
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The majority of prior studies use a multiple regression model in order to estimate 
the impact of subsidized housing on surrounding property values. Especially, when the 
dependent variable is the housing price, this methodology is known as the hedonic price 
model. The hedonic price model controls for the various physical and environmental 
characteristics of each housing, so it could elucidate the relationships between 
subsidized housing and neighboring housing prices (Freeman & Botein, 2002; Nguyen, 
2005). However, previous approaches based on the hedonic price model have suffered 
from three critical drawbacks: housing market heterogeneity, causal direction on the 
impacts of subsidized housing developments, and defining neighborhoods. First, as the 
housing market is known for its distinctive characteristics, which are heterogeneity that 
stems from the immobility of housing and imperfect information between a buyer and 
seller, it is difficult to define the market as a homogeneous single one (Mhatre, 2010). 
Thus, the fact that the housing market is divided by several different submarkets leads to 
the question about the results of prior studies. Specifically, because prior studies assume 
that the characteristics of regions and neighborhoods where housing is located are 
identical, prior studies have a fatal flaw in terms of their methodology. Thus, several 
studies confined their hedonic price models to a single neighborhood in order to 
eliminate the need to distinguish their approach by different housing submarkets 
(Freeman & Botein, 2002). However, a few studies have controlled difference 
characteristics of neighborhood in their models (Ellen & Voicu, 2007; Galster, Tatian, & 
Smith, 1999; Koschinsky, 2009; Santiago, Galster, & Tatian, 2001). Second, the 
methodologies of prior studies also have a limitation with respect to lack of 
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consideration for the direction of causality. In other words, the majority of these studies 
employed a cross-sectional approach in order to estimate the impact of subsidized 
housing developments, so prior studies do not take the direction of causality into account. 
For instance, is subsidized housing the cause of threatened neighborhood property values, 
or are subsidized housing complexes placed only in distressed neighborhoods? At this 
point, a few studies have prominent implications in terms of looking at the direction of 
causality by applying a quasi-experimental research design to consider preexisting 
neighborhood stability levels (Galster, Tatian, & Smith, 1999; Koschinsky, 2009; 
Santiago, Galster, & Tatian, 2001; Schwartz, Ellen, Voicu, & Schill, 2006). They 
developed the hedonic price model considering the change of single-family housing 
sales price levels and trends. In other words, they looked at the impact of subsidized 
housing units by using a pre/post and control/impact design that can capture the causal 
direction of a changing impact before and after subsidized household occupancy. Thus, 
these studies estimated the impact of subsidized housing by employing a robust quasi-
experimental research design in order to determine the causal direction between 
subsidized housing and neighborhood property values. Last, when it comes to defining 
the boundaries of neighborhoods, there are no clear criteria to determine the radii of 
boundaries. Different researchers employed different criteria to define the radial distance 
of neighborhood boundaries. In other words, several researchers set up different ring 
boundaries in order to assess the impacts of subsidized housing on nearby property 
values. For instance, the radial distances of neighborhoods are defined as 1,000 feet by 
Koschinsky (2009), 1,500 feet by Castells (2010), 2,000 feet by (Schwartz, Ellen, Voicu, 
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& Schill, 2006), and 0.5 miles by (Cummings & Landis, 1993). In some studies, those 
radial distances are classified as three distance bands: 500, 1,000, and 2000 feet (Galster, 
Tatian, & Smith, 1999) or 750, 1,500, and 2,500 feet (Lee, 2008), or 0.5, 1.0, and 1.5 
miles (Ezzet-Lofstrom & Murdoch, 2006). After setting up the boundaries, they focused 
on single-family houses sold within rings chosen for subsidized housing units. However, 
they did not provide clear criteria to define the radial distances of neighborhoods.  
 
3.3 Implications of Prior Studies  
Can we say simply that subsidized housing developments have a negative impact 
on nearby property values? After reviewing prior studies, there are clues that the 
different impacts of subsidized housing depend on certain circumstances. In other words, 
the impact of subsidized housing may vary across neighborhoods according to the type 
of subsidized housing programs, the characteristics of surrounding neighbors, and the 
size of the subsidized housing. First, the characteristics of subsidized housing programs 
are different from each other because of the unique nature of each program. Specifically, 
the LIHTC program is a major supply-based housing policy in the U.S., which means 
that this program focuses on providing affordable housing units and involves the merit of 
a private market into the production process (Deng, 2009). On the other hand, the HCV 
program is a demand-based housing policy, which means that it provides the choices of 
locations for low-income households (Van Zandt & Mhatre, 2013). Thus, the impact of 
each subsidized unit on surrounding neighborhoods would be different due to their own 
characteristics. Second, the impact of subsidized housing on nearby property values 
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would be different according to the characteristics of neighborhoods where subsidized 
housing are located. However, most studies failed to classify neighborhoods according to 
characteristics such as racial composition, income, education, and crime level. Last, the 
impact of subsidized housing on neighborhoods would vary with the size of subsidized 
housing complexes. The impact would also be different if each subsidized housing 
complex were larger. Thus, the size of subsidized housing needs to be considered in 
order to assess the impact of subsidized housing developments.  
Finally, when three aspects such as the type of program, neighborhood 
environments, and size are considered with a robust methodology, the results of the 
research would take a step toward figuring out the impact of subsidized housing on 
nearby property values. However, the majority of prior studies are flawed in terms of 
research methodologies. First, many previous studies have a limitation in terms of 
lacking a look at the causal direction of the impacts of subsidized housing developments. 
Thus, the results of the research could be developed by employing a pre/post and 
control/impact research design in order to clarify the causal direction of changing 
impacts before and after subsidized household occupancy. Second, the attributes of 
housing market heterogeneity should be controlled in the analytic model in order to 
unveil contradictory results on the impact of subsidized housing. The majority of studies 
failed to distinguish different housing submarkets in their methodologies; their results 
remained in question. Third, previous studies did not provide clear criteria to define the 
boundaries of neighborhoods. Setting up the extent of subsidized housing’s influence is 
the first step in analyzing the impact of subsidized housing. Only after establishing well-
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found boundaries of subsidized housing’s influence, would the results of research be 
persuasive. Finally, the majority of research areas are limited to older northeastern cities 
(Freeman & Botein, 2002; Nguyen, 2005). Thus, it is hard for the results of prior studies 
to be generalizable to the entire country. This fact shows that research in the west and 
south need to be conducted in order to extend the research areas. 
When three aspects such as the type of program, neighborhood environments, 
and size are considered with a robust methodology, the results of the research would 
provide a step toward figuring out the impact of subsidized housing on neighborhoods. 
Hence, this study will overcome some limitations of previous studies by devising 
multidimensional variables and applying a robust methodology. This research will shed 
light on a longstanding question: Does subsidized housing negatively affect 
neighborhoods? 
 
3.4 Subsidized Housing and Neighborhood Stability  
Previous studies have examined the impacts of subsidized housing programs on 
neighborhood property values to assess the effects of NIMBY attitudes, although 
findings have been inconsistent. However, there are few studies that focus on the 
relationship between subsidized housing programs and neighborhood stability, especially 
in terms of neighborhood housing turnover, as a proxy for attitudes toward subsidized 
households. NIMBY attitudes about subsidized housing can be explained as opposition 
to the influx of undesirables into neighborhoods (Nguyen, 2005). The discrepancies of 
tenant characteristics among subsidized and non-subsidized housing may have a 
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destabilizing effect on neighborhoods, causing existing residents to feel uncomfortable 
and desire to move.  
In studies about subsidized housing and neighborhood stability, the term 
“neighborhood stability” has had a somewhat fluid definition and might be conceptually 
divided into two aspects: economic stability and residential stability (Ross, Reynolds, & 
Geis, 2000). Economic stability refers to the change in the socioeconomic characteristics 
of neighborhoods or residents with respect to household income, home ownership, or 
property values, to name a few. On the other hand, residential stability signifies the flux 
of residents into and out of neighborhoods over time regardless of their socioeconomic 
characteristics (Ross, Reynolds, & Geis, 2000). In this sense, exploring the housing 
durations in neighborhoods can be an indicator for capturing residential stability. Other 
scholars also suggested that when it comes to the stabilizing conditions in neighborhoods, 
especially in terms of socioeconomic characteristics such as improved physical 
environments, reduced social problems, and appreciation of property values, these are 
sometimes referred to as neighborhood health not neighborhood stability (Rohe & 
Stewart, 1996). However, in this study examining the associations between subsidized 
housing developments and housing turnovers, I will continue to use the term 
neighborhood stability because it is more commonly used (Rohe & Stewart, 1996).  
Neighborhood stability is an integral element for communities as well as for 
individuals. According to the cohesiveness perspective, low housing turnover results in 
social integration by expanding the opportunities for knowing each other, sharing values 
and norms, participating in community organizations, and sustaining neighborhood 
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networks (Shaw & McKay, 1969; Van Zandt, 2003). On the other hand, high housing 
turnover induces neighborhood pathology in terms of social and economic problems. 
This restricts social ties and friendship networks among neighbors, and leads to the 
breakdown of informal social control (Ross, Reynolds, & Geis, 2000; Sampson, 1985; 
Sampson & Groves, 1989). High housing turnover also might threaten property value 
stability, and increase crime within the neighborhood. For these reasons, neighborhood 
stability is seen as a goal for most communities. 
Although the discrepancies in characteristics between subsidized housing and 
non-subsidized housing tenants might be a significant reason for the deterioration of 
neighborhood stability, there are few empirical studies that focus on the associations 
between subsidized housing developments and neighborhood stability, especially in 
terms of housing turnovers. The majority of prior studies are limited to the relationships 
between subsidized housing programs and surrounding housing prices. Further, there are 
no studies to date examining housing turnover at the individual parcel level while taking 
into account the spatial characteristics of properties before and after the implementation 
of subsidized housing developments. This research addresses this gap by examining 
neighborhood stability and how the spatial distribution of subsidized housing 
developments influence housing turnover. This study will shed light on resolving 
questions about the relationship between subsidized housing and neighborhood housing 
turnovers. 
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CHAPTER IV  
DATA AND DESCRIPTION 
 
4.1 Study Areas 
The study areas are the cities of Charlotte, North Carolina, and Cleveland, Ohio, 
which are two comparable housing markets in the south and midwest, respectively (See 
Figure 4). Previous research has focused largely on northeastern cities with a legacy of 
public housing programs such as New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore (Freeman & 
Botein, 2002; Nguyen, 2005). Thus, the findings of this paper contribute to extending 
research on subsidized housing beyond the Northeast Corridor, although the results may 
not be representative of all areas in the U.S.  
 
 
Figure 4. Study Areas: Cities of Charlotte and Cleveland 
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Charlotte is the 17th largest city in the U.S. (pop. 731,000 in 2010) and has 
experienced continuous rapid population growth for several decades (Delmelle, Thill, 
Furuseth, & Ludden, 2013). Although many cities in the state have suffered from the 
current economic recession, Charlotte remains one of the fastest growing cities (Rohe, 
Donegan, & Han, 2012). In contrast, Cleveland has struggled with population decline 
and neighborhood destabilization for many years due to deindustrialization (Koschinsky, 
2009). Since its peak in the 1950s, the population of Cleveland has declined steeply from 
914,000 to 397,000 in 2010. Mirroring this demographic decline of the city, housing 
market conditions also continue to be depressed.  
 
 
Figure 5. Housing Market Trends in the Cities of Charlotte and Cleveland 
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Figure 5 shows the trend in housing sales transactions per person in Charlotte and 
Cleveland from 1996 to 2007. In the Charlotte housing market, the number of housing 
sales transactions per person increased gradually during this period (from 0.05 to 0.10). 
In contrast, the Cleveland housing market fluctuated with fewer transactions per person 
compared to Charlotte. The annual average number of housing sales transactions per 
person in Cleveland between 1996 and 2007 was 0.04, while that in Charlotte was 0.08. 
Hence, findings from this study comparing both housing markets account for the varying 
impacts of subsidized housing developments between different housing market 
conditions. 
 
4.2 Data  
This study assesses the impact of LIHTC subsidized housing developments based 
on historic housing sales data from 1996 to 2007 for the cities of Charlotte and 
Cleveland. This section describes the data sources and formats used in this study to 
analyze the impact of LIHTC developments on nearby property values as well as 
housing turnover.  
 
4.2.1 Sales and Property Characteristics 
The unit of analysis for this research is a single-family housing unit. Data for 
housing duration and sales prices for Charlotte were drawn from the Mecklenburg 
County Assessor's Office; similar data for Cleveland were obtained from the Northeast 
Ohio Community and Neighborhood Data for Organizing (NEO CANDO), a publicly 
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available database provided by the Center on Urban Poverty and Community 
Development at Case Western Reserve University. One of advantage of these data 
compared to the Multiple Listing Services (MLS) data is that these data include all sales 
transaction records while the MLS data only includes those records involving a realtor, 
which may cause bias (Koschinsky, 2009). The data used in this study consists of all 
repeat sales. To give an impression of the scope involved, the data for Charlotte includes 
0.9 million records between 1990 and 2011 and those for Cleveland involves 2.0 million 
records between 1975 and 2012. For the analysis in this study, the sales records for both 
cities from 1996 to 2007 were extracted and linked to additional files containing 
structure and parcel characteristics. Available structure characteristics of single-family 
housing for Charlotte include heated areas, building age, number of bathrooms, number 
of half bathrooms, number of bedrooms, number of fireplaces, heating sources (electric, 
oil, and others), exterior types (brick/stone and others), and housing quality (the lowest 
[below average] and highest [very good-excellent]). In contrast, available structure 
characteristics for Cleveland include property sizes, heated areas, number of bathrooms, 
number of half bathrooms, number of bedrooms, building age, housing quality (the 
lowest [unsound-poor] and highest [very good-excellent]), exterior types (brick/stone 
and others), and housing styles (bungalow, colonial, and others).  
Compared to previous studies, this study conservatively applied the decision in 
cleaning and handling the sales transaction data. First, for the study exploring the 
associations between LIHTC developments and nearby property values, repeat sales 
were excluded when sales transaction records were linked to structure and parcel 
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characteristics. The data for structure and parcel characteristics only included the 
characteristics at the latest transfer date, not historical records. Thus, repeat sales may be 
less precise than non-repeat sales in capturing the structure characteristic of each 
property (Koschinsky, 2009). For example, suppose there are two transactions for the 
same property between 1996 and 2007. However, structure characteristics of this 
property might have changed through new construction or major renovations before the 
sale. If we use (the latest) structure characteristics for this property, the structure 
information of the first (unrenovated) sales may be erroneous because the property for 
the first sale has the same renovated characteristics although it was not renovated. Also, 
missing records for sales prices and structure characteristics were excluded from the 
analysis. Further, we excluded all forced sales transactions in both cities. In the case of 
the city of Cleveland, transactions between warranty deeds were only selected to clarify 
arms-length transactions. In addition, low and high outliers in sales price and housing 
duration were excluded. The top and bottom 1 percent of the sample in sales prices was 
excluded to remove extremely low and high prices. To explore the relationships between 
LIHTC developments and housing turnover, the bottom 1 percent of the sample in 
housing duration was also excluded. Finally, census tracts with fewer than 10 properties 
were excluded from the analysis.  
As a result, the final sample for examining the associations between the LIHTC 
programs and surrounding housing prices included 114,471 housing sales in Charlotte 
and 27,662 housing sales in Cleveland between 1996 and 2007. In addition, our final 
sample for examining the relationships between LIHTC projects and neighborhood 
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housing turnover included 59,882 housing transactions in Charlotte and 20,824 housing 
transactions in Cleveland between 1996 and 2007.  
 
4.2.2 LIHTC Developments 
The Picture of Subsidized Households data was obtained from the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to determine the characteristics 
of LIHTC developments such as the size of the subsidized housing and their spatial 
locations in the research areas. However, the location information in this data contained 
many errors. The longitude and latitude coordinates of this data did not allow for 
pinpointing the exact location of LIHTC developments. Hence, the location information 
was not precise enough to analyze the impacts of LIHTC developments at the parcel 
level because of the differences between the LIHTC locations in the data and actual 
locations. This data also does not include the project completion dates needed to 
determine the duration of each property’s transaction before and after the LIHTC 
projects were developed. Thus, we improved the information in this data by using 
additional data obtained from the Mecklenburg County Integrated Data Store (IDS) 
Public Reports, the Mecklenburg County GeoPortal, and the Ohio Housing Finance 
Agency. For Charlotte, we reconfirmed all LIHTC projects and their locations by using 
the Mecklenburg County GeoPortal, Google satellite imagery, and FindTheData. 
Specifically, Mecklenburg County Geoportal provides extensive information, especially 
in terms of property, environment, community information, and even building images 
(maps.co.mecklenburg.nc.us). Also, FindTheData allows us to identify the addresses, 
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sizes, types and building images of LIHTC projects (www.findthedata.org). We also 
determined the project completion dates through the Mecklenburg County IDS Public 
Reports. For Cleveland, the LIHTC data set derived from the Ohio Housing Finance 
Agency included information about locations and placed in service (PIS) dates. However, 
we also reconfirmed all of these LIHTC projects and their locations by using Google 
satellite imagery and FindTheData. As a result, there were 75 projects (4,718 units) in 
Charlotte and 123 projects (8,603 units) in Cleveland (see Figure 6). 
 
 
Figure 6. LIHTC Developments in the Study Areas 
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4.2.2.1 Defining Proximity to LIHTC Developments 
This study analyzed sales prices and housing duration before and after the 
implementation of LIHTC subsidized housing within a microneighborhood. This study 
defined a microneighborhood as concentric ring buffer areas of each property, which has 
been used in previous studies (Castells, 2010; Galster, Tatian, & Smith, 1999; 
Koschinsky, 2009; Lee, 2008; Schwartz, Ellen, Voicu, & Schill, 2006). Each property 
has its own microneighborhood that may include other properties within the radius of the 
property, based on Euclidean distance rings (i.e., 500 feet). Additionally, we identified 
the property as belonging to the “subsidized housing pocket,” i.e., the influence area of 
LIHTC developments, when the boundaries of LIHTC developments fall within the 
microneighborhood of each property (Galster, Santiago, Smith, & Tatian, 1999). This is 
based on the perception that neighbors would recognize LIHTC units from the 
boundaries (edges) of the housing complexes, and not from the center point (centroid).  
Many previous studies employed the centroid measurement to specify the 
distance between subsidized housing developments and each property. The measured 
distance from the center point of LIHTC parcels could be employed in other particular 
studies focused on small size developments. However, this approach is not appropriate 
to estimate the spillover effects of a large size development, which has the size over 500 
feet from center point to the development boundary. For instance, even though each 
property is located right next to or in close proximity to the LIHTC development, the 
approach measured from the center point does not allow properties include the 
development within their microneighborhoods (See Figure 7). Hence, this approach 
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based on measurements from centroids is not reasonable to specify the subsidized 
housing pocket. 
 
 
Figure 7. Definition of Microneighborhoods 
 
The radial distance of microneighborhood boundaries is arbitrary and varies in 
different research; commonly used buffer distances are 1,000 feet, 1,500 feet, or 2,000 
feet. Different researchers employed different criteria to define the radial distance of 
microneighborhood boundaries. For instance, microneighborhoods’ radial distances are 
defined as 1,000 feet by Koschinsky (2009), 1,500 feet by Castells (2010), and 2,000 
feet by Schwartz, Ellen, Voicu, and Schill (2006). In some studies, those radial distances 
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are classified as three distance bands: 500, 1,000, and 2000 feet (Galster, Tatian, & 
Smith, 1999) or 750, 1,500, and 2,500 feet (Lee, 2008). In this study, we used two 
microneighborhood boundaries: 0-500 feet and 500-2,000 feet. The inner ring aims to 
examine the change in sales prices and housing duration adjacent to LIHTC 
developments, which is termed an immediate neighborhood. The outer ring aims to 
explore the change in sales price and housing duration not adjacent to but sited in close 
proximity to LIHTC developments, which may be termed a functional neighborhood. 
These classifications of microneighborhoods are useful for examining different impacts 
on housing duration that might vary according to the proximity to LIHTC developments. 
Some researchers criticize Euclidean buffers as not real urban space (Kobie & 
Lee, 2011). To define real neighborhood space, the face block measurement of proximity 
might be employed to define an immediate neighborhood (Kobie & Lee, 2011). 
However, when we employed the face block measurement of proximity, many properties 
did not include the LIHTC development within their microneighborhood although the 
LIHTC project was developed right next to their property. Thus, this approach is only 
useful for exploring spillover effects of small-scale units or projects (e.g., residential 
foreclosures, abandoned housing, to name a few), not for exploring those of large-scale 
developments.  
 
4.2.3 Locational and Neighborhood Characteristics 
Many previous studies employed the hedonic price model, especially in terms of 
the cross-sectional approach, to estimate the impact of subsidized housing programs on 
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neighborhoods. The typical variables to control neighborhood characteristics in their 
methodologies is that they included sociodemographic features derived from the 
decennial Census, especially in terms of income, poverty, race, unemployment, and 
education, to name a few. However, those sociodemographic characteristics do tend to 
be highly correlated with each other, so only limited features were used in their 
methodologies. To overcome this limitation, this study employed the AITS-DID 
approach to estimate the impacts of LIHTC developments on neighborhoods. The AITS-
DID approach does not specify neighborhood characteristics directly (Koschinsky, 2009). 
This model uses census tract fixed effects to control for unobserved neighborhood 
characteristics. In addition, this approach includes trend surface variables (x-y 
coordinates or polynomial transformations of these coordinates) to explain the locational 
characteristics of each property. Incorporating the trend surface in empirical models 
explains or reduces spatial heterogeneity and spatial correlation because this approach 
explains the price of each property in terms of its geographic location vis-à-vis those of 
other properties (Ellen & Voicu, 2007; Galster, Santiago, Smith, & Tatian, 1999; Galster, 
Tatian, & Smith, 1999; Koschinsky, 2009; Schwartz, Ellen, Voicu, & Schill, 2006). 
Hence, the AITS-DID approach can isolate the impacts of LIHTC developments by 
controlling for locational and neighborhood characteristics, as well as housing structural 
characteristics. 
In this study, the spatial fixed effects for capturing the unobserved neighborhood 
characteristics were derived from Year 2000 census tracts. The geographic coordinates 
of each property normalized by the distance to the Central Business District (CBD) were 
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calculated from the Mecklenburg and Cuyahoga County Parcel data, and the Census 
Transportation Planning Products (CTPP) 2000 Home-to-work Flows data. To be more 
specific, this study defined a CBD as a group of high-job-density census tracts. Job 
density was calculated as the number of jobs per square meter of land use in each census 
tract. The number of jobs for each census tract was derived from the CTPP 2000 Home-
to-work flows and land area for each census tract was derived from the Census 2000 data. 
Additionally, this research used the Mecklenburg and Cuyahoga GIS Center data to 
account for the proximity to parks, rivers, and lakes.  
 
4.2.4 Neighborhood Heterogeneity 
Empirical models in this study are estimated separately for three types of 
neighborhoods stratified by family income, to test whether impacts of subsidized 
housing vary based on income heterogeneity. Housing submarkets could be defined in 
terms of ethnicity and income level. However, the study focused on the income levels of 
neighborhoods to signify the neighborhood’s heterogeneity. Because LIHTC subsidized 
units are almost always occupied by households below the 30th percentile of the income 
distribution, the discrepancies in income levels of tenant characteristics between LIHTC 
households and neighbors would play a key role in allowing different spillover effects 
across neighborhoods.  
The 2000 census data for median family income was used for measuring income 
heterogeneity based on census tract boundaries. Census tracts where the median family 
income was less than 80 percent of the city’s median family income were defined as 
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low-income neighborhoods; census tracts with a median family income of 80 to 120 
percent of the city’s median family income were defined as middle-income 
neighborhoods; census tracts with a median family income higher than 120 percent of 
the city’s median family income were defined as high income neighborhoods.1 
 
 
Figure 8. LIHTC Developments in Neighborhood Heterogeneity 
 
As seen in Figure 8, there is a difference between the spatial distribution of 
residents based on their family income between Charlotte and Cleveland. The city of 
                                                 
1 The HUD’s 2000 median family income for the city of Charlotte was $56,500 and for the city of 
Cleveland was $30,300. 
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Charlotte has neighborhoods radiating in all directions from the Charlotte center city. 
High-income neighborhoods are distributed in a fan-shape from the center of city in the 
southern part of Charlotte, so low- and middle-income neighborhoods are shaped like a 
crescent in Charlotte. In contrast, the residential geography of Cleveland shows that low-
income neighborhoods are concentrated in the center city while high-income 
neighborhoods are located at the edge of the city.  
 
Table 2. Spatial Distribution of LIHTC Developments by Submarkets 
Submarkets 
(by Income) 
Charlotte Cleveland 
No. (%) of 
Projects 
No. (%) of 
Units 
No. (%) of 
Projects 
No. (%) of 
Units 
Low-income 59  (78.67)  
3,447 
(73.06)  
59 
(47.97)  
5,105 
(59.34)  
Middle-income 12 (16.00)  
830 
(17.59)  
46 
(37.40)  
2,645 
(30.75)  
High-income 4 (5.33)  
441 
(9.35)  
18 
(14.63)  
853 
(9.91)  
Citywide 75 (100.00)  
4,718 
(100.00)  
123 
(100.00)  
8,603 
(100.00)  
 
Table 2 presents the spatial distribution of LIHTC developments in both cities. 
Most LIHTC projects were developed in low- and middle-income neighborhoods. 
Around 79 percent of LIHTC projects and 73 percent of LIHTC units were located in 
low-income neighborhoods in Charlotte. Similarly, 48 percent of projects and 59 percent 
of units were sited in low-income neighborhoods in Cleveland. 
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4.3 Descriptive Statistics 
This study consists of an empirical analysis exploring the impacts of LIHTC 
developments on 1) nearby property values and 2) neighborhood housing turnover. The 
first analysis for examining the associations between LIHTC developments and 
neighboring housing prices used 114,471 housing sales in Charlotte and 27,634 housing 
sales in Cleveland between 1996 and 2007. Of these housing sales records, 7.2 percent 
(8,246 sales) were within 2,000 feet of the LIHTC developments in Charlotte and 28.9 
percent (8,006 sales) were within 2,000 feet of the LIHTC developments in Cleveland. 
There were 125 census tracts for Charlotte and 192 census tracts for Cleveland with 
more than ten properties per census tracts. Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics on 
the structure and location characteristics of the final sample for the first analysis 
exploring the relationships between LIHTC projects and surrounding housing prices in 
Charlotte and Cleveland. The average sales price for Charlotte was around $195,000 at a 
heated area of 2,055 square feet. The average sales price for Cleveland was lower than 
that for Charlotte, around $74,000 at a heated area of 1,268 square feet. Almost 95 
percent of sold homes were built before 1980 in Cleveland while only 20 percent of 
properties were built before 1980 in Charlotte. Around 26 percent of properties in 
Charlotte had a brick/stone exterior, but only 9 percent in Cleveland had a similar 
exterior. There were more sales in the sample with high housing qualities than low 
housing qualities in Charlotte; 2 percent of properties had high housing qualities and 1 
percent had a low housing qualities. In contrast, there were more properties with low 
than high housing qualities in Cleveland; 7 percent of properties had low housing 
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qualities and less than 1 percent had high housing qualities. In terms of locational 
characteristics, 7 percent of sales in Charlotte and 5 percent in Cleveland were located 
within 250 feet from parks. The descriptive statistics implied that housing characteristics 
for properties in Cleveland has deteriorated more than those in Charlotte. Furthermore, 
around 50 percent of sales in both cities occurred between 2004 and 2007.  
 
Table 3. Citywide Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Definition and Unit Charlotte  Cleveland 
Mean Std.Dev. Min Max  Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variable          
Sales Price ($1,000) 194.95 142.71 23.50 1,039.50  73.74  37.41  3.50  239.90  
          
Independent Variables          
Structural characteristics          
Heated Areas (sq ft) 2,055.77 904.84 414 13,580  1,268.10  344.21  390.00  8,023.00  
Property Sizes (sq ft) - - - -  5,157.94  2,774.59  340.00  102,000.00  
Building Age (years) 17.29 20.59 0.00  107.00   74.64  26.03  0.00  207.00  
Number of Bedrooms (#) 3.31 0.67 1.00  44.00   2.97  0.78  1.00  10.00  
Number of Full Bathrooms (#) 2.03 0.63 1.00  8.00   1.10  0.31  1.00  4.00  
Number of Half Bathrooms (#) 0.57 0.57 0.00  11.00   0.14  0.36  0.00  10.00  
Number of Fireplaces (#) 0.84 0.84 0.00  11.00   - - - - 
Binary: 1 = Electric Heating 
  
0.11 0.31 0.00  1.00   - - - - 
Binary: 1 = Oil Heating Source 0.01 0.09 0.00  1.00   - - - - 
Binary: 1 = Brick/Stone Exterior 
 
0.26 0.44 0.00  1.00   0.09  0.29  0.00  1.00  
Binary: 1 = High-Housing 
 
0.02 0.13 0.00  1.00   0.00  0.06  0.00  1.00  
Binary: 1 = Low-Housing 
 
0.01 0.09 0.00  1.00   0.07  0.26  0.00  1.00  
Binary: 1 = Bungalow Housing 
 
- - - -  0.07  0.25  0.00  1.00  
Binary: 1 = Colonial Housing 
 
- - - -  0.49  0.50  0.00  1.00  
          
Locational Characteristics          
    Binary: 1 = Parks 250 ft. 0.07 0.25 0.00  1.00   0.05  0.21  0.00  1.00  
Binary: 1 = Rivers/Lakes 500 ft. -  - -  0.04  0.19  0.00  1.00  
          
Year/Quarter Characteristics          
    1997 (Sales Year) 0.04  0.20  0.00  1.00   0.06  0.24  0.00  1.00  
1998 (Sales Year) 0.05  0.22  0.00  1.00   0.07  0.25  0.00  1.00  
1999 (Sales Year) 0.06  0.24  0.00  1.00   0.07  0.26  0.00  1.00  
2000 (Sales Year) 0.07  0.25  0.00  1.00   0.07  0.26  0.00  1.00  
2001 (Sales Year) 0.07  0.26  0.00  1.00   0.08  0.27  0.00  1.00  
2002 (Sales Year) 0.08  0.27  0.00  1.00   0.06  0.24  0.00  1.00  
2003 (Sales Year) 0.09  0.28  0.00  1.00   0.09  0.29  0.00  1.00  
2004 (Sales Year) 0.10  0.30  0.00  1.00   0.10  0.30  0.00  1.00  
2005 (Sales Year) 0.12  0.32  0.00  1.00   0.13  0.33  0.00  1.00  
2006 (Sales Year) 0.14  0.35  0.00  1.00   0.12  0.32  0.00  1.00  
2007 (Sales Year) 0.14  0.35  0.00  1.00   0.10  0.30  0.00  1.00  
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Table 3. Continued 
Variable Definition and Unit Charlotte  Cleveland 
Mean Std.Dev. Min Max  Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
    April-June (Sales Quarter) 0.28  0.45  0.00  1.00   0.29  0.45  0.00  1.00  
July-Sept (Sales Quarter) 0.28  0.45  0.00  1.00   0.27  0.45  0.00  1.00  
Oct-Dec (Sales Quarter) 0.23  0.42  0.00  1.00   0.23  0.42  0.00  1.00  
          
LIHTC Developments          
Within 500 ft. of LIHTC 0.01 0.10 0.00  1.00   0.03  0.17  0.00  1.00  
Within 2,000 ft. of LIHTC 0.06 0.25 0.00  1.00   0.26  0.44  0.00  1.00  
 
Empirical models for exploring the impacts of LIHTC developments on nearby 
property values were estimated separately for three types of neighborhoods stratified by 
family income. Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics on the sample for low-income 
neighborhoods in Charlotte and Cleveland. The analysis for low-income neighborhoods 
used 17,853 housing sales in Charlotte and 4,549 housing sales in Cleveland. Of these 
housing sales records, 25.9 percent (4,628 sales) were within 2,000 feet of the Charlotte 
LIHTC developments and 55.2 percent (2,511 sales) were within 2,000 feet of the 
Cleveland LIHTC developments. In addition, there were 47 census tracts for Charlotte 
and 62 census tracts for Cleveland with more than ten properties per census tracts. The 
average sales price for the low-income submarkets was around $113,000 at a heated area 
of 1,347 square feet in Charlotte, whereas in Cleveland the average sales price was 
around $62,000 at a heated area of 1,358 square feet. About 43 percent of properties in 
Charlotte had a brick/stone exterior, but only 4 percent in Cleveland had this exterior. 
The ratios for the low housing quality of sales were 21 percent in Cleveland, but only 4 
percent in Charlotte. In contrast, the average ratio for the high housing quality of sales 
was below 1 percent in both cities. In terms of locational characteristic, 9 percent of 
sales in Charlotte and 4 percent in Cleveland were located within 250 feet from parks.  
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for Low-income Submarkets 
Variable Definition and Unit Charlotte  Cleveland 
Mean Std.Dev. Min Max  Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variable          
Sales Price ($1,000) 112.84  78.78  23.50  1,025.00   61.72  42.32  3.50  239.00  
          
Independent Variables          
Structural characteristics          
Heated Areas (sq ft) 1,346.62  440.73  414.00  5,193.00   1,357.95  386.30  456.00  8,023.00  
Property Sizes (sq ft) - - - -  4,356.07  2,113.02  340.00  43,750.00  
Building Age (years) 39.00  24.05  0.00  107.00   87.33  30.78  0.00  207.00  
Number of Bedrooms (#) 2.86  0.57  1.00  10.00   3.14  0.92  1.00  10.00  
Number of Full Bathrooms (#) 1.47  0.56  1.00  5.00   1.16  0.39  1.00  4.00  
Number of Half Bathrooms (#) 0.28  0.46  0.00  11.00   0.14  0.35  0.00  2.00  
Number of Fireplaces (#) 0.51  0.51  0.00  7.00   - - - - 
Binary: 1 = Electric Heating 
  
0.12  0.32  0.00  1.00   - - - - 
Binary: 1 = Oil Heating Source 0.01  0.11  0.00  1.00   - - - - 
Binary: 1 = Brick/Stone Exterior 
 
0.43  0.49  0.00  1.00   0.04  0.19  0.00  1.00  
Binary: 1 = High-Housing 
 
0.00  0.01  0.00  1.00   0.00  0.06  0.00  1.00  
Binary: 1 = Low-Housing 
 
0.04  0.19  0.00  1.00   0.21  0.40  0.00  1.00  
Binary: 1 = Bungalow Housing 
 
- - - -  0.08  0.27  0.00  1.00  
Binary: 1 = Colonial Housing 
 
- - - -  0.61  0.49  0.00  1.00  
          
Locational Characteristics          
    Binary: 1 = Parks 250 ft. 0.09  0.28  0.00  1.00   0.04  0.18  0.00  1.00  
Binary: 1 = Rivers/Lakes 500 ft. - - - -  0.01  0.09  0.00  1.00  
          
Year/Quarter Characteristics          
    1997 (Sales Year) 0.04  0.20  0.00  1.00   0.06  0.23  0.00  1.00  
1998 (Sales Year) 0.05  0.22  0.00  1.00   0.07  0.25  0.00  1.00  
1999 (Sales Year) 0.06  0.24  0.00  1.00   0.06  0.25  0.00  1.00  
2000 (Sales Year) 0.06  0.24  0.00  1.00   0.07  0.25  0.00  1.00  
2001 (Sales Year) 0.06  0.25  0.00  1.00   0.08  0.27  0.00  1.00  
2002 (Sales Year) 0.08  0.27  0.00  1.00   0.06  0.24  0.00  1.00  
2003 (Sales Year) 0.08  0.27  0.00  1.00   0.09  0.29  0.00  1.00  
2004 (Sales Year) 0.09  0.29  0.00  1.00   0.10  0.30  0.00  1.00  
2005 (Sales Year) 0.11  0.32  0.00  1.00   0.14  0.35  0.00  1.00  
2006 (Sales Year) 0.15  0.36  0.00  1.00   0.13  0.34  0.00  1.00  
2007 (Sales Year) 0.17  0.37  0.00  1.00   0.09  0.29  0.00  1.00  
    April-June (Sales Quarter) 0.27  0.45  0.00  1.00   0.29  0.45  0.00  1.00  
July-Sept (Sales Quarter) 0.27  0.44  0.00  1.00   0.26  0.44  0.00  1.00  
Oct-Dec (Sales Quarter) 0.24  0.43  0.00  1.00   0.23  0.42  0.00  1.00  
          
LIHTC Developments          
Within 500 ft. of LIHTC 0.04  0.21  0.00  1.00   0.08  0.27  0.00  1.00  
Within 2,000 ft. of LIHTC 0.22  0.41  0.00  1.00   0.47  0.50  0.00  1.00  
 
As seen in Table 5, the analysis for middle-income neighborhoods used 51,728 
housing sales in Charlotte and 10,598 housing sales in Cleveland. Of these housing sales 
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records, 4.5 percent (2,328 sales) were within 2,000 feet of the Charlotte LIHTC 
developments and 39.3 percent (4,163 sales) were within 2,000 feet of the Cleveland 
LIHTC developments. In addition, forty-one census tracts including more than ten 
properties were used in Charlotte and 82 census tracts were used in Cleveland. The 
average sales price for Cleveland middle-income submarkets was again lower than that 
for Charlotte: around $63,000 at a heated area of 1,288 square feet in Cleveland and 
around $145,000 at a heated area of 1,775 square feet in Charlotte. The ratio of 
brick/stone exteriors in Charlotte continues to be higher than Cleveland: 15 percent in 
Charlotte and 4 percent in Cleveland. In terms of locational characteristic, 8 percent of 
sales in Charlotte and 4 percent in Cleveland were located within 250 feet from parks.  
 
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics for Middle-income Submarkets 
Variable Definition and Unit Charlotte  Cleveland 
Mean Std.Dev. Min Max  Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variable          
Sales Price ($1,000) 144.76  75.12  23.50  1,013.00   63.22  34.10  3.50  237.00  
          
Independent Variables          
Structural characteristics          
Heated Areas (sq ft) 1,774.90  613.95  451.00  8,380.00   1,288.45  336.39  390.00  6,089.00  
Property Sizes (sq ft) - - - -  4,810.18  1,799.49  731.00  54,554.00  
Building Age (years) 12.78  16.06  0.00  107.00   82.58  24.49  0.00  206.00  
Number of Bedrooms (#) 3.16  0.49  1.00  9.00   3.05  0.78  1.00  10.00  
Number of Full Bathrooms (#) 1.93  0.41  1.00  6.00   1.10  0.31  1.00  4.00  
Number of Half Bathrooms (#) 0.54  0.51  0.00  10.00   0.11  0.32  0.00  3.00  
Number of Fireplaces (#) 0.82  0.39  0.00  5.00   - - - - 
Binary: 1 = Electric Heating 
  
0.13  0.34  0.00  1.00   - - - - 
Binary: 1 = Oil Heating Source 0.01  0.11  0.00  1.00   - - - - 
Binary: 1 = Brick/Stone Exterior 
 
0.15  0.36  0.00  1.00   0.04  0.20  0.00  1.00  
Binary: 1 = High-Housing 
 
0.00  0.02  0.00  1.00   0.00  0.04  0.00  1.00  
Binary: 1 = Low-Housing 
 
0.00  0.07  0.00  1.00   0.09  0.28  0.00  1.00  
Binary: 1 = Bungalow Housing 
 
- - - -  0.05  0.23  0.00  1.00  
Binary: 1 = Colonial Housing 
 
- - - -  0.61  0.49  0.00  1.00  
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Table 5. Continued 
Variable Definition and Unit Charlotte  Cleveland 
Mean Std.Dev. Min Max  Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Locational Characteristics          
    Binary: 1 = Parks 250 ft. 0.08  0.27  0.00  1.00   0.04  0.21  0.00  1.00  
Binary: 1 = Rivers/Lakes 500 ft. - - - -  0.04  0.20  0.00  1.00  
          
Year/Quarter Characteristics          
    1997 (Sales Year) 0.04  0.19  0.00  1.00   0.06  0.23  0.00  1.00  
1998 (Sales Year) 0.05  0.22  0.00  1.00   0.06  0.24  0.00  1.00  
1999 (Sales Year) 0.07  0.25  0.00  1.00   0.07  0.26  0.00  1.00  
2000 (Sales Year) 0.07  0.26  0.00  1.00   0.07  0.25  0.00  1.00  
2001 (Sales Year) 0.08  0.26  0.00  1.00   0.08  0.27  0.00  1.00  
2002 (Sales Year) 0.08  0.27  0.00  1.00   0.06  0.24  0.00  1.00  
2003 (Sales Year) 0.08  0.28  0.00  1.00   0.08  0.28  0.00  1.00  
2004 (Sales Year) 0.09  0.29  0.00  1.00   0.10  0.30  0.00  1.00  
2005 (Sales Year) 0.11  0.32  0.00  1.00   0.13  0.34  0.00  1.00  
2006 (Sales Year) 0.15  0.36  0.00  1.00   0.13  0.33  0.00  1.00  
2007 (Sales Year) 0.14  0.35  0.00  1.00   0.11  0.31  0.00  1.00  
    April-June (Sales Quarter) 0.27  0.45  0.00  1.00   0.28  0.45  0.00  1.00  
July-Sept (Sales Quarter) 0.27  0.45  0.00  1.00   0.26  0.44  0.00  1.00  
Oct-Dec (Sales Quarter) 0.24  0.43  0.00  1.00   0.23  0.42  0.00  1.00  
          
LIHTC Developments          
Within 500 ft. of LIHTC 0.01  0.06  0.00  1.00   0.03  0.18  0.00  1.00  
Within 2,000 ft. of LIHTC 0.04  0.20  0.00  1.00   0.36  0.48  0.00  1.00  
 
Table 6 presents the descriptive statistics on the sample for high-income 
neighborhoods in Charlotte and Cleveland. The analysis for high-income submarkets 
used 44,890 housing sales in Charlotte and 12,487 housing sales in Cleveland. Of these 
housing sales records, 2.9 percent (1,290 sales) were within 2,000 feet of the Charlotte 
LIHTC developments and 10.7 percent (1,332 sales) were within 2,000 feet of the 
Cleveland LIHTC developments. These ratios for LIHTC developments were relatively 
small compared to other housing submarkets such as low- and middle-income 
neighborhoods. This implied that LIHTC complexes are more likely to be located within 
distressed neighborhoods. There were 37 census tracts for Charlotte and 48 census tracts 
for Cleveland with more than ten properties per census tracts. The average sales price for 
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Charlotte was around $285,000 at a heated area of 2,660 square feet. Additionally, there 
was large variation of sales prices in the high-income neighborhoods of Charlotte. In 
contrast, the average sales price for Cleveland high-income submarkets was lower than 
that for Charlotte, $87,000 at a heated area of 1,218 square feet. Cleveland’s high-
income neighborhoods also showed that there was relatively small variation in housing 
prices compared to Charlotte. About 31 percent of properties in Charlotte had 
brick/stone exterior, but only 15 percent in Cleveland had those exteriors. There were 
more sales in the sample with a high rather than low housing quality in Charlotte. In 
terms of locational characteristic, 4 percent of sales in Charlotte and 5 percent in 
Cleveland were located within 250 feet from parks. 
 
Table 6. Descriptive Statistics for High-income Submarkets 
Variable Definition and Unit Charlotte  Cleveland 
Mean Std.Dev. Min Max  Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variable          
Sales Price ($1,000) 285.45  170.84  23.50  1,039.50   87.05  33.68  3.50  239.90  
          
Independent Variables          
Structural characteristics          
Heated Areas (sq ft) 2,660.19  959.15  534.00  13,580.00   1,218.10  325.61  440.00  5,766.00  
Property Sizes (sq ft) - - - -  5,745.22  3,461.35  825.00  102,000.00  
Building Age (years) 13.86  18.19  0.00  107.00   63.28  20.10  0.00  154.00  
Number of Bedrooms (#) 3.66  0.71  1.00  44.00   2.83  0.69  1.00  8.00  
Number of Full Bathrooms 
 
2.36  0.68  1.00  8.00   1.07  0.27  1.00  4.00  
Number of Half Bathrooms 
 
0.71  0.50  0.00  10.00   0.16  0.39  0.00  10.00  
Number of Fireplaces (#) 0.99  0.21  0.00  11.00   - - - - 
Binary: 1 = Electric Heating 
  
0.07  0.26  0.00  1.00   - - - - 
Binary: 1 = Oil Heating 
 
0.00  0.04  0.00  1.00   - - - - 
Binary: 1 = Brick/Stone 
  
0.31  0.46  0.00  1.00   0.15  0.36  0.00  1.00  
Binary: 1 = High-Housing 
 
0.04  0.20  0.00  1.00   0.01  0.08  0.00  1.00  
Binary: 1 = Low-Housing 
 
0.00  0.02  0.00  1.00   0.01  0.10  0.00  1.00  
Binary: 1 = Bungalow 
  
- - - -  0.07  0.26  0.00  1.00  
Binary: 1 = Colonial Housing 
 
- - - -  0.36  0.48  0.00  1.00  
          
Locational Characteristics          
    Binary: 1 = Parks 250 ft. 0.04  0.20  0.00  1.00   0.05  0.22  0.00  1.00  
Binary: 1 = Rivers/Lakes 500 ft. - - - -  0.04  0.21  0.00  1.00  
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Table 6. Continued 
Variable Definition and Unit Charlotte  Cleveland 
Mean Std.Dev. Min Max  Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Year/Quarter Characteristics          
    1997 (Sales Year) 0.04  0.20  0.00  1.00   0.06  0.25  0.00  1.00  
1998 (Sales Year) 0.05  0.23  0.00  1.00   0.07  0.26  0.00  1.00  
1999 (Sales Year) 0.06  0.24  0.00  1.00   0.08  0.27  0.00  1.00  
2000 (Sales Year) 0.07  0.25  0.00  1.00   0.07  0.26  0.00  1.00  
2001 (Sales Year) 0.07  0.26  0.00  1.00   0.08  0.27  0.00  1.00  
2002 (Sales Year) 0.08  0.27  0.00  1.00   0.06  0.25  0.00  1.00  
2003 (Sales Year) 0.09  0.29  0.00  1.00   0.09  0.29  0.00  1.00  
2004 (Sales Year) 0.11  0.31  0.00  1.00   0.10  0.30  0.00  1.00  
2005 (Sales Year) 0.13  0.33  0.00  1.00   0.11  0.32  0.00  1.00  
2006 (Sales Year) 0.14  0.34  0.00  1.00   0.10  0.31  0.00  1.00  
2007 (Sales Year) 0.12  0.33  0.00  1.00   0.09  0.29  0.00  1.00  
    April-June (Sales Quarter) 0.29  0.45  0.00  1.00   0.29  0.45  0.00  1.00  
July-Sept (Sales Quarter) 0.28  0.45  0.00  1.00   0.29  0.45  0.00  1.00  
Oct-Dec (Sales Quarter) 0.23  0.42  0.00  1.00   0.23  0.42  0.00  1.00  
          
LIHTC Developments          
Within 500 ft. of LIHTC 0.01  0.05  0.00  1.00   0.01  0.11  0.00  1.00  
Within 2,000 ft. of LIHTC 0.03  0.16  0.00  1.00   0.10  0.29  0.00  1.00  
 
This study also examines the impacts of LIHTC developments on neighborhood 
housing turnover. As seen in Table 7, the second analysis exploring the relationships 
between LIHTC developments and neighborhood housing turnover used 59,882 housing 
transactions in Charlotte and 20,824 housing transactions in Cleveland between 1996 
and 2007. Among these housing transactions, 40.1 percent (23,974 properties) and 57.6 
percent (11,989 properties) were censored (were not sold) during the research period in 
Charlotte and Cleveland, respectively. Additionally, in our final sample, 7.9 percent 
(4,702 properties) were within 2,000 feet of the Charlotte LIHTC projects and 35.1 
percent (7,309 properties) were within 2,000 feet of the Cleveland LIHTC projects. 
Average housing duration including right-censored observations that sold after 2007 in 
Charlotte is around 1,210 days and that in Cleveland is around 1,230 days. Average 
standardized sales price in Charlotte is around 0.99 and that in Cleveland is about 0.96. 
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The housing sales price of each property was standardized by the average housing price 
of the same year with the housing sales price of each property to remove time 
dependency in this analysis (Kim & Horner, 2003). The standardized sales price 
variables are described in more detail in the methodology chapter. With respect to 
locational characteristics, 7 percent of sales in Charlotte and 5 percent in Cleveland were 
located within 250 feet from parks. 
 
Table 7. Citywide Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Definition and Unit Charlotte  Cleveland 
Mean Std.Dev. Min Max  Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variable          
Housing Duration (days) 1,213.16 1,009.86 1.00 4,381.00  1,231.15 1,040.77 3.00 4,373.00 
          
Independent Variables          
Housing Price characteristics          
Standardized Sales Price 0.99 1.00 0.02 15.91  0.96  0.51  0.02  3.67  
          
Locational Characteristics          
    Binary: 1 = Parks 250 ft. 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00  0.05  0.21  0.00  1.00  
Binary: 1 = Rivers/Lakes 500 ft. - - - -  0.01  0.10  0.00  1.00  
          
LIHTC Developments          
Within 500 ft. of LIHTC 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00  0.04  0.20  0.00  1.00  
Within 2,000 ft. of LIHTC 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00  0.31  0.46  0.00  1.00  
 
Empirical models for examining the impacts of LIHTC developments on 
neighborhood housing turnover are also estimated separately for three types of 
neighborhoods stratified by family income as they are in the models for exploring the 
impacts of LIHTC developments on nearby property values. Table 8 presents the 
descriptive statistics on the sample for low-income neighborhoods in Charlotte and 
Cleveland. The analysis for low-income submarkets used 9,604 housing sales in 
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Charlotte and 3,198 housing sales in Cleveland between 1996 and 2007. Of these 
housing transactions, 26.6 percent (2,551 sales) were within 2,000 feet of the Charlotte 
LIHTC projects and 75.6 percent (2,417 sales) were within 2,000 feet of the Cleveland 
LIHTC projects. Average housing duration including right-censored observations in 
Charlotte is around 1,020 days and that in Cleveland is around 1,070 days. Average 
standardized sales price in Charlotte is around 0.46 and that in Cleveland is about 0.67. 
In terms of locational characteristics, 8 percent of sales in Charlotte and 3 percent in 
Cleveland were located within 250 feet from parks. 
 
Table 8. Descriptive Statistics for Low-income Submarkets 
Variable Definition and Unit Charlotte  Cleveland 
Mean Std.Dev. Min Max  Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variable          
Housing Duration (days) 1,021.72 998.25 1.00 4,333.00  1,069.82 990.14 5.00 4,317.00 
          
Independent Variables          
Housing Price characteristics          
Standardized Sales Price 0.46 0.41 0.02 5.57  0.67 0.47 0.02 3.55 
          
Locational Characteristics          
    Binary: 1 = Parks 250 ft. 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00  0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00 
Binary: 1 = Rivers/Lakes 500 ft. - - - -  0.01 0.06 0.00 1.00 
          
LIHTC Developments          
Within 500 ft. of LIHTC 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00  0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 
Within 2,000 ft. of LIHTC  0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00  0.64 0.48 0.00 1.00 
 
As seen in Table 9, the analysis for middle-income neighborhoods used 25,052 
housing sales in Charlotte and 7,702 housing sales in Cleveland between 1996 and 2007. 
Of these housing transactions, 5.04 percent (1,264 sales) were within 2,000 feet of the 
Charlotte LIHTC projects and 48.5 percent (3,736 sales) were within 2,000 feet of the 
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Cleveland LIHTC projects. Average housing duration including right-censored 
observations in Charlotte is about 1,185 days and that in Cleveland is about 1,130 days. 
Compared to other housing submarkets such as low- and high-income neighborhoods, 
average housing duration in the Charlotte middle-income submarket was longer than that 
in Cleveland. Average standardized sales price in Charlotte is around 0.83 and that in 
Cleveland is about 0.78. In addition, 8 percent of sales in Charlotte and 4 percent in 
Cleveland were located within 250 feet from parks. 
 
Table 9. Descriptive Statistics for Middle-income Submarkets 
Variable Definition and Unit Charlotte  Cleveland 
Mean Std.Dev. Min Max  Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variable          
Housing Duration (days) 1,185.07 1,025.36 1.00 4,381.00  1,130.45 1,028.24 3.00 4,373.00 
          
Independent Variables          
Housing Price characteristics          
Standardized Sales Price 0.83 0.97 0.02 11.17  0.78 0.40 0.03 3.67 
          
Locational Characteristics          
    Binary: 1 = Parks 250 ft. 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00  0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 
Binary: 1 = Rivers/Lakes 500 ft. - - - -  0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 
          
LIHTC Developments          
Within 500 ft. of LIHTC 0.01 0.07 0.00 1.00  0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 
Within 2,000 ft. of LIHTC 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00  0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 
 
Table 10 shows the descriptive statistics on the sample for high-income 
neighborhoods in Charlotte and Cleveland. The analysis for high-income submarkets 
used 25,226 housing sales in Charlotte and 9,924 housing sales in Cleveland between 
1996 and 2007. Of these housing transactions, 3.52 percent (887 sales) were within 
2,000 feet of the Charlotte LIHTC projects and 11.7 percent (1,156 sales) were within 
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2,000 feet of the Cleveland LIHTC projects. Compared to other housing submarkets 
such as low- and middle-income neighborhoods in both cities, there was small variation 
of impacts sales associated with the LIHTC developments in high-income 
neighborhoods. This implies that LIHTC developments are more likely to be located in 
deteriorated neighborhoods such as low- and middle-income submarkets. Average 
housing duration including right-censored observations in Charlotte is around 1,310 days 
and that in Cleveland is around 1,440 days. Average standardized sales price in Charlotte 
is around 1.36 and that in Cleveland is about 1.23. In addition, 4 percent of sales in 
Charlotte and 5 percent in Cleveland were located within 250 feet from parks. 
 
Table 10. Descriptive Statistics for High-income Submarkets 
Variable Definition and Unit Charlotte  Cleveland 
Mean Std.Dev. Min Max  Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variable          
Housing Duration (days) 1,309.29 986.74 1.00 4,381.00  1,435.46 1,049.38 10.00 4,371.00 
          
Independent Variables          
Housing Price characteristics          
Standardized Sales Price 1.36 1.05 0.02 15.91  1.23 0.47 0.05 3.62 
          
Locational Characteristics          
    Binary: 1 = Parks 250 ft. 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00  0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 
Binary: 1 = Rivers/Lakes 500 ft. - - - -  0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00 
          
LIHTC Developments          
Within 500 ft. of LIHTC 0.01 0.05 0.00 1.00  0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00 
Within 2,000 ft. of LIHTC 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00  0.10 0.31 0.00 1.00 
 
In sum, the descriptive statistics for both analyses have expected values. Average 
sales prices in Charlotte were higher than those in Cleveland. Also, there was a large 
variation of sales prices in Charlotte compared to the variation of sales prices in 
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Cleveland. The average sales price in high-income neighborhoods was higher than that 
in other neighborhoods such as low- and middle-income submarkets. Housing duration 
in Cleveland was longer than in Charlotte. Additionally, housing duration in high-
income submarket was longer than that in other submarkets. In terms of LIHTC 
developments, the number of properties including LIHTC developments within the 
microneighborhood of each property in low- and middle-income neighborhoods was 
higher than in high-income neighborhoods. Furthermore, the structure characteristics of 
properties in Charlotte were better than those in Cleveland. Compared to Cleveland, the 
average heated areas and numbers of bedrooms in Charlotte were larger. The building 
age in Charlotte was also younger than in Cleveland. Furthermore, the structure 
characteristics of properties were better in high-income neighborhoods for both cities. 
For instance, the building age in low-income neighborhoods was older compared to 
other neighborhoods such as high- and middle-income submarkets. The ratio of low 
housing quality was higher in low-income submarkets while the ratio of high housing 
quality was higher in high-income submarkets. 
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CHAPTER V  
METHODOLOGY 
 
5.1 Analysis for Social Equity 
5.1.1 Bivariate Analysis (Location Quotient)  
Before we explore the impacts of LIHTC developments on neighborhoods, this 
study examines the associations between the spatial location of each LIHTC 
development and the sociodemographic characteristics of neighborhoods. We can 
explore the discrepancies between LIHTC subsidized households and geography of 
opportunities by identifying the sociodemographic characteristics of neighborhoods 
associated with locating of LIHTC projects and units. Identifying these relationships will 
shed light on examining the empirical evidence on the uneven geography of 
opportunities for subsidized households.  
This study used simple bivariate analysis, especially in terms of a location 
quotient (LQ), to explore the associations between LIHTC developments and 
neighborhoods.  
 = nin
n
SLQ
LS
 (1) 
where 𝑆𝑛𝑖 is the share of LIHTC project n in neighborhood i and 𝐿𝑆𝑛 is the share of 
LIHTC project n at the local level (Malizia & Feser, 1998). The location quotient is a 
simple ratio that captures the proportion of LIHTC subsidized developments that are 
attributable to each neighborhood weighted by the number of LIHTC projects developed 
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(Van Zandt & Mhatre, 2009). Thus, we can identify the likelihood that neighborhoods 
with each sociodemographic characteristic will contain LIHTC developments, especially 
in terms of the scale of projects and units, compared to the overall probability of a 
neighborhood containing that type of subsidized housing development (Rohe & Freeman, 
2001). Rohe and Freeman (2001) employed this index to account for the relationships 
between the neighborhood characteristics and the siting of subsidized housing 
developments at the census tract level. However, since they constructed this index in 
terms of whether or not each census tract received subsidized housing developments 
without considering the scale of subsidized housing developments, their index could not 
take into account the number of subsidized housing projects and units in each 
neighborhood. Thus, this study reconstitutes their index with a consideration of the total 
number of subsidized housing projects and units at the census tract level. The index was 
calculated by dividing the ratio of each category of the census tracts’ sociodemographic 
characteristics to the total number of projects or units in each category by the ratio of all 
census tracts to the total number of projects or units in all census tracts. Ratios less than 
1 mean that census tracts in a category are less likely to contain LIHTC projects and 
units than an even distribution of those among categories. Ratios over 1 mean that 
census tracts in a category are more likely to contain LIHTC projects and units than even 
a distribution of those (Rohe & Freeman, 2001). Thus, values less than 1.0 indicate that, 
compared to the city as a whole, neighborhoods (census tracts) in an income category 
have an underrepresentation of LIHTC projects and units, while values over 1.0 indicate 
an overrepresentation (Van Zandt & Mhatre, 2009). 
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5.2 Analysis for Neighborhood Impacts 
5.2.1 Hedonic Price Model 
The hedonic price model, derived from Rosen (1974), has wide use in exploring 
the multidimensional aspects of the housing market, especially with respect to the 
evaluation of housing prices. Etymologically, the term “hedonics” stems from the Greek 
word hedonikos, meaning pleasure (Chin & Chau, 2003). This word origin implies that 
the hedonic price model is used to estimate the determinants of housing prices by 
looking at the utility of housing units. Housing price is determined by supply and 
demand in common with the market mechanism. However, the housing market is unique 
due to the inherent characteristics of housing goods in terms of durability, high cost of 
supply, heterogeneity, and spatial fixity, compared to other consumer goods (Chin & 
Chau, 2003). According to Rosen’s perspective (1974), because housing units are 
heterogeneous goods, the price of one unit is different from other housing units due to 
the different inherent attributes with respect to structural, neighborhood, and locational 
characteristics.  
According to the hedonic price model, various attributes embedded in housing 
goods cannot be separated from each other and be traded as part of a house (Mhatre, 
2010). Buying housing goods means shopping for a package of inherent attributes of 
housing goods which refers to implicit prices. Hence, the hedonic price model postulates 
that housing goods are traded as a bundle of inherent attributes (Chin & Chau, 2003; 
Rosen, 1974). The market price of a house is accounted for as a function of various 
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characteristics, especially in terms of structural, neighborhood, and locational 
characteristics: 
 ( , , ),=h h h hP f S N L   (2) 
where Ph is the market price of a house, each Sh, Nh, and Lh is a vector of structural, 
neighborhood, and locational characteristics of a house, and eh is the error term.  
Housing price function is the summation of all implicit prices associated with 
various characteristics of a housing unit. In addition, the implicit price of each housing 
attribute is derived from a regression analysis; the implicit price represents the 
preference and willingness of a consumer to pay for the corresponding attributes (Chin 
& Chau, 2003; Li, 2011). To be more specific, structural characteristics include physical 
attributes of a house such as the size of the living area, number of bedrooms, number of 
bathrooms, number of fireplaces, age of the structure, and lot size area to name a few 
(Mhatre, 2010). Neighborhood characteristics comprise neighborhood qualities where a 
housing unit is located such as education level, homeownership level, poverty level, 
income level, racial composition, unemployment level, and so on. Last, locational 
characteristics involve the proximity to amenities or disamenities from a house such as 
parks, rivers, lakes, central business district, shopping centers, and so on.  
According to Rosen’s framework, the hedonic price model is based on several 
assumptions, most of all that the market operates under perfect competition (Chin & 
Chau, 2003). In other words, there are numerous market participants and they have 
perfect information on housing products and prices in order to achieve a price 
equilibrium (Chin & Chau, 2003; Mhatre, 2010). This assumption could be valid in 
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terms of numerous market participants because there are many buyers seeking housing 
and developers supplying housing goods in the market. However, the condition of 
perfect information and knowledge on housing products is hard to realize in reality. 
Second, the hedonic price model works in market equilibrium, and there are no 
interrelationships between the implicit prices of attributes (Chin & Chau, 2003; Li, 2011; 
Mhatre, 2010). Market equilibrium is hard to assume due to the imperfections of reality 
(Chin & Chau, 2003). Also, the assumption of no interrelationships between the implicit 
prices of attributes is not plausible because it is clear that the implicit price of attributes 
vary throughout all areas and property types (Chin & Chau, 2003; Mhatre, 2010). 
Notwithstanding these controversial assumptions, the hedonic price model has been 
widely employed to determine implicit prices, especially in terms of assessing the 
externalities of amenities or disamenities on nearby property values. When the hedonic 
price model is free of the misspecification of variables and accounting for all relevant 
factors that capture the variance in sales price, the hedonic price model is more reliable 
than other methods such as the sales comparison approach, contingent valuation, and 
traditional appraisal techniques (Mhatre, 2010). 
Several prior studies employed the hedonic price model, especially in terms of 
the cross-sectional approach, to estimate the impact of subsidized housing programs on 
nearby property values. However, the lack of methodological rigor of prior studies 
produces confusing findings, and it casts doubt on the validity of prior results (Nguyen, 
2005). The methodologies of previous studies have fatal flaws in terms of two aspects. 
First, one potential drawback of the hedonic price model is the problem of omitted 
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variables. In other words, if some relevant variables related to the property 
characteristics are omitted or unmeasured by the model, the hedonic price model may 
yield biased estimates (Schwartz, Ellen, Voicu, & Schill, 2006). Some researchers have 
tried to employ a repeat sales analysis to overcome the problem of omitted variables. If 
omitted variables are time-constant, we can eliminate these time-constant variables in 
the repeat sales analysis through differencing (Wooldridge, 2009). However, this model 
cannot explain variables that are time-constant or that change slowly (Schwartz, Ellen, 
Voicu, & Schill, 2006; Wooldridge, 2009). Also, we can only include some property 
data that transacts multiple times in the model, so this analysis suffers from the problem 
of inherent selection bias (Schwartz, Ellen, Voicu, & Schill, 2006). Second, the 
methodologies of previous studies have flaws in terms of the direction of causality 
(Galster, Temkin, Walker, & Sawyer, 2004). In other words, they failed to account for 
the causal direction in the impacts of subsidized housing developments, that is, whether 
subsidized housing causes the depreciation of property values in neighborhoods, or 
subsidized housing complexes are placed only in neighborhoods with declining housing 
prices (Nguyen, 2005). The majority of prior studies fundamentally suffer from the 
problem of selection bias because of failing to account for the lower preexisting price 
levels of neighborhoods where subsidized housing was developed (Koschinsky, 2009).  
 
5.2.2 AITS-DID (Adjusted Interrupted Time Series-Difference in Differences) Model 
The direction of causality should be explained in the analytical model in order to 
unveil contradictory results on the impact of subsidized housing that stem from the 
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methodological flaw. The methodologies of prior studies failed to distinguish the causal 
direction of the impact of subsidized housing. The most recent quasi-experimental 
research design, which is the AITS-DID (Adjusted Interrupted Time Series-Difference in 
Differences) model, could shed light on the direction of causality. The AITS-DID model 
was originally devised by Galster, Temkin, Walker, and Sawyer (2004) as the Adjusted 
Interrupted Time Series (AITS) model and adjusted by Schwartz, Ellen, Voicu, and 
Schill (2006) as the Difference in Differences (DID) model (Koschinsky, 2009). While 
the DID model only focuses on the differences in housing price levels, the AITS model 
measures the differences in both housing price levels as well as trends (Koschinsky, 
2009). Even though there are some differences between both models, especially in terms 
of controlling the levels and trends in housing prices, the logic of both empirical models 
is very similar. In this context, Koschinsky (2009) coined the term “AITS-DID” model 
in order to acknowledge both studies. 
The AITS-DID model estimates the levels and trends in coefficients in two kinds 
of neighborhoods during two periods (Galster, 2004). Specifically, this approach 
compares housing price differentials in neighborhoods including subsidized housing 
before and after it was developed with those in nearby neighborhoods where subsidized 
housing was not developed for the same years (Galster, 2004; Koschinsky, 2009). The 
heart of the AITS-DID model could be intuitively illustrated as in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9. Illustration of Potential Impacts of Subsidized Housing on Nearby Property 
Values, Adapted from "The Effects of Affordable and Multifamily Housing on Market 
Values of Nearby Homes," by G. C. Galster, 2004, In A. Downs (Ed.), Growth 
management and affordable housing: Do they conflict? (pp. 176-211): Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press. 
 
The idea of the AITS-DID model stems from the core of the pre/post approach as 
well as the impact/control approach simultaneously. To be specific, this model captures 
the differentials in levels and trends of pre- and post-housing prices associated with the 
subsidized housing developments by comparing control and impact sales (Koschinsky, 
2009; Lee, 2008). As seen in Figure 9, assume that housing price trends in control sales 
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are the line E-E’-E” while those in impact sales are the line A-A’-A”. The primary 
interest of the AITS-DID approach is a pre/post break in the trend of impact sales 
compared with control sales. In this context, the estimated line A-A’-A’’ points out that 
there was no impact of subsidized housing because the housing price trend of post-
development in impact sales continues to be parallel with those in control sales, E-E’-E”. 
This also means that the housing price differential of post-development, A”-E”, is not 
changed when compared with the housing differential of predevelopment, A’-E’ (Galster, 
2004). However, if the housing price of post-development in impact sales shifted up (A-
A’-B’-B”) or increased more steeply than those in the control sales (A-A’-B’’’), then 
this situation indicates a positive impact of subsidized housing (Galster, 2004). In 
contrast, if the housing price of post-development in impact sales shifted down (A-A’-
C’-C’’) or increased less steeply than those in the control sales (A-A’-D”), it signifies a 
negative impact of subsidized housing (Galster, 2004).  
The fundamental concept of the AITS-DID model is grounded in those of the 
hedonic price model (Koschinsky, 2009). The centerpiece of the AITS-DID model is 
estimating the implicit price for neighborhood attributes where subsidized housing units 
are developed. However, this model controls for the locational and neighborhood 
characteristics of properties through the spatial fixed effects, and clarifies the direction 
of causality to capture the differentials in levels and trends of pre- and post-housing 
prices associated with subsidized housing developments by comparing control and 
impact sales. Thus, the baseline model in this study could be specified as: 
 int intln ,α β γ δ ζ η ε= + + + + + +i it i n itP S T L N R   (3) 
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where ln 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡 is the log of housing sales price of property i in neighborhood n at time t, 
that is transformed to a natural logarithmic functional form to reduce skew and pull in 
outliers. 𝑆𝑖 is a vector of property related structural characteristics such as heated areas, 
number of fireplaces, number of full-bathrooms, half-bathrooms, bedrooms, and age, to 
name a few. The vector 𝑇𝑖𝑡 is a set of time dummy variables for each property indicating 
the year and quarter in which the sale occurred in order to account for seasonal 
differences. The variable 𝐿𝑖 includes the dummy variables of locational characteristics 
for each property such as proximity to parks (within 250 feet), rivers and lakes (within 
500 feet), and the geographic coordinates of each property (normalized by the distance 
to the CBD) to capture any remaining locational attributes (Koschinsky, 2009). 𝑁𝑛 is a 
set of census tract fixed effects capturing the unobserved and time-invariant 
neighborhood characteristics, which was specified in the Year 2000 census tracts. 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is 
a vector of ring variables, which is the core of the analysis that captures housing price 
differentials before and after LIHTC projects were developed within a 
microneighborhood, described in more detail in the section describing independent 
variables. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is an error term of the model. The coefficients 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾, 𝛿, 𝜁, and 𝜂 are 
estimated employing traditional ordinary least squares (OLS) with a heteroskedasticity-
robust standard error in order to address heteroskedasticity which might violate the 
assumption that the variance of the error term is the same across the housing submarket 
segmentations or space (Koschinsky, 2009; Wooldridge, 2009).  
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This study also explored the associations between subsidized housing and nearby 
property values by considering the size effects of subsidized housing. Specifically, the 
model for capturing the size effects of subsidized housing could be developed as: 
 int intln ,α β γ δ ζ η µ ε= + + + + + + +i it i n it itP S T L N R M   (4) 
where 𝑀𝑖 is a vector of size variables that explores the size effects of newly developed 
subsidized housing, which is the total number of subsidized housing units within a 
microneighborhood after that subsidized housing was developed. Further, for each city, 
these models were estimated separately for three types of neighborhoods stratified by 
family income, to test whether impacts of subsidized housing vary based on income 
heterogeneity.  
 
5.2.2.1 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in this model is the sales price for single-family housing 
units (𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑡). The natural log transformation is usually used when the dependent variable 
is a positive dollar amount (Wooldridge, 2009). When the range of the variable is broad, 
the natural log transformation can narrow this range. To be specific, taking logs for the 
variable (to the base e) can stabilize the variance of the variable when the variance 
increases remarkably as the value of the variable increases (Mhatre, 2010). Thus, the 
model using the natural log transformation as the dependent variable often satisfies the 
normality assumption. After we checked the dependent variable for normality using tests 
for kurtosis and skewness, the dependent variable was transformed using a natural log 
transformation. In sum, by using the algebraic properties of the logarithmic functions, 
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the percent change in the predicted value of the dependent variable (y) in case of a unit 
change in the independent variables 𝑥𝑖 could be specified as: 
 % 100 [exp( ) 1],β∆ = ⋅ ∆ −i iy x  (5) 
where 𝛽𝑖∆𝑥𝑖 is the coefficient representing expected change in the value of the 
independent variable x (Wooldridge, 2009). 
 
5.2.2.2 Independent Variables 
Independent variables consist of structural, locational, neighborhood, and the 
LIHTC development characteristics of each property. The model for Charlotte includes 
several structural characteristics (𝑆𝑖) such as heated areas, building age, number of 
bathrooms, number of half bathrooms, number of bedrooms, number of fireplaces, 
heating sources (electric, oil, and others), exterior types (brick/stone and others), and 
housing quality (the lowest [below average] and highest [very good-excellent]). Also, 
the model for Cleveland uses property sizes, heated areas, number of bathrooms, number 
of half bathrooms, number of bedrooms, building age, housing quality (the lowest 
[unsound-poor] and highest [very good-excellent]), exterior types (brick/stone and 
others), and housing styles (bungalow, colonial, and others). Those structural variables 
were selected after testing for multicollinearity problems. Specifically, among various 
structural characteristics, each variable which had a variance inflation factor (VIF) value 
greater than 10 was excluded from the final variables. Further, after checking the 
normality of each variable using tests for kurtosis and skewness, two variables (heated 
areas and number of bedrooms) for Charlotte and three variables (property sizes, heated 
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areas, and number of bedrooms) for Cleveland were transformed using a natural log 
transformation. Also, the independent variable that is the age of a structure consists of 
quadratic functions to capture the marginal effect.  
To control the locational (𝐿𝑖) and neighborhood characteristics (𝑁𝑛) of each 
property, the model includes spatial fixed effects variables, especially in terms of using 
the census tract fixed effects and geographic coordinates of each property. The census 
tract fixed effects were derived from Year 2000 census tracts. The x-y coordinates were 
normalized by the distance to the CBD. In addition, indicators for the proximity to parks 
in Charlotte and those for parks, rivers, and lakes in Cleveland were used to account for 
locational characteristics of properties. To account for seasonal differences for housing 
sales, independent variables included time dummy variables for each property indicating 
the year and quarter in which the sale occurred. To be more specific, time variables 
consisted of eleven indicators for the year of sale (with 1996 as the reference category) 
and three indicators for the quarter (with the first quarter as the reference category) in 
which the sale occurred. 
The key variables comprise the vector of ring variables (𝑅𝑖𝑡), which capture the 
differentials in levels and trends of pre- and post-housing prices relating to the LIHTC 
housing developments by comparing control and impacts sales (Galster, 2004; 
Koschinsky, 2009; Lee, 2008). Differences between impact and control sales are also 
controlled by spatial fixed effects, especially by trend surface (x-y coordinates) and 
census tract dummy variables (Koschinsky, 2009). The inherent concept of these 
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variables could be accounted for with two aspects: 1) control/impacts sales and; 2) 
pre/post differentials of housing prices.  
First, all sales can be categorized into two groups: control sales and impact sales. 
Impact sales are defined as single-family housing units where subsidized housing is 
located within the property’s microneighborhood. Control sales are properties where 
subsidized housing is not within the property’s microneighborhood but located in the 
same census tract with impact sales (Koschinsky, 2009). Second, the ring variables 
measure the differentials in the levels and trends of housing prices in 
microneighborhoods including subsidized housing before and after its completion. 
Impact sales for housing prices and trends can be further divided into two categories 
according to the completion dates of subsidized housing: pre-impact sales and post-
impact sales. Pre-impact sales are transactions that occurred prior to the development of 
subsidized housing while post-impact sales are sales that took place after subsidized 
housing was developed within their microneighborhoods.  
The vector of ring variables includes four dummy variables for each of the two 
microneighborhoods for each property (0-500 feet and 500-2000 feet) in order to capture 
the differences in housing price levels and trends. Pre-impact sales for housing price 
levels (pre-price level) take on a value of one when there is or will be LIHTC 
developments within the microneighborhood of the residential property. The pre-impact 
sales capture the existing average price levels in microneighborhoods before subsidized 
housing is developed and reflect the inherent neighborhood price levels prior to 
subsidized housing. This variable measures the location effect that is not due to the 
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presence of subsidized housing developments. Post-impact sales for housing price levels 
(post-price level) take on a value of one when the residential property has a completed 
LIHTC development within the property’s microneighborhood. The post-impact sales 
measure the levels of housing price in microneighborhoods after subsidized housing is 
developed. By specifying these two dummy variables, we can compare the differentials 
in housing price levels with control sales for each of the two microneighborhoods before 
and after subsidized housing was developed.  
The vector of ring variables also includes two indicators for each of the two 
microneighborhoods in order to estimate the break in housing price trends. One variable 
signifies the distance in days between the date of sale and the beginning of the research 
period (pre-price trend) (Galster, Tatian, & Smith, 1999; Koschinsky, 2009). The other 
variable measures the distance in days between the date of sale and the completion date 
of subsidized housing (post-price trend) (Galster, Tatian, & Smith, 1999; Koschinsky, 
2009; Schwartz, Ellen, Voicu, & Schill, 2006). For instance, the post-price trend variable 
is 1/365 if a sale includes the LIHTC development within microneighborhoods and 
occurs the day after the completion of LIHTC development; it is one if the sale occurs 
one year after the completion of LIHTC development; and so on. Therefore, the vector 
of ring variables allows us to compare the differentials in levels and trends of housing 
prices between impact sales and control sales for each of the two types of 
microneighborhoods before and after subsidized housing was developed. Further, the 
size variable (𝜇𝑖𝑡) that explores the size effects of newly developed LIHTC housing was 
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included as the independent variable. This variable describes the total number of LIHTC 
units at the time of sale.  
The associated coefficients (𝛼,𝛽, 𝛾, 𝛿, 𝜁, 𝜂, and 𝜇) are estimated using traditional 
OLS with robust standard errors to account for any heteroskedasticity. When the 
variance of the unobservable error (𝜀𝑖𝑛𝑡) is not constant, the homoscedasticity 
assumption is violated. Even though the issue of heteroskedasticity does not cause bias 
or inconsistency in the OLS estimators, it makes the OLS estimator no longer BLUE 
(Best Linear Unbiased Estimators) (Wooldridge, 2009). In other words, the statistics 
used to test hypotheses are not valid due to the heteroskedasticity (Wooldridge, 2009). 
After using the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity (BP test) for our model in 
Charlotte and Cleveland, we checked the presence of heteroskedasticity that might 
violate the constant variance (See Table 11). Thus, our model does account for 
heteroskedasticity by estimating robust standard errors.  
 
Table 11. Breusch-Pagan Test for Heteroskedasticity 
Models 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg Test for Heteroskedasticity  
H0: Constant Variance / Variables: Fitted Values of ln(Sales) 
Charlotte 
chi2(1) = 1908.52 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Cleveland 
chi2(1) = 5935.84 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
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5.2.3 Extended Cox Hazard Model 
Housing sales may be influenced by structural, locational, and neighborhood 
characteristics. In this context, we used the extended Cox hazard model, which is a 
partial likelihood estimation method, to explore the impact of subsidized housing 
programs on neighborhood housing turnover. Housing sales were regarded as a hazard 
occurrence, and the housing duration was specified with the duration between the first 
sale and the next sale (Kim & Horner, 2003). The hazard model controls for both of 
these factors simultaneously and this is a significant advantage of employing the hazard 
analysis; using OLS or logistic regression would result in the loss of observations since 
we cannot use dichotomous data for sales occurrence in the OLS regression, and cannot 
use housing duration in the logistic regression. The hazard model also allows the 
equation to assume time dependence without having to specify time; additionally, it 
could easily control both time-varying independent variables and time-invariant 
independent variables (Vittinghoff, Glidden, Shiboski, & McCulloch, 2005). If time-
varying variables are considered in the Cox hazard model, the proportional hazard 
assumption is no longer satisfied (Kleinbaum & Klein, 2012). However, the Cox hazard 
model can still be used and is called the extended Cox hazard model (Kleinbaum & 
Klein, 2012). Another advantage of this approach is that after explicitly specifying the 
risk period, this model can handle certain types of censored observations, especially 
right-censored observations (Allison, 1984; Yamaguchi, 1991). For instance, censoring 
exists when an observation is not observed in its entirety during the risk period (1996 to 
2007). When the observation is terminated before the hazard has occurred, this 
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observation is censored on the right at the end of the risk period. Right-censored 
observations are those that sell after 2007 in this study. 
This study also clarified the direction of causality to capture the differentials in 
levels of pre- and post-neighborhood stability associated with subsidized housing 
developments by comparing control and impact sales (Galster, Tatian, & Smith, 1999; 
Koschinsky, 2009; Schwartz, Ellen, Voicu, & Schill, 2006). As a result, the extended 
Cox hazard framework considering time-varying key variables, which are the change of 
situation (newly developed) of subsidized housing over time, could be specified as: 
 [ ]0 ( ) exp ,α β γ θ= + + +int i i n ith h t P L N R   (6) 
where ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑡 is the hazard rates that are a log-linear function of parameters for the effects 
of co-variates for each property i at time t, and ℎ0(𝑡) is the baseline hazard function. 
Each vector, 𝐹𝑖, 𝐿𝑖, and 𝑁𝑛 which does not depend on time and Rit which depends on 
time, and their coefficients are the parameters to be estimated. To be specific, 𝑃𝑖 is a 
vector of the housing price ratio of property i. The housing sales price of the ith property 
in the kth year, is standardized by the average housing price in the kth year, in order to 
remove time dependency (Kim & Horner, 2003). The variable 𝐿𝑖 includes the dummy 
variables of locational characteristics for each property such as proximity to parks 
(within 250 feet), rivers and lakes (within 500 feet), and the geographic coordinates of 
each property (normalized by the distance to the CBD) to capture any remaining 
locational attributes (Koschinsky, 2009). 𝑁𝑛 is a set of census tract fixed effects 
capturing the unobserved and time-invariant neighborhood characteristics, which was 
specified in the Year 2000 census tracts. 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is a vector of ring variables that captures the 
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differentials of housing duration before and after subsidized housing was developed 
within a microneighborhood, described in more detail in the section describing 
independent variables and Appendix A. 
This paper also scrutinized the relationships between neighborhood stability and 
subsidized housing by considering the size effects of subsidized housing. To be specific, 
the model for capturing the size effects of subsidized housing could be developed as: 
 [ ]0 ( ) exp ,α β γ θ λ= + + + +int i i n it ith h t P L N R M   (7) 
where 𝑀𝑖𝑡 is a vector of size variables that explores the size effects of newly developed 
subsidized housing, which is the total number of subsidized housing units within a 
microneighborhood. 
The main interest in the models is to estimate the coefficients 𝜃, which relate to 
the effects of subsidized housing variables, and these coefficients can be estimated by 
using the following partial likelihood method: 
 
1
( ) exp ( ) exp ( ) ,
δ
θ η η
≥=
    
=     
    
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k ik i k jk i
k j i ki
Likelihood X t X t   (8) 
where Xi(j)k(t), which may depend on time, refers to the value of the kth co-variate for 
individual property i(j) at time t, and 𝛿𝑖 refers a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one when the ith property had an event (hazard) and zero if the ith property was censored. 
Furthermore, for each city, these models were estimated separately for three types of 
neighborhoods stratified by family income, to test whether impacts of subsidized 
housing vary based on income heterogeneity. 
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5.2.3.1 Dependent Variable 
Our sample is considered as a flow sample because data on housing transactions 
were collected over time period (1996 to 2007) (Kim & Horner, 2003). The dependent 
variable in our model consists of two actual data in terms of the duration of sales 
nonoccurrence (housing duration) and hazard occurrence. Housing turnover was 
regarded as the hazard occurrence, and the housing duration was calculated as the 
duration of each property’s transaction measured in days between the first sale and the 
next sale during the research period. If there was no next transaction for a given property 
during the research period, these observations were treated as a censored data in our 
models. 
One way to describe the hazard data set is to plot the Kaplan-Meier (K-M) 
survivor functions, which is an empirical plot showing the probabilities of surviving the 
dependent variable, the hazard, for each unit of time (Kaplan & Meier, 1958). 
 [ ]( ) ( /= −∏ t t t
t
S t n d n   (9) 
where let 𝑛𝑡 represents the number of observations that have not failed (not sold) at the 
beginning of time period t, and 𝑑𝑡 denotes the number of failure (the number of housing 
sales) that occur to these observations during time period t. The K-M estimator of 
surviving beyond time t (i.e., not having a sales occurrence before time t) is the product 
of survival probabilities in t (Poston, 2002). 
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Figure 10. Probability of Surviving the Hazard of Housing Turnover 
 
Figure 10 shows the probabilities of surviving the hazard of housing turnover for 
each day of analysis time in Charlotte and Cleveland. The K-M survivor curve for 
Charlotte steps down more rapidly than that for Cleveland. This step down is depicted in 
the K-M survivor curve above by showing that Charlotte decreases from a probability of 
near 1.0 of surviving the hazard of housing turnover to 0.5 by about the 1,800th day (5th 
year), while Cleveland decreases by the same probability, but by around the 3,300th day 
(9th year). Thus, there were clear differences for housing turnover between two cities in 
our sample; properties in Charlotte tend to turn over faster than those in Cleveland. 
 
5.2.3.2 Independent Variables 
Independent variables for this model include housing, locational, neighborhoods, 
and LIHTC development characteristics of each property. This model used the housing 
price variable (𝑃𝑖) instead of employing housing structural characteristics. Housing 
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structure characteristics such as heated areas, lot size, number of full-bathrooms, number 
of bedrooms, and building age might be related to housing turnovers. However, the 
housing price variable captures many of the amenities related to the property itself, 
especially in terms of housing structure characteristics. Hence, this study excluded 
housing structure characteristics in our model to resolve multicollinearity problems (Kim 
& Horner, 2003). Further, when it comes to using a housing price variable, this study 
used housing price ratios instead of exact price values to deal with the time-dependent 
nature of monetary variables (Kim & Horner, 2003). To remove time dependency from 
housing prices, the housing sales price of the ith property in the kth year, is standardized 
by the average housing price in the kth year, 𝑝𝚥� . It could be specified as: 
 = iki
j
px
p
  (10) 
To control the locational (𝐿i) and neighborhood characteristics (𝑁n) of each 
property, the model includes spatial fixed effects variables, with respect to using census 
tract fixed effects and geographic coordinates of each property. The census tract fixed 
effects were derived from Year 2000 census tracts. The x-y coordinates were normalized 
by the distance to the CBD. In addition, indicators for the proximity to parks in Charlotte 
and those for parks, rivers, and lakes in Cleveland were used to account for locational 
characteristics of properties. 
The key variables comprise the vector of ring variables (𝑅𝑖𝑡), which capture the 
differentials in levels of pre- and post-housing turnover ratios relating to the subsidized 
housing developments by comparing control and impact sales (Galster, 2004; 
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Koschinsky, 2009; Lee, 2008). Differences between impact and control sales are also 
controlled by spatial fixed effects (Koschinsky, 2009). Along with the logic of the AITS-
DID model, the inherent concept of these variables in the extended Cox hazard model 
could be explained in terms of the following: 1) control/impact sales and; 2) pre/post 
differentials of hazard. 
First, all sales can be categorized into two groups: control sales and impact sales. 
Impact sales are defined as housing transactions where subsidized housing is located 
within the property’s microneighborhood. Control sales are transactions where 
subsidized housing is not within the property’s microneighborhood but located in the 
same census tract with impact sales (Koschinsky, 2009). Second, the ring variables 
measure the differentials in the levels of hazard in microneighborhoods including 
subsidized housing before and after its completion. Impact sales can be further divided 
into two categories according to the completion dates of subsidized housing: pre-impact 
sales and post-impact sales. Pre-impact sales are transactions that occurred prior to the 
development of subsidized housing while post-impact sales are sales that took place after 
subsidized housing was developed within their microneighborhoods. 
The vector of ring variables includes two dummy variables for each of the two 
microneighborhoods for each property (0-500 feet and 500-2000 feet) in order to capture 
the differences in hazard ratios. Pre-impact sales take on a value of one when there is or 
will be LIHTC developments within the microneighborhood of the residential property. 
The pre-impact sales capture the existing average hazard ratios in microneighborhoods 
before subsidized housing is developed, and reflect the inherent neighborhood stability 
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prior to subsidized housing. Post-impact sales take on a value of one when the residential 
property has a completed LIHTC development within the property’s microneighborhood. 
The post-impact sales measure the levels of hazard in microneighborhoods after 
subsidized housing is developed. Therefore, the vector of ring variables allows us to 
compare the differentials in levels of housing turnover ratios between impact sales and 
control sales for each of the two types of microneighborhoods before and after 
subsidized housing was developed. Thus, the findings of this study assess the impacts of 
the LIHTC program on neighborhood stability by constructing multidimensional 
variables related to the impacts of subsidized housing in order to clarify the direction of 
causality.  
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CHAPTER VI  
RESULTS 
 
6.1 Bivariate Analysis for Social Equity 
The bivariate analysis in this chapter explored the associations between LIHTC 
subsidized households and geography of opportunities by identifying the 
sociodemographic characteristics of neighborhoods associated with locations of LIHTC 
projects and units. As I described in the methodology chapter, this study employed 
simple bivariate analysis, especially in terms of a location quotient (LQ), to examine the 
empirical evidence of the uneven geography of opportunities for subsidized households. 
This study employed 2000 decennial census data to identify the sociodemographic 
characteristics of neighborhoods. Further, this paper focused on all LIHTC projects 
developed between 2000 and 2007 in this analysis. Thus, by employing the location 
quotient index, we can identify the likelihood that census tracts with certain 
sociodemographic characteristics will receive LIHTC developments compared to the 
overall probability of census tracts receiving LIHTC subsidized housing.  
In terms of income levels in this analysis, this study stratified five types of 
neighborhoods by family income. Census tracts where the median family income was 
less than 50 percent of the city’s median family income were defined as very low-
income neighborhoods; census tracts with a median family income of 50 to 80 percent of 
the city’s median family income were defined as low-income neighborhoods; census 
tracts with a median family income of 80 to 100 percent of the city’s median family 
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income were defined as moderate-income neighborhoods; census tracts with a median 
family income of 100 to 120 percent of the city’s median family income were defined as 
middle-income neighborhoods; census tracts with a median family income of 120 to 140 
percent of the city’s median family income were defined as high-income neighborhoods; 
census tracts with a median family income higher than 140 percent of the city’s median 
family income were defined as very high-income neighborhoods (Galster, Temkin, 
Walker, & Sawyer, 2004). 
Poverty rates were the proportion of people living under poverty by census tracts. 
This study stratified five types of neighborhoods by poverty levels: poverty rates of less 
than 10 percent, from 10 to 20 percent, from 20 to 30 percent, from 30 to 40 percent, and 
over 40 percent in neighborhoods. With respect to defining the level of minorities (non-
white populations) and education in neighborhoods, this paper stratified five types of 
census tracts respectively by minority and education rates: non-white population or 
college degree holder rates of less than 20 percent, from 20 to 40 percent, from 40 to 60 
percent, from 60 to 80 percent, and over 80 percent. Unemployment rates by census 
tracts were also stratified by five types of neighborhoods: unemployment rates of less 
than 5 percent, from 5 to 10 percent, from 10 to 15 percent, from 15 to 20 percent, and 
over 20 percent. Median house value for each census tract was the proportion of city 
median house value and stratified into six types of neighborhoods: median house value 
of less than 50 percent, from 50 to 80 percent, from 80 to 100 percent, from 100 to 120 
percent, from 120 to 140 percent, and over 140 percent.  
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Table 12 indicates that the likelihood that neighborhoods with income, poverty, 
and minority levels received LIHTC subsidized housing compared to overall probability 
of neighborhoods receiving LIHTC subsidized housing between 2000 and 2007. LIHTC 
developments were likely to be located in very low-income neighborhoods. This spatial 
pattern was clearly evident in both Charlotte and Cleveland. LIHTC housing projects 
and units were 3.35 times and 3.14 times respectively as likely to be developed in very 
low-income neighborhoods in Charlotte compared to the expected rate, which is a 
likelihood of even distribution. The census tract in the lowest income category had over 
17 times and 11 times the probability of receiving a LIHTC project and unit than the 
census tract in the highest income category. Also, the likelihood of LIHTC projects and 
units being developed in very low-income neighborhoods in Cleveland were 1.63 times 
and 3.04 times, respectively, compared to the likelihood of even distribution. The index 
of LIHTC projects in Cleveland indicates that a large number of LIHTC projects were 
located in both very low-income and low-income neighborhoods, albeit the largest 
number of LIHTC units were sited in very low-income neighborhoods. This implies that 
the most LIHTC projects located in very low-income neighborhoods were large-scale 
developments. 
Table 12 also illustrates that LIHTC developments are likely to be located in high 
poverty neighborhoods. This pattern was obvious for LIHTC developments in Cleveland. 
LIHTC projects in Cleveland were 1.85 times as likely to be located in over 40 percent 
poverty neighborhoods, and the total units of LIHTC projects were 2.33 times as likely 
to be sited in those neighborhoods. Moreover, the likelihood of LIHTC developments 
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being distributed in neighborhoods of the lowest poverty level was zero. This shows that 
there were no LIHTC developments in low poverty neighborhoods of Cleveland between 
2000 and 2007. LIHTC developments in Charlotte were sited in neighborhoods where 
between 20 and 40 percent of the households were below the poverty line. 
 
Table 12. Location Quotients of LIHTC Developments by Income, Poverty, and 
Minority Levels in Neighborhoods 
 
         Charlotte          Cleveland 
Projects Units Projects Units 
Projects (Units) by Income 
Very Low-income 3.35  3.14  1.63  3.04  
Low-income 1.30  1.65  1.60  1.26  
Moderate-income 0.24  0.16  1.46  1.46  
Middle-income 1.32  0.85  0.70  0.33  
High-income 0.00  0.00  0.13  0.15  
Very High-income 0.19  0.27  0.28  0.09  
     
Projects (Units) by Poverty Level 
0-10% 0.40  0.32  0.00  0.00  
10-20% 0.99  1.45  0.18  0.15  
20-30% 3.35  2.90  1.24  0.75  
30-40% 2.55  2.55  1.79  1.80  
Over 40% 0.00  0.00  1.85  2.33  
     
Projects (Units) in Minority Neighborhoods 
0-20% 0.00  0.00  0.15  0.13  
20-40% 0.66  0.57  0.68  0.40  
40-60% 1.04  0.97  0.88  0.49  
60-80% 1.12  0.64  0.94  2.60  
Over 80% 2.86  3.32  1.70  1.54  
 
LIHTC developments were also likely to be located in neighborhoods with a 
higher percent of minorities. To be specific, LIHTC developments were distributed in 
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neighborhoods with more than 80 percent minorities in both cities. The likelihood of 
LIHTC projects and units in Charlotte being sited in neighborhoods of minorities 
exceeding 80 percent were 2.86 times and 3.32 times, respectively, compared to the 
expected rate, which is a likelihood of even distribution. Furthermore, LIHTC housing 
complexes were not developed in neighborhoods of the category of lowest minorities 
(less than 20 percent minorities) between 2000 and 2007. LIHTC projects in Cleveland 
were 1.70 times as likely to be located in neighborhoods with over 80 percent minorities. 
Also, LIHTC units were 1.54 times as likely to be developed in the category of highest 
minorities (neighborhoods of over 80 percent minorities). The census tract in the 
category of highest minorities had over 11 times the probability of receiving a LIHTC 
project and unit than the census tract in the category of lowest minorities. 
Table 13 indicates how the spatial distribution of LIHTC developments varies by 
the percent of population with college education, unemployment, and median house 
value in census tracts. LIHTC housing complexes in both cities were not developed in 
neighborhoods of high education between 2000 and 2007. Also, LIHTC developments in 
both cities were likely to be sited in neighborhoods where less educated populations 
resided. This pattern was pronounced, especially in Charlotte. The likelihood of LIHTC 
projects and units being sited in neighborhoods with less than a 20% education level 
were 2.08 times and 2.30 times. 
Furthermore, LIHTC developments were likely to be located in neighborhoods 
with high unemployment levels. The likelihood of LIHTC projects and units in 
Cleveland being sited in neighborhoods with more than a 20% unemployment rate were 
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2.34 times and 2.70 times. The census tract in the highest unemployment category had 
over 29 times and 30 times the probability of receiving a LIHTC project and unit than 
the census tract in the lowest unemployment category. In terms of Charlotte, LIHTC 
development projects and units were 13.40 times and 12.69 times as likely to be located 
in the neighborhoods of 10 to 15 percent unemployment levels.  
 
Table 13. Location Quotients of LIHTC Developments by Education, Unemployment, 
and Housing Value Levels in Neighborhoods 
 
         Charlotte         Cleveland 
Projects Units Projects Units 
Projects (Units) by Education 
0-20% 2.08  2.30  1.28  1.24  
20-40% 0.97  0.71  0.09  0.03  
40-60% 0.19  0.27  1.01  2.07  
60-80% 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Over 80% 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
     
Projects (Units) by Unemployment 
0-5% 0.54  0.49  0.08  0.09  
5-10% 2.55  3.04  0.44  0.92  
10-15% 13.40  12.69  1.25  0.67  
15-20% 0.00  0.00  1.73  1.47  
Over 20% 0.00  0.00  2.34  2.70  
     
Projects (Units) by Median House Value (% of City Median) 
0-50% 2.45  2.17  1.06  1.71  
50-80% 1.44  1.79  1.87  1.40  
80-100% 1.15  0.64  1.13  0.74  
100-120% 0.46  0.75  0.67  1.29  
120-140% 0.33  0.48  0.00  0.00  
Over 140% 0.00  0.00  0.43  0.35  
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Table 13 also shows that LIHTC developments were likely to be located in 
neighborhoods of lower housing value. This spatial pattern was noticeable in both cities. 
The likelihood of LIHTC projects and units in Charlotte were 2.45 times and 2.17 times 
respectively as likely to be developed in neighborhoods of less than 50 percent of city 
median house value. The likelihood of LIHTC projects and units in Cleveland being 
sited in neighborhoods with 50 to 80 percent of median house value was 1.87 times and 
1.40 times. In addition, the likelihood of LIHTC units in Cleveland being distributed in 
neighborhoods of less than 50 percent median house value was 1.71 times.  
 
6.2 Impacts of LIHTC Developments on Nearby Property Values 
The study in this section employed the AITS-DID approach to examine the 
relationships between LIHTC developments and nearby property values. The analysis 
assesses the impacts of the LIHTC program on neighboring housing prices by 
constructing multidimensional variables related to the impacts of subsidized housing in 
order to clarify the direction of causality. First, the analyses were conducted at the 
citywide level for Charlotte and Cleveland. Subsequently, for each city, models were 
estimated separately for three types of neighborhoods stratified by family income to test 
whether impacts of LIHTC developments vary based on income heterogeneity.  
 
6.2.1 Citywide Results 
Table 14 shows the results for the citywide models for Charlotte and Cleveland. I 
first present the results for Charlotte.  
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Table 14. Citywide Results 
Variables 
Citywide Results, Charlotte  Citywide Results, Cleveland 
Beta Adj.Beta† Robust Std. Err 
 Beta Adj.Beta† Robust Std. Err 
Pre-impact 0-500 feet -0.099 *** -9.404  0.035   -0.147 * -13.681  0.076  
Post-impact 0-500 feet -0.059  -5.714  0.037   0.126  13.391  0.082  
Pre-impact 500-2,000 feet -0.050 *** -4.851  0.011   -0.074 *** -7.160  0.028  
Post-impact 500-2,000 feet -0.067 *** -6.466  0.013   0.058 * 5.990  0.032  
Pre-trend 0-500 feet 0.008 * 0.845  0.004   0.024 ** 2.386  0.011  
Post-trend 0-500 feet 0.011 ** 1.107  0.005   -0.029 ** -2.906  0.012  
Pre-trend 500-2,000 feet 0.004 *** 0.419  0.002   0.010 ** 1.018  0.005  
Post-trend 500-2,000 feet 0.008 *** 0.806  0.002   -0.005  -0.523  0.005  
No. of LIHTC Units 0.000  -0.012  0.000   0.000  -0.005  0.000  
Log Heated Areas 0.641 *** 0.641 0.005   0.381 *** 0.381  0.020  
Log Property Sizes - - -  0.091 *** 0.091  0.011  
Building Age -0.009 *** -0.916  0.000   -0.013 *** -1.307  0.001  
Building Age2 0.000 *** 0.010  0.000   0.000 *** 0.005  0.000  
Log Number of Bedrooms 0.023 *** 0.023  0.008   0.070 *** 0.070  0.017  
Number of Full Bathrooms 0.065 *** 6.763  0.003   0.018  1.779  0.013  
Number of Half Bathrooms 0.004  0.360  0.002   0.037 *** 3.767  0.013  
Number of Fireplaces 0.048 *** 4.959  0.003   - - - 
Electric Heating Source  0.009 *** 0.877  0.003   - - - 
Oil Heating Source 0.011  1.068  0.014   - - - 
Brick/Stone Exterior Types 0.108 *** 11.450  0.003   0.051 *** 5.262  0.009  
High-Housing Quality 0.211 *** 23.482  0.012   0.066  6.830  0.054  
Low-Housing Quality -0.073 *** -7.008  0.022   -0.210 *** -18.982  0.021  
Bungalow Housing Style - - -  0.059 *** 6.086  0.015  
Colonial Housing Style - - -  0.055 *** 5.628  0.008  
Parks within 250 feet -0.016 *** -1.572  0.004   0.003  0.269  0.016  
River/Lake within 500 feet - - -  0.001  0.077  0.017  
X, Y Coordinates (CBD) Yes  Yes 
Census Tract Fixed Effects Yes  Yes 
Seasonal Indicators Yes  Yes 
Number of Observations 114,471  27,634 
𝑅2 0.7623  0.4004 
***Denotes a 1% significance level; **denotes a 5% significance level; *denotes a 10% significance level 
† Adjustment = 100(𝑒𝛽-1), except Log Heated Areas, Log Property Sizes, and Log Number of Bedrooms. 
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The model fits the data well and the variables included explain around 76.2 
percent of the variance in the property values. For sales price, the model showed 
expected coefficient signs for all structural variables. Properties with larger heated areas, 
more bedrooms and bathrooms, younger building ages, higher housing qualities, and 
brick/stone exterior types showed statistically significant higher sales prices (p<0.01). 
For instance, when heated areas increased by 1 percent, housing prices increased by 0.64 
percent, ceteris paribus. Also, when a house had a brick/stone exterior type, the housing 
price increased by 11.45 percent, holding all other factors fixed. 
The main substantive result analyzed with the AITS-DID model for Charlotte 
was that the completion of LIHTC developments in a microneighborhood had a 
significant negative effect on nearby property values (see Table 14 and Figure 11). The 
coefficient of pre-impact variables showed negative signs. This indicates that the 
housing price level is lower compared to the control area (i.e., outside the impact area 
but in the same census tract) before the LIHTC projects are sited. Holding all other 
factors constant, the housing price level for impact sales was 9.4 percent lower in the 
inner ring (immediate neighborhood) and 4.9 percent lower in the outer ring (functional 
neighborhood) compared to control properties located outside of the 
microneighborhoods before LIHTC projects were developed. However, the gap in 
housing price level between impact and control sales increased after the introduction of 
LIHTC units into the microneighborhoods; the post-impact variable was statistically 
significant only in the outer ring. After the LIHTC complexes were developed within 
functional neighborhoods, the housing price level for impact sales was 6.5 percent lower 
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compared to control sales. This indicates that the gap in housing price levels increased 
from -4.9 percent to -6.5 percent after the introduction of LIHTC units into the 
functional neighborhoods. Price trend changes were far less substantial within immediate 
and functional neighborhoods, averaging around a 0.9 percent and a 0.4 percent incline 
before the development of LIHTC projects, and a 1.1 percent and a 0.8 percent incline, 
respectively, after the development. The project size effect was not statistically 
significant in Charlotte.  
 
 
Figure 11. Citywide Results in Charlotte: Pre- and Post-Sales Price Levels and Trends 
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Cleveland’s citywide model explained around 40.0 percent of the variance in the 
property values using the variables included. The model showed expected coefficient 
signs for all structural variables. For example, when heated areas increased by 1 percent, 
the housing prices increased by 0.38 percent, holding other factors fixed. In addition, 
when a house had a low-housing quality, the housing price decreased by 13.98 percent, 
ceteris paribus.  
The results for Cleveland for LIHTC developments tell an opposite story to those 
for Charlotte. It is notable that the LIHTC developments in a microneighborhood had a 
positive impact on surrounding housing prices (see Table 14 and Figure 12). The 
coefficients for pre-impact variables showed negative signs, like those in Charlotte. The 
housing price level for impact sales was 13.7 percent lower in the inner ring and 7.2 
percent lower in the outer ring compared to control sales located outside of the 
microneighborhoods before LIHTC projects were sited. The pre-existing housing price 
level of the control area prior to LIHTC developments was lower than that of the control 
area. However, after the LIHTC projects were developed in the immediate and 
functional neighborhoods, the housing price levels were 13.4 percent and 6.0 percent 
higher, respectively, than for control sales; however, the post-impact variables were 
statistically significant only in the functional neighborhoods. This indicates that the 
completion of the LIHTC developments significantly increased the level of housing 
price in neighborhoods, particularly within the functional neighborhood from -7.2 
percent to 6.0 percent. Positive pre-price trends within immediate and functional 
neighborhoods contrast with declining post-price trends by around 2.9 percent and 0.5 
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percent, respectively. However, post-price trend variables were statistically significant 
only in the immediate neighborhoods. In addition, the association between the project 
size of the LIHTC and housing prices was not statistically significant in Cleveland. 
In sum, the citywide results for Charlotte show that the introduction of the 
LIHTC developments had a negative impact on nearby property values. In contrast, the 
LIHTC developments for Cleveland positively affected surrounding housing prices. This 
suggests that local housing market conditions (i.e., hot and cold markets) may account 
for these differences in housing prices for these cities.  
 
 
Figure 12. Citywide Results in Cleveland: Pre- and Post-Sales Price Levels and Trends 
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6.2.2 Neighborhood Heterogeneity Results 
This study also examined how impacts of LIHTC developments vary according 
to housing submarket heterogeneity in terms of income levels. This section presents the 
results for low, middle, and high-income neighborhoods in Charlotte and Cleveland. The 
results suggested a mixed story according to neighborhood heterogeneity and contrasting 
housing market conditions.  
 
Table 15. Results in Low-income Neighborhoods 
Variables 
Low-income Submarkets,  
Charlotte 
 Low-income Submarkets,  
Cleveland 
Beta Adj.Beta† Robust Std. Err 
 Beta Adj.Beta† Robust Std. Err 
Pre-impact 0-500 feet -0.159 *** -14.724  0.062   -0.179  -16.384  0.136  
Post-impact 0-500 feet 0.043  4.429  0.065   0.157  17.011  0.132  
Pre-impact 500-2,000 feet -0.101 *** -9.594  0.024   -0.069  -6.692  0.065  
Post-impact 500-2,000 feet 0.012  1.167  0.026   0.114 * 12.062  0.065  
Pre-trend 0-500 feet 0.005  0.507  0.007   0.020  2.053  0.016  
Post-trend 0-500 feet 0.014 ** 1.414  0.006   -0.018  -1.767  0.017  
Pre-trend 500-2,000 feet 0.007 ** 0.699  0.004   0.006  0.632  0.010  
Post-trend 500-2,000 feet 0.005  0.498  0.003   0.003  0.327  0.009  
No. of LIHTC Units 0.000 *** -0.027  0.000   0.000  -0.022  0.000  
Log Heated Areas 0.517 *** 0.517  0.018   0.327 *** 0.327  0.061  
Log Property Sizes - - -  0.093 *** 0.093  0.032  
Building Age -0.010 *** -1.006  0.000   -0.018 *** -1.784  0.001  
Building Age2 0.000 *** 0.011  0.000   0.000 *** 0.008  0.000  
Log Number of Bedrooms -0.041 ** -0.041  0.019   0.066  0.066  0.046  
Number of Full Bathrooms 0.071 *** 7.362  0.009   -0.012  -1.144  0.032  
Number of Half Bathrooms 0.026 *** 2.640  0.006   0.044  4.507  0.037  
Number of Fireplaces 0.059 *** 6.130  0.006   - - - 
Electric Heating Source  -0.016 ** -1.577  0.008   - - - 
Oil Heating Source 0.058 * 5.932  0.032   - - - 
Brick/Stone Exterior Types 0.080 *** 8.374  0.007   0.103 * 10.865  0.057  
High-Housing Quality 0.366  44.144  0.381   0.419 *** 51.991  0.126  
Low-Housing Quality -0.023  -2.261  0.026   -0.127 *** -11.958  0.032  
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Table 15. Continued 
Variables 
Low-income Submarkets,  
Charlotte 
 Low-income Submarkets,  
Cleveland 
Beta Adj.Beta† Robust Std. Err 
 Beta Adj.Beta† Robust Std. Err 
Bungalow Housing Style - - -  0.026  2.624  0.047  
Colonial Housing Style - - -  0.028  2.790  0.029  
Parks within 250 feet -0.010  -0.960  0.010   0.112 * 11.815  0.062  
River/Lake within 500 feet - - -  -0.434 *** -35.192  0.142  
X, Y Coordinates (CBD) Yes  Yes 
Census Tract Fixed Effects Yes  Yes 
Seasonal Indicators Yes  Yes 
Number of Observations 17,853  4,549 
𝑅2 0.5772  0.3442 
***Denotes a 1% significance level; **denotes a 5% significance level; *denotes a 10% significance level 
† Adjustment = 100(𝑒𝛽-1), except Log Heated Areas, Log Property Sizes, and Log Number of Bedrooms. 
 
Table 15 shows the results for low-income neighborhoods in Charlotte and 
Cleveland. The Charlotte model explained around 57.7 percent of the variance in the 
property values using the variables included. We can observe that the pre-impact 
variables showed negative coefficients indicating that the housing price level for impact 
sales was 14.7 percent lower in the inner ring and 9.6 percent lower in the outer ring 
compared to control sales located outside of the microneighborhoods before LIHTC 
projects were developed. However, the post-impact variables for low-income 
neighborhoods in Charlotte were not statistically significant. Similar to the previous 
models in terms of post-trend variables, post-price trend changes were far less 
substantial within immediate neighborhoods, averaging around a 1.4 percent incline after 
the development within immediate neighborhoods. However, pre-price trend changes for 
immediate neighborhoods were not statistically significant. The association between the 
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project size of the LIHTC and housing prices was statistically significant (p<0.01). A 
one-unit increase in the number of LIHTC units at the time of sale decreased the housing 
price by 0.03 percent, ceteris paribus, in the low-income neighborhoods of Charlotte. 
This indicates that a larger number of LIHTC projects for low-income neighborhoods 
had larger negative impacts on surrounding property values in Charlotte. 
The model for the low-income neighborhoods in Cleveland explained around 
34.4 percent of the variance in the property values using the variables included. The 
results for Cleveland showed that the LIHTC developments in a functional neighborhood 
had a positive impact on neighboring housing prices. The post-impact variable for 
functional neighborhoods showed a positive coefficient. This indicates that the housing 
price level was higher compared to the control area after the LIHTC projects were sited. 
Holding all other factors constant, the housing price level for impact sales was 12.1 
percent higher in the outer ring compared to control properties located outside of the 
microneighborhoods after LIHTC projects were developed. However, other variables 
related to LIHTC developments were not statistically significant.  
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Table 16. Results in Middle-income Neighborhoods 
Variables 
Middle-income Submarkets,  
Charlotte 
 Middle-income Submarkets,  
Cleveland 
Beta Adj.Beta† Robust Std. Err 
 Beta Adj.Beta† Robust Std. Err 
Pre-impact 0-500 feet -0.117 ** -11.031  0.051   -0.007  -0.715  0.108  
Post-impact 0-500 feet -0.166 *** -15.267  0.058   0.008  0.770  0.122  
Pre-impact 500-2,000 feet -0.025 * -2.470  0.013   -0.038  -3.740  0.038  
Post-impact 500-2,000 feet -0.150 *** -13.909  0.022   0.023  2.362  0.040  
Pre-trend 0-500 feet 0.017 *** 1.746  0.007   0.020  1.995  0.018  
Post-trend 0-500 feet -0.004  -0.443  0.012   -0.034  -3.345  0.021  
Pre-trend 500-2,000 feet 0.002  0.180  0.002   0.010  1.020  0.006  
Post-trend 500-2,000 feet 0.008 *** 0.768  0.002   -0.008  -0.791  0.006  
No. of LIHTC Units 0.001 *** 0.105  0.000   0.000  0.004  0.000  
Log Heated Areas 0.604 *** 0.604  0.007   0.368 *** 0.368  0.035  
Log Property Sizes - - -  0.072 *** 0.072  0.023  
Building Age -0.011 *** -1.084  0.000   -0.013 *** -1.295  0.001  
Building Age2 0.000 *** 0.012  0.000   0.000 *** 0.004  0.000  
Log Number of Bedrooms 0.051 *** 0.051  0.012   0.039  0.039  0.030  
Number of Full Bathrooms 0.079 *** 8.231  0.006   0.013  1.335  0.021  
Number of Half Bathrooms -0.004  -0.378  0.003   0.053 *** 5.460  0.018  
Number of Fireplaces 0.072 *** 7.478  0.004   - - - 
Electric Heating Source  0.026 *** 2.632  0.003   - - - 
Oil Heating Source 0.043 *** 4.356  0.016   - - - 
Brick/Stone Exterior Types 0.101 *** 10.637  0.006   -0.026  -2.587  0.028  
High-Housing Quality 0.409 *** 50.576  0.066   0.086  8.955  0.155  
Low-Housing Quality -0.278 *** -24.247  0.035   -0.262 *** -23.018  0.029  
Bungalow Housing Style - - -  -0.009  -0.944  0.030  
Colonial Housing Style - - -  0.062 *** 6.377  0.015  
Parks within 250 feet -0.020 *** -2.012  0.004   -0.015  -1.529  0.030  
River/Lake within 500 feet - - -  0.040  4.044  0.030  
X, Y Coordinates (CBD) Yes  Yes 
Census Tract Fixed Effects Yes  Yes 
Seasonal Indicators Yes  Yes 
Number of Observations 51,728  10,598 
𝑅2 0.5864  0.2877 
***Denotes a 1% significance level; **denotes a 5% significance level; *denotes a 10% significance level 
† Adjustment = 100(𝑒𝛽-1), except Log Heated Areas, Log Property Sizes, and Log Number of Bedrooms. 
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Table 16 presents the results for middle-income neighborhoods in Charlotte and 
Cleveland. The model for Charlotte explained around 58.6 percent of the variance in the 
property values using the variables included. The core result for middle-income 
neighborhoods in Charlotte was that the LIHTC developments in a microneighborhood 
had a negative impact on neighboring housing prices (see Table 16 and Figure 13). Pre-
impact variables showed negative signs in both immediate and functional neighborhoods 
indicating that the housing price levels were lower compared to the control sales before 
the LIHTC complexes were sited. Specifically, the housing price level for impact sales 
was 11.0 percent lower in the inner ring and 2.5 percent lower in the outer ring 
compared to control sales before LIHTC projects were developed. After the LIHTC 
complexes were developed in the microneighborhoods, however, the gaps in housing 
price level increased. To be more specific, after the introduction of LIHTC complexes 
into the immediate and functional neighborhoods, the housing price level for impacts 
sales was 15.3 percent and 13.9 percent lower than it was for those in the control sales, 
respectively. This indicates that the gaps in housing price increased from -11.0 percent to 
-15.3 percent within immediate neighborhoods and from -2.5 percent to -13.9 percent 
within functional neighborhoods after the LIHTC developments were sited. Post-price 
trend change for functional neighborhoods was statistically significant (p<0.01), 
indicating an average of around 0.8 percent incline after the development. It is 
noteworthy that building more units in LIHTC developments appears to mitigate the 
negative effects of LIHTC developments; a one-unit increase in the number of LIHTC 
units at the time of sale increased housing price by 0.1 percent, ceteris paribus. This 
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implies that although the introduction of LIHTC projects negatively affected 
neighboring housing prices, the larger size of LIHTC developments mitigates those 
spillover effects in the middle-income neighborhoods of Charlotte. 
 
 
Figure 13. Results in Middle-income Neighborhoods, Charlotte: Pre- and Post-Sales 
Price Levels and Trends 
 
For Cleveland, the R2 for the middle-income neighborhoods was lower than that 
for other models such as models for low- and high-income neighborhoods. The model 
accounted for around 28.8 percent of the variance in the property values using the 
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variables included. Compared to other models, small numbers of structural variables 
were only statistically significant. Furthermore, the variables related to the introduction 
of LIHTC projects were not statistically significant in the middle-income neighborhoods 
of Cleveland.  
 
Table 17. Results in High-income Neighborhoods 
Variables 
High-income Submarkets,  
Charlotte 
 High-income Submarkets,  
Cleveland 
Beta Adj.Beta† Robust Std. Err 
 Beta Adj.Beta† Robust Std. Err 
Pre-impact 0-500 feet 0.069  7.161  0.046   -0.181  -16.540  0.161  
Post-impact 0-500 feet 0.034  3.444  0.069   0.381 ** 46.328  0.192  
Pre-impact 500-2,000 feet 0.037 ** 3.753  0.017   -0.079  -7.618  0.065  
Post-impact 500-2,000 feet -0.041 ** -4.014  0.020   0.037  3.731  0.102  
Pre-trend 0-500 feet -0.012  -1.201  0.005   0.026  2.649  0.019  
Post-trend 0-500 feet -0.011  -1.136  0.012   -0.055 *** -5.350  0.020  
Pre-trend 500-2,000 feet -0.008 *** -0.785  0.002   0.008  0.759  0.011  
Post-trend 500-2,000 feet 0.009 *** 0.872  0.002   -0.006  -0.564  0.012  
No. of LIHTC Units 0.000 *** -0.047  0.000   0.000  -0.009  0.001  
Log Heated Areas 0.766 *** 0.766  0.009   0.434 *** 0.434  0.023  
Log Property Sizes - - -  0.097 *** 0.097  0.012  
Building Age -0.005 *** -0.506  0.000   -0.010 *** -0.958  0.001  
Building Age2 0.000 *** 0.008  0.000   0.000 *** 0.003  0.000  
Log Number of Bedrooms -0.010  -0.010  0.011   0.101 *** 0.101  0.018  
Number of Full Bathrooms 0.037 *** 3.813  0.004   0.038 ** 3.851  0.017  
Number of Half Bathrooms 0.001  0.120  0.004   0.025  2.575  0.018  
Number of Fireplaces -0.040 *** -3.938  0.010   - - - 
Electric Heating Source  -0.009 * -0.852  0.005   - - - 
Oil Heating Source -0.138 ** -12.877  0.063   - - - 
Brick/Stone Exterior Types 0.126 *** 13.431  0.004   0.061 *** 6.333  0.008  
High-Housing Quality 0.219 *** 24.422  0.012   -0.036  -3.531  0.059  
Low-Housing Quality 0.299  34.840  0.206   -0.334 *** -28.393  0.080  
Bungalow Housing Style - - -  0.130 *** 13.899  0.014  
Colonial Housing Style - - -  0.051 *** 5.265  0.009  
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Table 17. Continued 
Variables 
High-income Submarkets,  
Charlotte 
 High-income Submarkets,  
Cleveland 
Beta Adj.Beta† Robust Std. Err 
 Beta Adj.Beta† Robust Std. Err 
Parks within 250 feet -0.021 *** -2.110  0.008   -0.004  -0.434  0.016  
River/Lake within 500 feet - - -  0.029 * 2.979  0.017  
X, Y Coordinates (CBD) Yes  Yes 
Census Tract Fixed Effects Yes  Yes 
Seasonal Indicators Yes  Yes 
Number of Observations 44,890  12,487 
𝑅2 0.6988  0.4327 
***Denotes a 1% significance level; **denotes a 5% significance level; *denotes a 10% significance level 
† Adjustment = 100(𝑒𝛽-1), except Log Heated Areas, Log Property Sizes, and Log Number of Bedrooms. 
 
In the high-income neighborhoods of Charlotte and Cleveland, the opposite 
results for the impacts of LIHTC developments between both cities were generally 
consistent with previous results (see Table 17). The LIHTC developments in a 
microneighborhood had a negative impact on surrounding housing prices in Charlotte 
while they had a positive impact in Cleveland. For Charlotte, we can observe that the 
pre-impact variables showed positive coefficients indicating that the pre-existing 
housing price level of impact areas prior to LIHTC developments was higher than that of 
the control areas; the pre-impact variable was statistically significant only in the 
functional neighborhoods. The pre-price level in high-income submarkets contrasts with 
that in other submarkets such as low- and middle-income neighborhoods in Charlotte. 
Specifically, the housing price level for impact sales was 3.8 percent higher in the 
functional neighborhoods compared to control sales located outside of the 
microneighborhoods before LIHTC projects were developed. However, the post-impact 
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variable for high-income neighborhoods showed a negative sign. After the LIHTC units 
were developed within functional neighborhoods, the housing price level for impact 
sales was 4.0 percent lower compared to control sales. This indicates that the gap in the 
housing price level increased from 3.8 percent to -4.0 percent after the introduction of 
LIHTC units into the functional neighborhoods of properties. Price trend changes were 
less substantial, averaging around a 0.8 percent decline before the LIHTC developments 
and a 0.9 percent incline after the development. The project size effect was also 
statistically significant (p<0.01), although the magnitude of this impact was not 
substantial; a one-unit increase in the number of LIHTC units at the time of sale 
decreased the housing price by 0.1 percent, ceteris paribus. 
For Cleveland, pre-impact variables were not statistically significant. However, 
the post-impact variable for functional neighborhoods was statistically significant 
(p<0.05). To be more specific, the housing price level for impact sales was 46.3 percent 
higher in the immediate neighborhoods compared to control sales after LIHTC projects 
were developed. Post-price trend change for immediate neighborhoods was also 
statistically significant (p<0.01), indicating an average of around a 5.3 percent decline 
after the LIHTC developments.  
 
6.3 Impacts of LIHTC Developments on Neighborhood Stability 
The analyses in this section employed the extended Cox hazard approach with 
difference-in-differences specifications to explore the associations between LIHTC 
developments and neighborhood housing turnover. Most of all, the analyses were 
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conducted at the citywide level for both Charlotte and Cleveland. Subsequently, for each 
city, models were estimated separately for three types of neighborhoods stratified by 
family income to test whether impacts of LIHTC developments vary based on income 
heterogeneity. 
 
6.3.1 Citywide Results 
Table 18 shows the key coefficients for the citywide models for Charlotte and 
Cleveland. I first present the results for Charlotte.  
 
Table 18. Citywide Results 
Variables 
Citywide Results, Charlotte  Citywide Results, Cleveland 
Coefficient z-score Hazard  Ratio 
 Coefficient z-score Hazard  Ratio 
Sales Price (Standardized) -0.063***  -5.17  0.939   -1.639***  -25.28  0.194  
Sales Price2 (Standardized) 0.013***  10.56  1.013   0.392***  14.33  1.480  
Pre-impact 0-500 feet -0.193  -1.36  0.825   -0.405***  -3.43  0.667  
Post-impact 0-500 feet 0.300**  2.01  1.350   0.573***  4.63  1.773  
Pre-impact 500-2,000 feet -0.321***  -5.10  0.726   -0.412***  -7.00  0.662  
Post-impact 500-2,000 feet 0.240***  4.14  1.271   0.539***  10.40  1.714  
No. of LIHTC Units 0.001  1.53  1.001   0.000  -1.52  1.000  
Park within 250 feet 0.068***  3.12  1.070   0.098*  1.83  1.103  
River/Lake within 500 feet - -  -   1.074***  14.27  2.928  
X, Y Coordinates (CBD) Yes  Yes 
Census Tract Fixed Effects Yes  Yes 
Number of Observations 59,882  20,824 
Log likelihood -370499.27  -81768.169 
Likelihood ratio 𝜒2 2,445.99***  3,252.42*** 
***Denotes a 1% significance level; **denotes a 5% significance level; *denotes a 10% significance level 
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For housing property values, the negative hazard coefficients indicate that sale 
prices of properties are inversely related to housing turnover rates; hence, more 
expensive properties tend to turn over more slowly on average. A one-unit increase in 
the annual average price ratio results in a 6.1 percent lower probability of housing 
turnover (hazard), keeping all other factors constant.2 However, this marginal effect, 
which is the probability of housing turnover, increases by 1.3 percent as the annual 
average price ratio increases. 
The completion of LIHTC developments in a microneighborhood had a significant 
spillover effect on neighborhood stability, as indicated by housing turnover, in Charlotte. 
Before the development of LIHTC projects within the microneighborhoods, the pre-
impact variables show a negative hazard coefficient. This indicates that the probability 
of housing turnover is lower compared to the control area (i.e., outside the impact area 
but in the same census tract) before the LIHTC projects are sited; it is statistically 
significant only in the outer ring (500 to 2,000 feet). Holding all other factors constant, 
the probability of housing turnover for impact sales was 17.5 percent less than that for 
control sales. However, the probability of housing turnover significantly increased after 
the introduction of LIHTC units into the microneighborhoods. The probability of 
housing turnover located adjacent and in proximity to LIHTC developments was 35.0 
percent higher in the inner ring (immediate neighborhood) and 27.1 percent higher in the 
outer ring (functional neighborhood) compared to control properties located outside of 
                                                 
2 If the values of the hazard coefficients are exponentiated, hazard ratios can be obtained. Thus, calculating 
100(eβ-1) indicates the percentage change in the hazard with each one unit change in independent variables, 
termed hazard ratios (Allison, 1984). 
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the microneighborhoods after LIHTC projects were sited. However, the association 
between the project size of the LIHTC and housing turnover was not statistically 
significant in Charlotte. 
The results for Cleveland tell a similar story to those for Charlotte. The coefficients 
for property values, like those in Charlotte, show that the probability of housing turnover 
is non-linear. However, the magnitude of property values on housing turnover is more 
substantial than other factors in the Cleveland housing market. For every additional one-
unit in the annual average price ratio, the probability of housing turnover is reduced by 
80.6 percent, but this marginal effect increases by 48.0 percent as the annual average 
price ratio increases. This implies that the housing sales price may be a primary 
determinant of the in- and out-migration of neighborhood residents in cities with 
depressed market conditions such as Cleveland. 
For Cleveland, the probabilities of housing turnover in the two distance rings 
before and after LIHTC developments show the same signs as that of Charlotte. The 
probability of housing turnover was 33.3 percent lower in the inner ring and 33.8 percent 
lower in the outer ring compared to the control areas before the LIHTC was developed. 
However, after the LIHTC projects are sited in the immediate and functional 
neighborhoods, the hazards of housing turnover were about 1.8 times and 1.7 times 
greater than it was for those in the control areas, respectively. Thus, the gaps in turnover 
between impact and control areas that exist before the completion of the LIHTC projects 
are magnified afterward, from -33.3 percent to 77.3 percent within immediate 
neighborhoods and from -33.8 percent to 71.4 percent within functional neighborhoods. 
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This indicates that the completion of the LIHTC developments significantly increased 
the probability of housing turnover in neighborhoods, particularly within the immediate 
neighborhood. The relationship between the project size of the LIHTC and housing 
turnover, like that in Charlotte, was not statistically significant in Cleveland.  
 
6.3.2 Neighborhood Heterogeneity Results 
This study also examined how impacts of LIHTC developments vary according 
to housing submarket heterogeneity in terms of income levels. This section presents the 
results for low, middle, and high income neighborhoods in Charlotte and Cleveland. The 
results suggest a mixed story according to neighborhood heterogeneity and contrasting 
housing market conditions.  
 
Table 19. Results in Low-income Neighborhoods 
Variables 
Low-income Submarkets,  
Charlotte 
 Low-income Submarkets,  
Cleveland 
Coefficient z-score Hazard  Ratio 
 Coefficient z-score Hazard  Ratio 
Sales Price (Standardized) -1.123***  -12.74  0.325   -1.138***  -8.78  0.320  
Sales Price2 (Standardized) 0.289***  15.28  1.335   0.328***  5.65  1.388  
Pre-impact 0-500 feet -0.160  -0.71  0.852   -0.188  -1.00  0.829  
Post-impact 0-500 feet 0.246  1.08  1.279   0.589***  3.25  1.803  
Pre-impact 500-2,000 feet -0.453***  -4.25  0.636   -0.404***  -3.49  0.667  
Post-impact 500-2,000 feet 0.438***  4.37  1.550   0.669***  8.01  1.952  
No. of LIHTC Units 0.000  0.90  1.000   0.000  -0.90  1.000  
Park within 250 feet -0.087*  -1.68  0.916   0.040  0.30  1.041  
River/Lake within 500 feet - - -   0.553*  1.92  1.738  
X, Y Coordinates (CBD) Yes  Yes 
Census Tract Fixed Effects Yes  Yes 
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Table 19. Continued 
Variables 
Low-income Submarkets,  
Charlotte 
 Low-income Submarkets,  
Cleveland 
Coefficient z-score Hazard  Ratio 
 Coefficient z-score Hazard  Ratio 
Number of Observations 9,604  3,198 
Log likelihood -46145.645  -13523.945 
Likelihood ratio 𝜒2 849.30***  396.86*** 
***Denotes a 1% significance level; **denotes a 5% significance level; *denotes a 10% significance level 
 
The results for low-income neighborhoods in Charlotte and Cleveland are 
presented in Table 19. For the low-income submarket in Charlotte, the coefficients for 
property values showed that the probability of housing turnover was non-linear. For 
every one unit increase in the annual price ratio, the probability of housing turnover was 
reduced by 67.5 percent, but the marginal effect increased by 33.5 percent as the annual 
price ratio increased. We can observe that the pre-impact variables showed negative 
coefficients and the coefficients for the post-impact variables were positive, indicating 
that the probabilities of housing turnover were lower compared to the control areas 
before LIHTC projects were developed and higher than the control areas after LIHTC 
developments were introduced. However, the probabilities of housing turnover were 
statistically significant only in the outer rings of Charlotte. For the low-income 
neighborhoods of Charlotte, the probability of housing turnover in the outer ring was 
36.4 percent less than that for the control properties, before LIHTC was developed, and 
55.0 percent higher than control properties after LIHTC was introduced. In sum, the 
probability of selling properties including completed LIHTC projects within their 
functional neighborhoods, not within immediate neighborhoods, significantly increased 
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in the low-income submarkets of Charlotte. For the low-income neighborhoods of 
Cleveland, the probability of housing turnover in the outer ring was 33.3 percent less 
than the control area before LIHTC housing. However, after the LIHTC projects are 
developed in the immediate and functional neighborhoods, the probabilities of housing 
turnover were about 1.8 times and 2.0 times greater than it was for those in the control 
area, respectively. 
 
Table 20. Results in Middle-income Neighborhoods 
Variables 
Middle-income Submarkets,  
Charlotte 
 Middle-income Submarkets, 
 Cleveland 
Coefficient z-score Hazard  Ratio 
 Coefficient z-score Hazard  Ratio 
Sales Price (Standardized) 0.296***  15.38  1.345   -1.802***   -16.45  0.165  
Sales Price2 (Standardized) -0.013***  -6.08  0.987   0.425***   7.21  1.530  
Pre-impact 0-500 feet -0.317  -1.17  0.728   -0.659***   -3.68  0.517  
Post-impact 0-500 feet 0.510*  1.86  1.665   0.632***   3.30  1.881  
Pre-impact 500-2,000 feet -0.204  -1.28  0.815   -0.577***   -6.86  0.562  
Post-impact 500-2,000 feet 0.250***  2.51  1.284   0.612***   8.06  1.844  
No. of LIHTC Units 0.001  0.42  1.001   0.000  -0.58  1.000  
Park within 250 feet 0.124***  4.23  1.131   0.204***  2.47  1.227  
River/Lake within 500 feet - - -   0.924***   8.28  2.518  
X, Y Coordinates (CBD) Yes  Yes 
Census Tract Fixed Effects Yes  Yes 
Number of Observations 25,052  7,702 
Log likelihood -144832.22  -32127.007 
Likelihood ratio 𝜒2 1,471.60***  1,152.49*** 
***Denotes a 1% significance level; **denotes a 5% significance level; *denotes a 10% significance level 
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In the middle-income neighborhoods of Charlotte and Cleveland, the results were 
generally consistent among key variables (see Table 20). For the middle-income 
submarket in Charlotte, the sign of hazard coefficients for housing property values 
showed in the opposite direction. For every additional one unit in the annual average 
price ratio, the probability of housing turnover is increased by 34.5 percent, but the 
marginal effect decreased by 1.3 percent as the annual price ratio increased. 
The post-impact variables show that the probability of selling properties was 
higher after the LIHTC projects were completed in both cities. For Charlotte, the 
presence of LIHTC developments within the properties’ immediate neighborhood or 
inner ring resulted in about a 1.7 times higher chance of housing turnover, and 
developments within the properties’ functional neighborhood or outer ring resulted in a 
28.4 percent higher probability of turnover. The pre-impact variables were not 
statistically significant for Charlotte, although the coefficient maintained the same sign 
as other models. For Cleveland, the pre-impact variables showed a negative hazard 
coefficient, indicating that the probability of housing turnover was lower compared to 
control sales before the LIHTC subsidized housing was sited within the properties’ 
microneighborhoods. However, after the LIHTC projects were developed, the 
probability of housing turnover was 88.1 percent higher within immediate 
neighborhoods and 84.4 percent higher within functional neighborhoods. 
These results show that the likelihood of housing turnover in middle-income 
neighborhoods in both cities is sensitive to the influx of LIHTC subsidized households 
into microneighborhoods. This implies that spillover effects are consistent in the middle-
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income submarket regardless of differences in housing market conditions (i.e., hot and 
cold markets). 
 
Table 21. Results in High-income Neighborhoods 
Variables 
High-income Submarkets,  
Charlotte 
 High-income Submarkets,  
Cleveland 
Coefficient z-score Hazard  Ratio 
 Coefficient z-score Hazard  Ratio 
Sales Price (Standardized) -0.388***  -22.56  0.679   -1.890***  -15.65  0.151  
Sales Price2 (Standardized) 0.029***  18.43  1.030   0.432***  10.13  1.541  
Pre-impact 0-500 feet -0.919***  -2.89  0.399   0.102  0.26  1.107  
Post-impact 0-500 feet 0.897***  2.71  2.452   0.654*  1.74  1.923  
Pre-impact 500-2,000 feet -1.033***  -5.53  0.356   0.705***  3.39  2.023  
Post-impact 500-2,000 feet 0.373***  2.77  1.452   -0.049  -0.32  0.952  
No. of LIHTC Units 0.004***  4.12  1.004   -0.009***  -4.33  0.991  
Park within 250 feet 0.022  0.52  1.022   0.024  0.30  1.025  
River/Lake within 500 feet - - -  1.366***  12.64  3.919  
X, Y Coordinates (CBD) Yes  Yes 
Census Tract Fixed Effects Yes  Yes 
Number of Observations 25,226  9,924 
Log likelihood -142641.2  -26781.558 
Likelihood ratio 𝜒2 1,269.10***  843.61*** 
***Denotes a 1% significance level; **denotes a 5% significance level; *denotes a 10% significance level 
 
Table 21 shows the results for high income neighborhoods in Charlotte and 
Cleveland. For the high-income submarket in Charlotte, the coefficients for property 
values showed that the probability of housing turnover was non-linear. For every one 
unit increase in the annual price ratio, the probability of housing turnover is reduced by 
32.1 percent, but the marginal effect increased by 3.0 percent as the annual price ratio 
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increased. It is notable that the hazard of housing turnover increased dramatically within 
the inner ring after the LIHTC was developed. Before the development of LIHTC 
projects, the probability of turnover was 60.1 percent lower than for control sales in the 
immediate neighborhood. After the introduction of subsidized housing, however, the 
probability of housing turnover was about 2.45 times greater than the control area. In 
addition, the probability of housing turnover in functional neighborhoods was 64.4 
percent less than that for control sales, before LIHTC was introduced, and 45.2 percent 
higher than control sales after LIHTC was developed. In sum, the spillover effects on 
housing turnovers were much more substantial at closer proximities to LIHTC units after 
LIHTC projects were developed. Size effects of LIHTC developments were also 
statistically significant, although the magnitude of this impact was not substantial. A 
one-unit increase in the number of LIHTC projects at the time of sale resulted only in a 
0.4 percent higher chance of housing turnover, ceteris paribus, in the high-income 
neighborhoods of Charlotte. 
The results from the city of Cleveland tell a different story than those of 
Charlotte. The coefficients for property values, like those in Charlotte, showed that the 
probability of housing turnover was non-linear; for every additional one unit in the 
annual average price ratio, the probability of housing turnover was reduced by 84.9 
percent, but this marginal effect increased by 54.1 percent as the annual average price 
ratio increased. Also, after the LIHTC was developed within immediate neighborhoods, 
the probability of housing turnover was about 92.3 percent higher than the control area. 
However, this impact was only statistically significant at the 90 percent level. The 
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probability of selling properties within functional neighborhoods after the LIHTC 
development was not statistically significant in the high-income neighborhoods of 
Cleveland. Interestingly, building more units in LIHTC developments appears to 
decrease the effects, although the magnitude of this size impact is not substantial; a one-
unit increase in the number of LIHTC units at the time of sale results in only a 0.9 
percent lower chance of housing turnover, ceteris paribus.  
In sum, the results for the high-income submarket show that in Charlotte, high-
income residents are sensitive to the influx of LIHTC households into neighborhoods, 
particularly into the immediate neighborhood. However, the introduction of LIHTC 
developments only appears to have a significant impact within the immediate 
neighborhood for the high-income submarket in Cleveland. Size effects of LIHTC 
developments showed that the project size was directly related to housing turnover rates 
in Charlotte, while that was inversely related to housing turnover rates in Cleveland. 
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CHAPTER VII  
CONCLUSIONS 
 
7.1 Subsidized Households in the Vicious Circle of Residential Segregation and 
Inequality 
This study conceptualized, through simple bivariate analyses, the relationship 
between the LIHTC projects and the sociodemographic conditions of neighborhoods 
where projects were developed. The findings showed that the LIHTC program might 
perpetuate the uneven geography of opportunities through the concentration of 
disadvantages. The results demonstrated that LIHTC projects were more likely to be 
developed in neighborhoods with relatively high percentages of poor households, 
minorities, and unemployment. Furthermore, they were also likely to be sited in tracts 
with relatively low-housing values, low-income, and less educated populations. Current 
patterns of LIHTC developments due to NIMBY attitudes have contributed to the 
residential segregation of subsidized households.  
As the major supply-based project for producing affordable housing units, the 
LIHTC program can be a critical tool in the U.S. for the distribution of housing to 
achieve better social and economic opportunities (Van Zandt & Mhatre, 2009). Because 
the LIHTC developments involve a state-level planning process through the 
development of Qualified Allocation Plans (QAPs) by state housing finance agencies 
(HFAs), the LIHTC program allows even states without federal mandated planning or 
consistent requirements to consider the distribution of subsidized housing units within 
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and across state areas (Van Zandt & Mhatre, 2009). Despite these flexibilities of the 
program to contribute to poverty deconcentration and dispersal, current development 
patterns of the LIHTC program has exacerbated disparity in social and economic 
opportunities for subsidized households by promoting the isolation of the least 
advantaged groups in undesirable neighborhoods.  
Although the results of this study may not be generalizable to other U.S. cities 
since study areas are limited to only two cities, many previous studies provided 
empirical evidence that LIHTC projects across the country are developed in undesirable 
neighborhoods. Previous research has demonstrated that the LIHTC units are highly 
clustered in heavily urbanized areas (Van Zandt & Mhatre, 2009). Also, these clusters 
are strongly related to higher levels of the disadvantaged, especially in terms of high 
poverty, minorities, and inferior education opportunities (Van Zandt & Mhatre, 2009). 
Even though the LIHTC program is relatively more successful than other subsidized 
housing programs (i.e., public housing and HCV) at locating units in suburbs (McClure, 
2006), a large number of LIHTC units is still located in undesirable neighborhoods such 
as central cities (Freeman, 2004). Moreover, LIHTC neighborhoods remain 
disadvantaged, especially in terms of higher poverty rates, lower median incomes, and 
lower median house values, compared to other metropolitan neighborhoods (Freeman, 
2004).  
By targeting undesirable neighborhoods due to NIMBYism, LIHTC 
developments have contributed to residential segregation (Rohe & Freeman, 2001). 
Furthermore, residential segregation that stemmed from NIMBY opposition may 
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perpetuate inequitable opportunities for subsidized households by pushing them into a 
vicious circle of residential segregation and inequality. First, restriction of spatial 
location of LIHTC developments due to residential segregation means that subsidized 
households are isolated from mainstream social and economic opportunities. To be more 
specific, subsidized households face obstacles for accessing opportunities for good 
education, employment, and safety from crime. Second, lack of access to opportunities 
for a quality education, high-paying jobs, and safety limits the opportunities for wealth 
accumulation. In reverse, the disparity in wealth causes exposure to poor education 
quality, inadequate access to jobs, and high crime rates, especially in terms of the spatial 
location of the least advantaged groups. The wealth disparities of subsidized households 
might leave them as disadvantaged, underserved, and marginalized populations. Last, 
deprivation of social and economic opportunities for upward mobility is accelerated by 
poverty concentration due to interaction and clustering effects. 
In sum, the interrelated associations among residential segregation, poverty 
concentration, and deprivation of social and economic opportunities for subsidized 
households is mutual and bidirectional and makes social inequality worse. Residential 
segregation intensifies concentrated poverty, and these interacting forces prevent 
subsidized households from accessing social and economic opportunities for upward 
mobility. Conversely, lack of social and economic opportunities translates into 
residential segregation. Hence, subsidized households suffer from a vicious circle of 
residential segregation and inequality.  
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7.2 Impacts of the LIHTC Developments on Neighborhoods 
This study examined empirical evidence for the NIMBY perception on 
subsidized developments, especially exploring the impacts of subsidized housing 
programs on 1) nearby property values and 2) neighborhood stability (housing turnovers) 
in two cities: Charlotte, North Carolina and Cleveland, Ohio. Major findings for two 
empirical analyses are summarized below in Table 22.  
 
Table 22. Results on Property Values and Neighborhood Stability 
Variables 
Charlotte  Cleveland 
Property Values Stability  Property Values Stability 
Citywide Results      
Immediate Neighborhoods  
(0-500 feet) - Negative  - Negative 
Functional Neighborhoods  
(500-2,000 feet) Negative Negative  Positive Negative 
Low-income Submarkets      
Immediate Neighborhoods  
(0-500 feet) - -  - Negative 
Functional Neighborhoods   
(500-2,000 feet) - Negative  Positive Negative 
Middle-income Submarkets      
Immediate Neighborhoods  
(0-500 feet) Negative Negative  - Negative 
Functional Neighborhoods   
(500-2,000 feet) Negative Negative  - Negative 
High-income Submarkets      
Immediate Neighborhoods  
(0-500 feet) - Negative  Positive Negative 
Functional Neighborhoods  
(500-2,000 feet) Negative Negative  - - 
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I first present the results for exploring the relationships between the LIHTC 
developments and neighboring housing prices. Citywide results suggested that the 
impacts of LIHTC developments varied across local housing market conditions. The 
developments of LIHTC projects had a negative impact on surrounding housing prices in 
the city of Charlotte. In contrast, LIHTC developments positively affected nearby 
property values in the city of Cleveland.  
For Charlotte, the housing price level was lower compared to that of control sales 
after controlling for pre-existing housing price levels prior to LIHTC developments. 
These results are consistent with those found by Lee, Culhane, and Wachter (1999) in 
their research conducted for Philadelphia. However, the spillover effect was only 
significant within the properties’ functional neighborhoods, and not within immediate 
neighborhoods. No statistically significant impacts within immediate neighborhoods 
might stem from the lack of variation of impact sales that is needed to explain the effect 
of this variable. Interestingly, the results for the Cleveland housing market tell a different 
story than those for Charlotte. After the LIHTC projects were developed in 
microneighborhoods, the housing price levels were higher compared to control sales. 
This implies that LIHTC developments generate upgrading effects in depressed housing 
market conditions. These positive effects might be related to the removal of disamenities. 
Specifically, LIHTC developments in urban neighborhoods may replace disamenties 
such as dilapidated and abandoned buildings, as well as other eyesores that reduce 
surrounding housing prices (Schwartz, Ellen, Voicu, & Schill, 2006). Furthermore, 
subsidized housing developments can be regarded as a tool for community revitalization. 
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Thus, these community developments might create positive external effects in the 
depressed housing market conditions. However, these upgrading effects were only 
significant within functional neighborhoods, like those in Charlotte.  
The results also showed that the impacts of LIHTC projects vary across different 
housing submarkets. It is worth noting that spillover effects in low-income 
neighborhoods were not statistically significant in Charlotte. In addition, the results for 
the low-income submarkets in Cleveland showed that positive impacts due to LIHTC 
developments were only significant within the properties’ functional neighborhoods, and 
not within immediate neighborhoods. This finding might lead to several possible 
conclusions. First, tenant characteristics between subsidized housing and non-subsidized 
housing may not be as noticeable in low-income submarkets. Thus, the response to the 
influx of LIHTC households into microneighborhoods might not be as sensitive in low-
income submarkets compared to other neighborhoods. Second, low-income neighbors 
may have less information or lack awareness about the introduction of LIHTC 
households, due to lower education or income level (Kobie & Lee, 2011). Third, real 
estate agents may be less willing to provide this information to low-income neighbors 
and may not want to exert the same level of effort for low income clients compared to 
others due to the differences in commission (Galster, 1987; Kobie & Lee, 2011). Finally, 
even though LIHTC developments regarded as the tool for eliminating of disamenties 
might positively affect nearby property values, especially in the city of Cleveland, these 
upgrading effects may not be an impetus to significantly increased housing prices in 
low-income submarkets.  
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The findings for middle-income submarkets showed that spillover effects were 
significant in both immediate as well as functional neighborhoods for Charlotte. The 
influx of LIHTC subsidized households negatively affects surrounding housing prices 
under hot housing market conditions. Interestingly, the size effects of LIHTC projects 
were positive for middle-income submarkets in Charlotte. This implies that some degree 
of larger projects might mitigate the negative effects of LIHTC developments. The 
influx of subsidized households into neighborhoods contributes to housing price 
decreases, but larger projects rather than smaller projects may alleviate housing price 
decreases due to the removal of disamenities in middle-income neighborhoods of 
Charlotte. However, the impacts of LIHTC developments in middle-income 
neighborhoods were not statistically significant in the city of Cleveland, although the 
coefficient maintained the same sign (positive impacts) as the Cleveland citywide results. 
The result for Cleveland middle-income submarkets might lead to possible conclusions 
in two ways. First, the LIHTC developments in Cleveland might not generate upgrading 
(or negative) effects in middle-income neighborhoods based on my results. This study 
stratified Cleveland neighborhoods by comparing a neighborhoods’ median family 
income to the city’s median family income, and then we identified the middle-income 
neighborhoods in Cleveland. However, fundamentally, the city of Cleveland fully 
consists of poor neighborhoods compared to the metropolitan area. If we classified 
Cleveland neighborhoods by Cuyahoga County’s median family income, we would see 
that the city of Cleveland has a higher proportion of low-income neighborhoods 
compared to the suburbs (See Figure 14). To be specific, of 192 census tracts in 
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Cleveland, around 87 percent (167 census tracts) are low-income neighborhoods and 12 
percent (23 census tracts) are middle-income neighborhoods. This implies that middle-
income submarkets in Cleveland defined by the city’s median family income are 
inherently poor neighborhoods compared to Cuyahoga County. Thus, similar to the 
results for low-income submarkets, small discrepancies in characteristics between 
subsidized housing and non-subsidized housing tenants might be a reason for the 
insignificant impacts of LIHTC developments in Cleveland middle-income 
neighborhoods. In addition, upgrading effects due to eliminating of disamentieis may not 
be a significant reason to affect housing prices in the middle-income neighborhoods. 
Second, it is worthy to note that the R2 for the middle-income neighborhoods in 
Cleveland was lower than that for other models such as models for low- and high-
income submarkets. Given the homogeneity of the neighborhood characteristics within 
middle-income neighborhoods, it is not surprising that many of the independent 
variables were not significant in the results. This implies that the model may not explain 
the variance in the property values completely using the variables included. Lack of 
variations in explanatory variables may not account for the effects of LIHTC 
developments, especially in middle-income neighborhoods of Cleveland.  
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Figure 14. Neighborhood Stratifications by Cuyahoga County Median Family Income 
 
The results for high-income submarkets suggested that the LIHTC projects had 
negative impacts on neighboring property values in Charlotte, while they had upgrading 
effects in Cleveland. The negative impacts due to LIHTC developments in Charlotte 
were only significant within the properties’ functional neighborhoods, and not within 
immediate neighborhoods. This result for Charlotte might stem from a small variation of 
impact sales within immediate neighborhoods. Interestingly, the results for Cleveland 
showed strong positive impacts in immediate neighborhoods. These high upgrading 
effects in housing prices after the completion of LIHTC developments within immediate 
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neighborhoods of properties implies that LIHTC developments might be deemed as 
projects for community revitalization in depressed housing market conditions. In 
addition, the response to the removal of disamenities such as an abandoned building or a 
littered vacant lot might be more sensitive in high-income submarkets.  
I last present the results for examining the associations between the LIHTC 
developments and neighborhood stability, especially in terms of housing turnover. The 
citywide results suggest that LIHTC developments generated significant spillover effects 
undermining neighborhood stability in the cities of Charlotte and Cleveland. These 
results are consistent with those found by Baum-Snow and Marion (2009). However, my 
study circumstantiated spillover effects of LIHTC more precisely because this study 
used parcel-level sales transaction data whereas previous studies only utilized spatially 
aggregate census data. The probability of housing turnover was higher than that of 
control sales after controlling for pre-existing turnover levels prior to LIHTC 
construction. The spillover effects were generally consistent in both the Charlotte and 
Cleveland housing markets. Although the completion of LIHTC projects encouraged 
higher housing turnover, housing prices appear to have a more influential role in 
determining housing turnover in Cleveland, which may be due to its depressed housing 
market conditions. 
The findings also showed that the impacts of LIHTC developments vary across 
different housing submarkets. The results for high-income submarkets suggested strong 
negative impacts in immediate neighborhoods, especially in Charlotte. Exceptionally 
high housing turnover after the completion of LIHTC developments within immediate 
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neighborhoods of properties implies that neighbor attitudes about the entrance of LIHTC 
households would be more sensitive in high-income submarkets. It is also noteworthy 
that size effects of LIHTC developments were only significant in high-income 
submarkets of both cities. This signifies that high-income neighbors may be sensitive to 
the project size of developments. Building more units in LIHTC projects stimulated 
rapid housing turnovers in Charlotte, while increases in LIHTC units mitigated spillover 
effects of LIHTC developments in Cleveland. This implies that although the LIHTC 
developments accelerated housing turnover in both cities, larger projects rather than 
smaller projects in depressed housing market conditions like Cleveland might mitigate 
rapid housing turnovers due to the removal of disamenities such as dilapidated buildings 
and other eyesores. The results for middle-income submarkets showed that spillover 
effects were significant in both immediate as well as functional neighborhoods for both 
cities, with the influx of LIHTC subsidized households stimulating high housing 
turnovers in middle-income neighborhoods under both depressed and hot housing 
market conditions. Particularly, the probability of housing turnover was significantly 
higher when LIHTC units were developed within the immediate neighborhood of each 
property. Interestingly, the findings for the low-income submarkets in Charlotte showed 
that housing turnovers due to LIHTC completion were only significant within the 
properties’ functional neighborhoods, and not within immediate neighborhoods. This 
finding might lead to several possible conclusions, similar to the results of previous 
analyses exploring the relationships between the LIHTC developments and nearby 
property values for low-income submarkets. Because of small discrepancies of tenant 
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characteristics between subsidized households and non-subsidized households, the 
response to the influx of LIHTC households into immediate neighborhoods might not be 
as sensitive in low-income submarkets compared to other neighborhoods. In addition, 
lack of information and awareness about the entrance of LIHTC households due to the 
lower education or income level of neighbors, as well as the unfavorable information of 
real estate agents might result in insignificant impacts of LIHTC developments within 
low-income submarkets (Galster, 1987; Kobie & Lee, 2011).  
 
7.3 Policy Implications 
The study supported findings that the influx of subsidized households into 
neighborhoods leads to higher housing turnover in both Charlotte and Cleveland. 
Increasing rates of housing turnover may indicate neighborhood instability. Rapid 
turnover may restrict social ties among neighbors and contribute to the breakdown of 
informal social control (Ross, Reynolds, & Geis, 2000; Sampson, 1985; Sampson & 
Groves, 1989). The flow of residents in and out of neighborhoods responding to the 
entrance of LIHTC developments might undermine social integration by depriving 
residents of the opportunities to know each other, share norms, and sustain neighborhood 
networks. In addition, neighborhood instability may increase crime and other social 
pathologies within the neighborhood (Ross, Reynolds, & Geis, 2000). Many studies 
support the notion that neighborhood instability is strongly related to high levels of 
crime, violent victimization and delinquency (Crutchfield, Geerken, & Gove, 1982; 
Sampson, 1985). Moreover, there is growing concern about neighborhood instability 
 149 
 
when it is linked to the economic context of the neighborhood, especially in terms of 
poverty and income. The concurrence of high poverty levels and neighborhood 
instability may exacerbate neighborhood violent crime (Smith & Jarjoura, 1988). My 
results raise concerns about high rates of housing turnover in response to the 
development of LIHTC subsidized housing. Moreover, the fact that subsidized housing 
tends to be located in disadvantaged neighborhoods due to NIMBY behavior stimulates 
concerns about the exacerbation of neighborhood instability. This suggests that existing 
conditions related to neighborhood stability should be considered when placing LIHTC 
units in neighborhoods, and these conditions should be monitored in neighborhoods with 
LIHTC housing. Cities need to monitor stability within neighborhoods and ensure that 
increased turnover does not lead to additional destabilization in terms of property 
maintenance and upkeep. This may include the implementation of programs designed to 
ease the transition of new residents into the neighborhood. 
When it comes to establishing the relationship between the developments of 
LIHTC subsidized housing and nearby property values, the impacts of LIHTC 
developments showed a contrast between different housing market conditions (i.e., hot 
or cold market). Charlotte, being a hot housing market, the influx of LIHTC subsidized 
households did lead to lower property values. However, a larger size of LIHTC 
developments mitigated those spillover effects, especially in the middle-income 
neighborhoods. Cleveland, being a depressed housing market, the predominant impact of 
LIHTC developments was an upgrading effect on nearby property values. These results 
showed that the impacts of LIHTC developments vary according to the local housing 
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market conditions. The LIHTC developments may generate a negative impact on 
surrounding property values, especially in the hot housing market condition. Because 
LIHTC subsidized units are almost always occupied by households below the 30th 
percentile of income distribution, neighbors regard the developments of LIHTC units as 
the influx of undesirables into neighborhoods. However, new LIHTC units may also 
represent amenity improvement by replacing dilapidated buildings and unsightly lots in 
the depressed housing market condition (Baum-Snow & Marion, 2009). These positive 
impacts for the removal of disamenities were strong in high-income neighborhoods in 
depressed housing markets.  
The LIHTC developments caused high housing turnover and housing price 
decline in the hot housing market while contributing to high housing turnover and 
housing price increases in the depressed housing market. Based on the results of the 
study to explore the change in property values as well as housing turnover due to the 
LIHTC developments, we may identify the change in a neighborhood’s socioeconomic 
characteristics as filtering down or gentrification. Based on the results for high housing 
turnover due to the LIHTC developments, the socioeconomic characteristics of new 
neighborhoods might be capitalized into housing prices (Baum-Snow & Marion, 2009). 
Negative spillover effects of LIHTC projects on housing prices may signify the influx of 
lower-income residents (filtering down). In contrast, positive spillover effects on 
property values may indicate the influx of wealthier residents into neighborhoods. These 
neighborhood changes following the LIHTC developments in a depressed housing 
market may indicate displacement of lower income residents by higher income 
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populations. The trend might be referred to as neighborhood gentrification. However, the 
definition of gentrification is complicated and even the basic definition and perspectives 
on gentrification are highly controversial among scholars; neighborhoods are gentrified 
due to some development patterns in lower income neighborhoods that result in higher 
rents and property values, and then, the increasing property values displaces many 
existing residents in lower income areas by making the area unaffordable (Lang, 1982). 
In addition, my results cannot identify whether or not the displacees make only short 
moves and thus remain in or near their original neighborhood (Lang, 1982). If the 
displacees remain in or near their original neighborhood, it might be difficult to regard 
this pattern as neighborhood gentrification. Hence, we could not make an impetuous 
decision about whether or not the neighborhoods where subsidized housing units are 
developed are “gentrified” due to the LIHTC developments. However, according to the 
results of this study, even with minimal insight one can conclude that the LIHTC 
developments positively affect nearby property values in the depressed housing market, 
whereas they negatively affect neighboring housing prices in the hot housing market 
condition. These results implied that the LIHTC program may be implemented to 
revitalize or stimulate deteriorated areas, especially in the depressed housing market. 
There is, however, growing concern about current implementation of the LIHTC 
program. Current development patterns of LIHTC units have shown uneven geography 
of opportunity. The program has exacerbated disparity in social and economic 
opportunities for subsidized households by pushing them into the vicious circle of 
residential segregation and inequality. Current LIHTC regulations implemented by state 
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agencies overlook the issue of the concentration of subsidized households in undesirable 
neighborhoods. The lack of attention to this peculiar spatial pattern of LIHTC 
developments causes a serious gap in the federal effort to guard against residential 
segregation (Rohe & Freeman, 2001). Hence, this study suggests that the LIHTC 
program should be improved as a tool for the equitable redistribution of socioeconomic 
opportunities as well as the revitalization of neighborhoods. First, the LIHTC 
developments need to put a great deal of their effort into dispersing, rather than 
concentrating, subsidized housing units (Van Zandt & Mhatre, 2009). However, HUD’s 
use of Qualified Census Tracts (QCTs) for identifying Difficult Development Areas 
(DDAs) may be related to the uneven geography of opportunities for subsidized 
households (Rohe & Freeman, 2001; Van Zandt & Mhatre, 2009). LIHTC developments 
in QCTs, which include tracts in which at least half of the households have incomes 
below 60 percent of area median income, allow developers to be paid larger tax credits. 
Specifically, if the LIHTC projects are developed in QCTs, the developer receives a 
“basis boost” of 130 percent (Schwartz, 2010). Even though the designation of QCTs 
contributes to the siting of LIHTC projects in places where the market might not 
normally support it, QCTs may cause the concentration of the disadvantaged in 
undesirable neighborhoods (Oakley, 2008; Rohe & Freeman, 2001; Van Zandt & Mhatre, 
2009). Hence, the LIHTC program, as a dispersal tool, needs to be encouraged to 
develop in unaffordable markets (Van Zandt & Mhatre, 2009). 
Second, the income-mixing between LIHTC developments and neighborhoods 
need to be facilitated to achieve the equitable redistribution of socioeconomic 
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opportunities and to stimulate the revitalization of neighborhoods. Although the program 
was designed to facilitate mixing of incomes, in practice nearly 85 percent of all units 
developed through 2002 were low-income (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, 2005). Also, my study showed that LIHTC subsidized households are 
more likely to be located in neighborhoods with relatively high percentages of poor and 
low-income populations. Hence, tax credit regulations may be adjusted to produce 
affordable housing units where they are really needed (Van Zandt & Mhatre, 2009). Also, 
housing market conditions may be considered to distribute affordable housing units. 
Depressed housing markets need new units to revitalize communities and upgrade the 
housing stock, whereas hot housing markets (and high-income submarkets) need to be 
more accessible to low-income households (Van Zandt & Mhatre, 2009). According to 
the results of this study, LIHTC developments had strong upgrading effects in housing 
prices, due to the removal of disamenties in high-income neighborhoods of depressed 
housing market conditions. In addition, even in middle-income neighborhoods of hot 
housing market conditions, larger projects rather than smaller projects may mitigate the 
negative impacts of LIHTC developments. Thus, tax credit regulations might discourage 
a large proportion of LIHTC units from being located in disadvantaged neighborhoods to 
promote the deconcentration (Van Zandt & Mhatre, 2009). In contrast, LIHTC units 
need to be located in affluent neighborhoods to promote income-mixing and economic 
integration (Van Zandt & Mhatre, 2009). These suggestions on the locations of LIHTC 
units do not mean to proscribe the LIHTC developments in disadvantaged 
neighborhoods because it is not reasonable to expect that LIHTC developments are 
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evenly distributed across all neighborhood categories including different land values, 
residential environments, and community services (Rohe & Freeman, 2001). However, it 
is important for subsidized households to be provided a wider range of choices in 
residential opportunities. In addition, these approaches on siting of LIHTC developments 
might facilitate regional dispersal, achieve more equitable distributions of housing 
options for subsidized households, and ultimately sever the vicious circle of residential 
segregation and inequality for subsidized households.  
 
7.4 Study Limitations 
This dissertation has several limitations in terms of the issues on empirical 
methodologies and data sets. First, even though a large number of samples were used in 
this study, there were a small number of impact sales in immediate neighborhoods, 
especially in high-income submarkets. The lack of variation of impact sales associated 
with the LIHTC developments within 500 feet from single-family housing units is a 
principle problem in the empirical analyses of this study. In addition, a small variation of 
impact sales in high-income submarkets is associated with uneven geography of 
subsidized developments. Large numbers of LIHTC developments are more likely to be 
located in poor neighborhoods such as low- and middle-income submarkets rather than 
in wealthier neighborhoods. Hence, it is possible that potential positive or negative 
impacts of LIHTC developments might be missed, due to the lack of variation of impact 
sales that is needed to explain the effect of LIHTC projects.  
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Second, although the spatial fixed effect approach, especially in terms of using 
census tract fixed effects and geographic coordinates, partially accounts for spatial 
autocorrelation of the residuals, the imperfect control of the spatial autocorrelation might 
cause biased and/or inefficient estimates (Koschinsky, 2009).  
Third, when it comes to understanding the relationships between the LIHTC 
developments and neighborhood stability, the findings for this study was unable to 
identify housing turnover stratified by housing types such as owner-occupied and renter-
occupied units due to limitation in the data such as length of residence and 
distinguishing renters and homeowners. For example, housing turnovers in renter-
occupied units might be greater in low-income neighborhoods. However, according to 
the findings, one can show the change of neighbors in terms of housing turnover due to 
LIHTC developments, regardless of the vulnerability of neighborhood stability between 
renters and homeowners. In spite of the results of this study, it would be intriguing for 
future studies to examine the relationships between subsidized housing and housing 
turnovers classified by housing types.  
In addition, this study cannot identify multiple sales in a housing price between 
1996 and 2007. In the analysis for exploring the relationships between the LIHTC 
developments and housing turnover, housing sales were regarded as the hazard 
occurrence, and then the housing duration was measured with the duration between the 
first sale and the next sale (Kim & Horner, 2003). Thus, if some properties were sold 
multiple times after the second sale during the risk period (1996 to 2007), the empirical 
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model in this study did not specify these properties. This problem might under- or over-
estimate the impacts of LIHTC developments on neighborhood housing turnover.  
 
7.5 Directions for Further Studies 
Additional research is needed to understand better the conditions under which 
LIHTC developments may hurt or help neighborhoods. According to the Broken 
Windows Theory, individual perceptions on physical dilapidation stem from visual cues 
in communities (Massey & Denton, 1993). This paradigm implies that the visual design 
quality of subsidized housing might be a factor that affects neighborhoods. Schill and his 
colleagues (2002) have suggested that the design of developments may matter to the 
extent that the physical design is consistent with the neighborhood’s visual character, but 
little if any research exists to test this.  
The mixing of incomes within developments may need to be sensitive to the 
neighborhood context to help overcome concerns about the discrepancies between 
LIHTC residents and surrounding neighbors. HUD’s partnership with the American 
Institute for Architects (AIA) in developing the Affordable Housing Design Advisor 
(www.designadvisor.org) offers recommendations for maintaining massing, setback, and 
other land development regulations to ensure consistency. Other researchers suggest that 
LIHTC program should do a better job of income mixing (Van Zandt & Mhatre, 2009). 
Although the program was designed to facilitate mixing of incomes, in practice nearly 
85 percent of all units developed through 2002 were low-income (U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development, 2005). The mixing of incomes within developments 
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may need to be sensitive to the neighborhood context to help overcome concerns about 
the discrepancies between LIHTC residents and surrounding neighbors. At the very least, 
cities need to monitor stability within neighborhoods and ensure that increased turnover 
does not lead to additional destabilization in terms of neighborhood crime rates. This 
may include the implementation of programs designed to ease the transition of new 
residents into the neighborhood. 
The results on the studies on the cities of Charlotte and Cleveland suggest that 
the entrance of LIHTC developments may deteriorate neighborhood stability in terms of 
high rates of housing turnovers. Also, LIHTC developments may decrease housing 
prices in Charlotte and increase property values in Cleveland. However, it is possible 
that different subsidized housing programs, such as the HCV tenant-based subsidy 
program, might result in different spillover effects on neighborhoods. The HCV program, 
as a tenant-based subsidized housing program, in theory provides low-income families 
more flexibility in choices of locations as well as unit types (Van Zandt & Mhatre, 2013). 
The HCV program may help to deconcentrate income and racial segregation. Also, one 
primary characteristic of the HCV program compared to supply-based subsidized 
housing programs is that neighbors may not be as aware of the influx of HCV tenants 
into neighborhoods because there are no visual cues (Nguyen, 2005). In these contexts, 
the anticipated impact of the HCV program may be different due to the type of 
subsidized housing program. Thus, an extension of the study on the association between 
the HCV program and neighborhoods, compared with my results, would provide 
revealing insights into studies on spillover effects of subsidized housing programs. 
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While the results of this study are robust, I caution that the results may not be 
generalizable to other U.S. cities since the study examines only two U.S. cities. 
Additionally, although this study described Charlotte and Cleveland as having hot and 
depressed housing markets, respectively, these two cities may not be representative of 
housing market conditions in other cities due to the unique characteristics of each city. 
Thus, I suggest that future studies should further examine the association between 
neighborhoods and subsidized housing programs by exploring other cities, other housing 
market conditions, and other types of subsidized programs. 
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APPENDIX A: COX HAZARD MODEL WITH TIME-VARYING INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES: EPISODE SPLITTING 
 
Extended cox hazard model can easily control time-varying independent 
variables using episode splitting. In our empirical models, post-impact variables were 
treated as time-varying covariates because the LIHTC project can be developed with the 
housing duration between the first sale and the next sale of a property. In this situation, 
the hazard data set was reorganized to incorporate time-varying covariates using episode 
splitting (Alisson, 2004). For instance, consider a property i with two different values for 
a covariate (Xn: post-impact variable). 
1
2
0 if 
1 if 
= <
= ≥
X t u
X t u
 
where u is the completion date of LIHTC developments, t is the date of sales, and Ti is 
the survival time. 
 
Table A-1. Example of Episode Splitting 
Record No. Event (Sales Occurrence) Survival Time Entry Time 
Post-impact Vari
ables 
Data Record for Property i (Before Episode Splitting) 
1 1 T i 0 - 
     
Data Record for Property i (After Episode Splitting) 
1 0 u 0 X1 (=0) 
2 1 T i u X2 (=1) 
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As seen in Table A-1, after episode splitting, the survival time (episode) for a 
property i was split into two sub-periods (Jenkins, 2005). Also, in the first episode, the 
post-impact variable takes on the value X1, and in the second episode, the post-impact 
variable takes on the value X2. This transformation of the hazard data set that is episode 
splitting was used to account for the cases that LIHTC projects were developed between 
the first sale and the next sale of properties. 
 
